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Nederlandstalige
samenvatting
Dit doctoraatsproefschrift is een verzameling van vijf essays die bijdragen
leveren tot de literatuur rond alternatieve beleggingen. Hoewel elk van de
hoofdstukken grotendeels op zichzelf staat, is er desondanks een duidelijke
rode draad doorheen de verschillende hoofdstukken. Het is namelijk zo dat
elk van de hoofdstukken verband houdt met specifieke beleggingsstrate-
gieën en een fondsenindustrie (`Managed Futures' of `Commodity Trading
Advisors') die dit soort strategieën in de praktijk toepast.
In het eerste hoofdstuk onderzoeken we de kostenstructuur van Man-
aged Futures fondsen en hefboomfondsen in het algemeen. We bekijken
de typische kostenstructuur van hefboomfondsen, welke inhoudt dat de
fondsbeheerder 2% beheerskosten per jaar aanrekent en een prestatiever-
goeding gelijk aan 20% van de gerealiseerde meerwaarde. In dit hoofd-
stuk onderzoeken we een andere dimensie van deze kostenstructuur. Er
is namelijk ook een belangrijke tijdsdimensie verbonden met het aanreke-
nen van de prestatievergoeding, welke varieert over verschillende fondsen.
Deze verborgen dimensie van de kostenstructuur, genaamd de `crystalliza-
tion frequency', heeft een economisch significante invloed op de kosten die
beleggers betalen.
In hoofdstuk twee onderzoeken we de implicaties van lage maar per-
sistente autocorrelatie in de maandelijkse rendementen van Managed Fu-
tures fondsen voor portefeuillebeheer. We argumenteren dat de geob-
serveerde autocorrelatie wellicht niet het resultaat is van illiquiditeit in de
onderliggende posities, gezien de liquiditeit van de effecten die Managed
Futures fondsen verhandelen. In de plaats daarvan hypothetiseren we dat
deze autocorrelatie consistent is met een strategie die vaak kleine verliezen
incasseert en occasioneel grote winsten genereert. We bevestigen deze hy-
pothese empirisch en tonen aan dat de positieve autocorrelatie consistent
is met het divergent risicogedrag van trendvolgende strategieën. We to-
nen verder ook aan dat Managed Futures fondsen die positieve autocorre-
latie vertonen beter presteren dan fondsen met negatieve autocorrelatie.
Het geobserveerd rendement kan wellicht niet verklaard worden door een
concentratie in bepaalde strategieën, grootte en leeftijd van de fondsen,
en vertekeningen in de dataset. Bovendien heeft positieve autocorrelatie
geen negatieve impact op de diversificatievoordelen van Managed Futures
fondsen.
Het derde hoofdstuk focust op een trendvolgende strategie in de con-
text van high-frequency data. We onderzoeken met name de mogelijke
oorzaken van een fenomeen dat bekend staat als `intraday momentum',
welke gedefinieerd wordt als een significant positief verband tussen het
rendement in het eerste half uur van de handelsdag en rendement in het
laatste half uur van de handelsdag. Met behulp van transactie-level data
van de Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange (MICEX) voor het Russis-
che Roebel-Amerikaanse Dollar over de periode 2005-2014 analyseren we
de door de literatuur voorgestelde mogelijke oorzaken. Onze resultaten
suggereren dat, voor de periode 2005-2014, intraday momentum in de
Roebelmarket wellicht het gevolg is van risicoaversie onder marktmakers
voor het aanhouden van posities buiten de handelsuren. Onze resultaten
bevestigen verder ook eerdere bevindingen die suggereren dat expliciete
handelsuren van belang zijn voor intraday momentum en dat het effect
sterker is tijdens crisissen.
In het vierde hoofdstuk dragen we bij tot de literatuur rond de market
timing. We onderzoeken, aan de hand van vertrouwelijke data voorzien
door RPM Risk & Portfolio Management, of Managed Futures fondsen
in staat zijn trends in financiële markten te anticiperen. We verbeteren
de bestaande methodologie en gebruiken data van een hogere frequentie
om de analyse uit te voeren, en vinden dat Managed Futures fondsen
inderdaad een significant market timing talent hebben.
In hoofdstuk vijf proberen we de strategieën die Managed Futures
fondsen gebruiken, te ontrafelen. Aan de hand van data met betrekking
tot de financiële derivaten die deze fondsen verhandelen, implementeren
we een trendvolgende strategie. In dit hoofdstuk proberen we dus de
vertrouwelijke modellen gebruikt door deze fondsen zo nauw mogelijk te
repliceren. Hierbij combineren we handelssignalen over een groot aantal
tijdsbestekken om op die manier de sterkte van een trend te incorporeren
in het beleggingsproces. We tonen aan dat de voorgestelde strategie de
kenmerken van Managed Futures fondsen goed repliceert. De door ons
voorgestelde strategie is bijgevolg een goede maatstaf voor het analyseren
van kandidaat-fondsen.

Chapter 1
Crystallization  the
Hidden Dimension of
CTAs' Fee Struture
1
Finanial Analysts Journal
July/August 2015, Vol. 71, No. 4: 5162.
1.1 Introdution
The impat of the two omponents of hedge funds' and Commodity Trad-
ing Advisors' (CTAs) fee struture, the inentive fee and the high-water
mark lause, on hedge fund behavior has been disussed extensively in the
aademi literature. Espeially their eet on fund managers' risk-taking
behavior has reeived onsiderable attention.
2
However, the fee struture
also has more diret onsequenes for investors, apart from hanging the
risk prole of the investment. Fees impat long-term wealth and investors
are more and more starting to realize this, not in the least beause of the
urrent low yield environment. Consequently, hedge funds' fees are now
subjet to loser srutiny and are negotiated more often than in the past.
1
This hapter is based on joint work with John Sjödin (RPM Risk & Portfolio
Management and Ghent University) and Mihael Frömmel (Ghent University).
2
Studies inlude Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ross (2003), Hodder and Jakwerth
(2007), Kouwenberg and Ziemba (2007), Panageas and Westereld (2009), and Agar-
wal, Daniel, and Naik (2009).
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To illustrate the downward pressure on hedge funds' headline fee lev-
els, we report in Table 1 the management fee and inentive fee of newly
launhed CTAs reporting to BarlayHedge. The Table illustrates that,
while there has been no signiant hange in inentive fee levels, average
management fee levels have been dereasing steadily over time.
A 2/20-fee struture, i.e. a management fee of 2% of assets under
management ombined with an inentive fee of 20% of gains, is and has
been the standard ost for alloations in the hedge fund industry. It is
generally supplemented with a high-water mark, suh that investors only
pay the inentive fee one any previous underperformane has been made
up for.
However, headline fee levels are only one aspet of the fee struture
that should be onsidered. Another element usually not taken into on-
sideration when disussing hedge funds' fees, is the frequeny at whih
a fund harges the inentive fee and updates its high-water mark. This
feature is ommonly referred to as the rystallization frequeny or the
inentive fee payment shedule.
The rystallization frequeny diers from the arual shedule, whih
is the shedule used to alulate and harge the fee to the fund's prot and
loss aount. Whereas the proess of fee arual does not impat investor
returns, the same is not true for the fee rystallization. As the inentive
fee rystallization frequeny inreases, the expeted total fee load harged
by the hedge fund manager inreases as well.
To illustrate the above onepts, we provide a brief numerial example
in Table 1.2. For simpliity, we onsider a fee struture that onsists of a
20% performane fee but no management fee.
This example shows how an idential gross performane leads to widely
dierent performane fee loads when we vary the rystallization frequeny.
From the example the reader an easily infer the soure of this dierene
in fee load; under quarterly rystallization, some of the fund's interim
highs are allowed to materialize into performane fees. In the ase of
annual rystallization however, only the asset value at the end of the year
matters.
In this artile, we ontribute to the understanding of hedge funds' fee
struture in that we highlight and analyse the impat of the rystallization
frequeny on hedge funds' fee load. To the authors' best knowledge, no
study has yet investigated this aspet to hedge funds' fee struture. This
nding is ompelling. The rystallization frequeny forms the basis for
the inentive fee alulation and the way hedge funds update their high-
water mark. Consequently, it has a material eet on the fees investors
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Table 1.1: Evolution in CTA Headline Fee Levels
Number of
Funds
Management
Fee
Bootstrapped
95% CI
Inentive
Fee
Bootstrapped
95% CI
Prior to 1994 387 2.25% [2.14%;2.36%℄ 20.38% [20.09%;20.66%℄
1994-1998 295 1.97% [1.88%;2.06%℄ 20.63% [20.29%;20.97%℄
1999-2004 394 1.71% [1.65%;1.78%℄ 20.51% [20.24%;20.81%℄
2005-2008 377 1.67% [1.6%;1.73%℄ 20.71% [20.3%;21.16%℄
2009-2012 163 1.62% [1.51%;1.72%℄ 20.64% [19.9%;21.43%℄
1994-2012 1616 1.87% [1.83%;1.91%℄ 20.56% [20.39%;20.74%℄
This table reports summary statistis on the evolution of headline fee levels. In partiular,
we report the number of newly launhed funds and the average inentive- and management
fee for CTAs in BarlayHedge for the dierent sub-periods.
3
Table 1.2: Illustration Eet of Crystallization
Annual Crystallization Quarterly Crystallization
Time
Gross
Return
HWM
Inentive
Fee
Arued
Inentive
Fee
Paid
NAV HWM
Inentive
Fee
Arued
Inentive
Fee
Paid
NAV
Jan 1.3% 100 0.26 101.30 100 0.26 101.30
Feb 0.3% 100 0.32 101.60 100 0.32 101.60
Mar 3.2% 100 0.97 104.86 100 0.97 0.97 103.88
Apr 3.6% 100 1.73 108.63 103.88 0.75 107.62
May -0.9% 100 1.53 107.65 103.88 0.55 106.66
Jun 3.0% 100 2.18 110.88 103.88 1.19 1.19 108.66
Jul -2.2% 100 1.69 108.44 108.66 0.00 106.27
Aug -1.5% 100 1.36 106.82 108.66 0.00 104.68
Sep 0.0% 100 1.36 106.82 108.66 0.00 0.00 104.68
Ot -0.9% 100 1.17 105.85 108.66 0.00 103.73
Nov -2.3% 100 0.68 103.42 108.66 0.00 101.35
De 1.8% 100 1.06 1.06 104.23 108.66 0.00 0.00 103.17
This table reports the fees paid by an investor under annual and quarterly rystallization,
respetively. The initial HWM and NAV equal 100. The fee struture in this example equals
0/20%, i.e. no management fee and a performane fee of 20% of realized gains.
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pay and ould also inuene hedge funds' risk-taking behavior.
Our ndings have several impliations, both for researhers and pra-
tioners. First, we show that the hoie of the rystallization frequeny has
both a statistially and eonomially signiant impat on fees paid by
investors. In the ase of CTAs, and assuming a 2/20-fee struture, shifting
from annual to quarterly rystallization leads to a 49 basis points inrease
in the annual fee load (as a perentage of assets under management).
In addition, an inentive fee of 15% ombined with monthly rystalliza-
tion leads to the same total fee load as an inentive fee of 20% under
annual rystallization. Both results imply that the eet of the rystal-
lization frequeny is important for alloators evaluating and omparing
dierent fund investments. We stress that, while we fous on just one
hedge fund ategory, CTAs, the rystallization frequeny is an important
onsideration in any investment vehile whose fee struture depends on
a high-water mark provision. Moreover, in an environment where espe-
ially hedge funds' management fee levels are under pressure, the relative
importane of the inentive fee and, thus, rystallization in the total fee
load inreases.
Seond, our study also has impliations for aademi literature that
estimates hedge funds' gross returns and fee loads as well as researh
on hedge funds' risk-taking behavior. To onstrut gross returns, previ-
ous studies in most ases assume that inentive fees are paid at year-end
(e.g. Brooks, Clare, and Motson (2007), Frenh (2008) and Agarwal,
Daniel, and Naik (2009)), although some authors assume quarterly pay-
ment (see Bollen and Whaley (2009) and Jorion and Shwarz (2014)).
Certain authors also alulate hedge funds' historial fee load in their
analysis. Frenh (2008) estimates that the typial investor in U.S. equity-
related hedge funds has paid an annual ombined fee or total expense
ratio of 3.69% p.a. over the period 2000-2007. Brooks, Clare, and Motson
(2007) nd that between 1994 and 2006 hedge fund fees averaged 5.15%
annually. Ibbotson, Chen, and Zhu (2011) suggest a lower estimate of
3.43% p.a. for the period 1995 to 2009. Similarly, Feng, Getmansky, and
Kapadia (2011) report total fees over the period 1994-2010 to be on av-
erage 3.36% of gross asset value. However, these studies do not onsider
the impat of the rystallization frequeny on these gures. With regard
to hedge funds' risk-taking behavior, our analysis has impliations for the
time frame over whih previous results on hedge funds' risk-taking behav-
ior might apply. If fund managers update their high-water mark more
than one a year, their trading horizon is shortened aordingly.
Finally, rystallization frequenies of hedge funds have not been dou-
5
mented previously. To shed light on rystallization praties, we perform
a survey among the onstituents of the Newedge CTA Index as well as an
analysis of the fee notes of CTAs in the Tremont Advisory Shareholder
Servies (TASS) database. We nd that, at least in the ase of CTAs,
high-water marks are most often updated quarterly, rather than annually.
These ndings for the CTA hedge fund ategory ontrast the view om-
monly held in the aademi literature that the high-water marks in hedge
funds are ommonly set at the end of the year.
For ompleteness, we fous on the impat of the rystallization fre-
queny of the inentive fee, and we do not go into the payment frequeny
of the management fee. We do this mainly beause the payment of the
management fee does not depend on a fund's high-water mark.
3
1.2 Data
We analyse the impat of the rystallization frequeny on fees paid by
investors by using monthly net-of-fee returns of live and dead funds la-
belled CTA in the BarlayHedge Database. We use a sample that overs
the period January 1994 to Deember 2012 to mitigate a potential sur-
vivorship bias, sine most databases only started olleting information
on defunt programs from 1994 onwards.
4
As BarlayHedge does not re-
port a rst reporting date, we annot eliminate the bakll bias entirely.
We therefore opt for an alternative approah and remove the rst twelve
observations of a fund's return history, following Teo (2009).
5,6
We further require at least twelve return observations for a fund to be
inluded, and only inlude funds whose monthly returns are denominated
in USD or EUR.
7
The EUR-denominated returns are onverted to USD-
3
In addition, the vast majority of the funds harge the management fee monthly.
For the Tremont Advisory Shareholder Servies (TASS) database, we nd that 78% of
the CTAs in the database harge the management fee on a monthly basis. 13% harges
the management fee quarterly and 8% harges the management fee annually.
4
Gross returns are rst alulated using the funds' entire return history, after whih
the pre-1994 period is dropped.
5
We rst alulate gross returns (see Setion 1.4.1) using the fund's entire trak
reord, and afterwards drop the rst twelve observations of the fund's net-of-fee and
gross returns.
6
By keeping trak of the amount of months that are baklled when a fund is
rst inluded to BarlayHedge database, we traked bakll bias for the period 2005-
2010. For that sample period, the median (average) bakll bias was twelve (fourteen)
months.
7
Programs denominated in urrenies other than USD and EUR are in most in-
stanes dupliate share lasses of larger programs and would therefore be dropped in
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denominated returns, using the end-of-month spot USD/EUR exhange
rate. As the analysis also requires information on the funds' manage-
ment fee and inentive fee, we remove ases where at least one of the two
variables is unreported.
8
We then lter the resulting sample of funds by looking at their self-
delared strategy desription and remove funds whose desription is not
onsistent with the denition of CTAs. In the proess, we also determine
whether the program under onsideration is the fund's agship program
and disard dupliates. To ensure that our results apply to funds that an
be onsidered part of the investable universe for most CTA investors, we
remove funds whose net-of-fee returns exhibit unusually low- or high levels
of variation. To this end, we disard funds when the standard deviation
of the observed net-of-fee returns is lower than 2% or exeeds 60% p.a.
After applying these restritions, our sample onsists of 1,616 unique CTA
programs. Table 1.3 reports summary statistis for the nal set of funds.
Table 1.3: Summary Statistis CTAs
Mean Min P25 P50 P75 Max
Monthly net-of-fee return 0.57% -6.47% 0.06% 0.50% 0.99% 9.52%
Monthly standard deviation 5.08% 0.61% 2.75% 4.27% 6.59% 17.17%
Age (years) 5.4 1 2.1 3.8 7 19
Management fee 1.87% 0% 2% 2% 2% 5%
Inentive fee 20.56% 5% 20% 20% 20% 50%
This table reports summary statistis for the sample of 1616 CTAs from the Barlay-
Hedge database.
In this paper, we fous on one hedge fund ategory and CTAs in parti-
ular beause industry standards on rystallization for dierent hedge fund
ategories might dier. It is possible that the rystallization frequeny of
hedge funds is to some extent related to dierenes in the ability of funds
to value their underlying positions. Unlike some other hedge fund ate-
gories, CTAs trade almost exlusively highly liquid instruments and, thus,
do not have any pratial limitations regarding the alulation of NAVs.
As suh, CTAs provide a fruitful ground for analysing the impat of rys-
tallization.
any ase.
8
Additionally, we also exlude ases where both types of fee are zero or and ases
where the fee levels are deemed unreasonable low or high (management fee in exess
of 5% p.a., inentive fees below 5% or above 50% p.a.).
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1.3 Crystallization and Industry Praties
Sine publi hedge fund databases do not keep trak of funds' inentive fee
rystallization frequeny
9
, we perform a survey among the onstituents of
the Newedge CTA index (as of May 2013). The Newedge CTA index is
designed to trak the largest CTAs and aims to be representative of the
Managed Futures spae. The index is omprised of the 20 largest man-
agers (based on AUM) who are open to new investment and that report
performane on a daily basis to Newedge. Where possible, we omplete
the results of the survey with information available on the website of the
U.S. Seurities and Exhange Commission (SEC).
10
The results of the survey are reported in Figure 1.1. The bar hart
indiates that, in the ase of CTAs, the most ommonly used rystalliza-
tion frequeny is quarterly. In those instanes where the rystallization
frequeny is not quarterly, we nd that the frequeny generally tends to
be higher, rather than lower. In unreported results, we weigh the rys-
tallization frequeny by the assets under management (AUM) of every
manager. While quarterly rystallization remains the most ommonly
applied rystallization frequeny (55% of AUM), monthly rystallization
inreases in importane as it applies to 28.3% of AUM overed by the
survey. Finally, to gauge the sope of our survey vis-à-vis total AUM by
the CTA industry, the results of our survey over 57% of assets managed
in the CTA spae that report to BarlayHedge.
As mentioned above, publi databases do not keep trak of the rys-
tallization frequeny in a systemati way. However, the fee notes in the
Tremont Advisory Shareholder Servies (TASS) database in a number of
ases do provide a suient amount of information to pinpoint the rys-
tallization frequeny. Therefore, and in addition to the above survey, we
also examine the fee notes of defunt and live CTAs reported in the TASS
database. The results are also reported in Figure 1.1. Comparing these
results with those of our own survey suggests that the sample of funds
from TASS is haraterised by higher rystallization frequenies. These
dierenes ould be due to survivorship bias as well as dierenes in fund
size. Nevertheless, the results for the TASS sample orroborate our ear-
9
TASS's questionnaire only inquires about the management fee's payment fre-
queny; the other widely used databases' questionnaires and manuals (Hedge Fund
Researh (HFR), CISDM, and BarlayHedge) indiate that the databases do not keep
trak of the fee payment frequenies.
10
In partiular, we make use of the SEC's Investment Adviser Publi Dislo-
sure (IAPD) and the Eletroni Data-Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR)
database.
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Figure 1.1: Distribution of the Crystallization Frequenies of the Inentive
Fee
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lier nding that quarterly is the most ommon rystallization frequeny.
When funds use a rystallization frequeny other than quarterly rystal-
lization, the frequeny tends to be higher rather than lower.
For ompleteness, we also look at the relationship between the reported
fee levels and the rystallization frequeny of the funds. It ould be that
funds with lower rystallization frequenies have higher inentive fee lev-
els, suh that the total fee load is omparable. To verify that this is not the
ase, we group the sample of funds in TASS based on their reported rys-
tallization frequeny and analyse the average inentive and management
fee of the dierent groups. The results, reported in Table 1.4, indiate that
funds with a higher rystallization frequeny tend to have higher headline
inentive fee levels. For example, the average inentive fee level for funds
with monthly rystallization (22.38%) is signiantly higher than that of
funds that employ a quarterly rystallization frequeny (21.05%), with a
p-value of 0.0775. In addition, we also nd that the headline management
fee level tends to inrease as the rystallization frequeny inreases. These
results suggest that funds that apply higher a rystallization frequeny on
average also harge higher headline fee levels.
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Table 1.4: Relationship between Crystallization Frequeny and Fee Levels
Inentive
Fee
Bootstrapped
95% CI
Management
Fee
Bootstrapped
95% CI
Monthly 22.38% [20.72%;24.23%℄ 1.63% [1.36%;1.91%℄
Quarterly 21.05% [20.35%;21.8%℄ 1.64% [1.48%;1.79%℄
Semi-annual 20.00% [20%;20%℄ 1.93% [1.79%;2%℄
Annual 19.62% [17.69%;21.15%℄ 1.47% [1.17%;1.81%℄
This table reports the average inentive fee level and management fee level under
dierent rystallization frequenies for sample of CTAs in TASS.
1.4 Inentive Fee Crystallization and Fee Load
1.4.1 Constrution of Gross Returns
As mentioned in the introdution, analysing the impat of the rystalliza-
tion frequeny on hedge funds' fee load requires alulating hedge funds'
gross returns and harging fees to investors under various rystallization
frequenies. To this end, we develop an algorithm that ahieves this obje-
tive. We provide a thorough desription of the algorithm in the Appendix.
To alulate gross returns for the sample of CTAs, we assume that
CTAs apply quarterly rystallization to harge inentive fees. Our sur-
vey results and the results from TASS's fee notes suggest that this is the
most ommonly used rystallization frequeny. In addition, when CTAs
apply another rystallization frequeny, they generally tend to use higher
rystallization frequenies. As suh, the assumption of quarterly fee rys-
tallization should lead to fairly onservative estimates of the funds' gross
returns.
In Table 1.5 we ompare the observed net-of-fee CTA returns with the
obtained gross CTA returns. Funds appear to earn signiantly higher
risk-adjusted returns  measured by the annualized Sharpe ratio  based
on gross returns, as ompared to net-of-fee returns. Also, both skewness
and kurtosis are signiantly higher for the gross returns. Consequently,
we nd a higher proportion of ases in whih the Jarque-Bera test for
normality rejets the null hypothesis of normality. Finally, we nd that
both net-of-fee returns and gross returns of CTAs exhibit negative rst
order serial orrelation.
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Table 1.5: Comparison of Net-of-fee Returns and Gross Returns
Net-of-fee
Returns
Gross
Returns
p-
value
Average return 0.57% 0.77% 0
Standard deviation of monthly returns 5.08% 4.68% 0
Annualized Sharpe Ratio 0.48 0.69 0
Skewness 0.31 0.45 0
Kurtosis 4.82 5.13 0.013
First order serial autoorrelation -0.011 -0.004 0.138
JB-Statisti (Perentage of rejetions) 47.22% 52.23%
This table ompares net-of-fee returns with the estimated gross returns
based on the algorithm desribed above for the set of 1616 CTAs.
The reported p-values test the dierene in means using the empirial
t-distribution (bootstrap).
1.4.2 Analysis of the Historial Eet
As an introdution to our main analysis, we rst estimate the rystalliza-
tion frequeny's potential historial eet on investor wealth. This way,
we an get a feel of the eonomi signiane of the eet of rystalliza-
tion. Using the data set of gross returns obtained in Setion 1.4.1, we
re-apply the fund's reported headline fee levels under dierent rystalliza-
tion frequenies. This way we obtain net-of-fee returns under dierent
rystallization frequenies as well as the orresponding fee load.
In Table 1.6 we report the average gross return, average net-of-fee
return, and the average fee load under the dierent fee rystallization
shemes. The reported average net-of-fee returns are all statistially dif-
ferent from eah other at the 1% level of signiane (p-values unreported
for oniseness). Furthermore, the results suggest that investors whose in-
vestment is subjet to quarterly (monthly) rystallization, will earn net-
of-fee returns whih are on average 25 (42) basis points per year lower
than in the ase of annual rystallization. To put these gures into per-
spetive, an annual dierene of 42 basis points over a 10-year period will
ompound to a dierene of 9.32% in the expeted apital gain. For a
MUSD 1 initial investment, this dierene equals USD 63,303.
Even more important than these absolute numbers, is the impat on
the risk-adjusted performane. Our results suggest that when investors
move from annual to monthly rystallization, the Sharpe ratio deteriorates
from 0.4 to 0.34, a 15.65% derease.
We also observe from Table 1.6 that management fees are slightly
lower than 2% p.a., despite the positive drift in CTAs their returns. This
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Table 1.6: Summary Statistis Historial Fee-loads
Average Standard
Deviation
Sharpe
Ratio
Gross Return 8.65% 16.22% 0.61
Net-of-fee
Return
Standard
Deviation
Sharpe
Ratio
Management
Fee
Inentive
Fee
Monthly 4.90% 16.75% 0.34 1.93% 2.41%
Quarterly 5.07% 16.33% 0.37 1.93% 2.26%
Semi-annual 5.20% 16.05% 0.38 1.93% 2.16%
Annual 5.32% 15.75% 0.40 1.94% 2.14%
This table reports the average annual gross return, average standard deviation and
average Sharpe ratio for the set of 1616 CTAs. The seond part of the table reports the
orresponding statistis for the net-of-fee returns, as well as the average management
fee and inentive fee.
is onsistent with our nding that management fees, at least for newly
launhed funds, tend to be below 2% p.a. on average (see Table 1).
1.4.3 Blok Bootstrap Analysis
To study the eet of the rystallization frequeny on the level of fees
investors pay, we analyse the eet of rystallization by applying a blok
bootstrap. In partiular, we randomly sample gross return histories and
alulate the fee load under dierent rystallization regimes. The advan-
tage of this approah is that we do not have to make any distribution
assumptions with regard to the return generating proess. A blok boot-
strap allows us to aount for higher moments in monthly returns (e.g.
CTAs' returns exhibit positive skewness) and to preserve any autoorre-
lation present in the gross return data. These properties of the return
generating proess an have a material impat on the results of the anal-
ysis and investors' total fee load.
In performing the blok bootstrap, we onsider all the potential 12/36/60-
month samples in the data set of gross returns and pik 10,000 12-months,
36-month and 60-month samples. To avoid a potential look-ahead bias,
we allow the sampling proedure to selet inomplete samples ourring
at the end of a fund's trak reord. In those ases where a fund terminates
before the end of the sample period, we assume that investors redeem.
11
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While most of these ourrenes will orrespond to fund terminations due to bad
performane, we nevertheless treat the fund's exit as full redemption. If there is a
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Table 1.7: Impat of Crystallization on Fee Load
Crystallization
Frequeny
Inentive
Fee
Management
Fee
Total Fee
Load
1-year horizon Monthly 2.76%*** 2.07%** 4.84%***
Quarterly 2.42%*** 2.07% 4.50%***
Semi-annual 2.19%*** 2.08% 4.27%***
Annual 1.93% 2.08% 4.01%
3-year horizon Monthly 2.06%*** 2.06% 4.13%***
Quarterly 1.86%*** 2.06% 3.93%***
Semi-annual 1.73%*** 2.06% 3.79%***
Annual 1.61% 2.06% 3.67%
5-year horizon Monthly 1.84%*** 2.05% 3.89%***
Quarterly 1.67%*** 2.05% 3.72%***
Semi-annual 1.55%*** 2.05% 3.61%***
Annual 1.44% 2.05% 3.50%
This table reports the average inentive fee, average management fee, and av-
erage total fee from performing a blok bootstrap where 12, 36, or 60 month
bloks of gross returns are drawn from the obtained sample of CTAs. Fee
load equals the average annual fee load over the investment horizon, as a per-
entage of initial NAV/NAV at the end of the previous year.
Asterisks report statistially signiane of the dierene between of the ob-
tained fee levels and the benhmark ategory (annual rystallization) at the
10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) level of signiane. Signiane tests based
on the empirial t-distribution (bootstrap).
We also assume that every draw starts the beginning of a alendar year
(i.e. from January onwards). Having seleted a random sample path of
gross returns, we apply a standard 2/20-fee struture under dierent rys-
tallization frequenies. This framework allows us to examine the impat
of the rystallization frequeny on investors' total fee load.
Table 1.7 reports the results for one-year, three-year, and ve-year
investment horizons. We onsider periods of up to ve years as this or-
responds to the average age of the CTAs in the sample (see Table 1.3).
As suh, our analysis overs the relevant horizon over whih the eet of
rystallization applies for the majority of hedge fund investors. To gauge
the signiane of the results, we indiate whether the obtained fee level
diers signiantly from the fee load under annual rystallization. We
positive arued interest fee at the time of the last observation, it will be harged to
the investor's aount.
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Figure 1.2: Comparing the Total Fee Load with Annual Crystallization
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set annual rystallization as the benhmark sine most previous researh
made the assumption that the inentive fee is paid at the end of the year.
Our results illustrate that a higher rystallization frequeny always
leads to a higher average fee load.
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Management fees are slightly higher
than 2% and inreasing in time due to the positive drift in the CTAs'
returns. We nd signiantly higher fee loads as the rystallization fre-
queny inreases. The eet is also eonomially signiant. For the
one-year investment horizon, the total fee load is 49 (82) basis points p.a.
higher in the ase of quarterly (monthly) rystallization when ompared
to annual rystallization. This suggests that, under a 2/20-fee struture,
the fee load is expeted to be 12.2% (20.5%) higher if a manager harges
the inentive fee quarterly (monthly), rather than annually. If the invest-
ment horizon is extended to ve years, the dierene dereases 23 (40)
basis points p.a., a dierene of 6.5% (11.4%). For ease of omparison
and Figure 1.2 provides a graphial representation of the dierene in fee
load, with annual rystallization serving as the baseline.
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An alternative way to illustrate this nding, is by using option priing. Indeed,
the performane fee earned by the manager over any subperiod is a fration (20%) of
the value of a European all option with a strike prie equal to the investor's HWM.
Using Monte-Carlo simulation, it is easy to show that an exoti option, onsisting of
a sequene of European all options with path-dependent strike pries equal to the
relevant HWM, is more valuable than a single European all option over the same
period.
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In addition to the inrease in fee load as we inrease the rystallization
frequeny, several other observations are evident from the results in Table
1.7. First, inreasing the investment horizon dampens the impat of a
higher rystallization frequeny on fee load. We an explain this nding by
the fat that the fee loads reported for the three- and ve-year investment
horizons are an average aross the individual years. In years where a
fund is not able to harge inentive fees, the total fee is the same under
dierent rystallization frequenies. Despite this downward drag on the
total fee load, aused by years in whih only a management fee is paid, the
dierene in fee load for the dierent rystallization frequenies remains
signiant.
Seond, for the one-year investment horizon, the management fee in
the ase of monthly rystallization is signiantly lower than that under
annual rystallization. This illustrates the fat that a higher rystalliza-
tion frequeny lowers the NAV on whih funds an harge the management
fee, sine an inentive fee payment lower the investor's NAV. However, the
eet is small in eonomi terms and more than oset by the higher fee
load that results from the higher inentive fees paid.
Next, we have a look at the distribution of the dierene in fee loads.
From the above analysis, we ollet the set of dierenes in inentive
fee under annual and quarterly rystallization. The results, reported in
Figure 1.3, illustrate how the distribution of dierenes is highly skewed
to the right.
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The Figure also shows that in approximately 41.77% of
the ases, the two rystallization frequenies do not show any dierene in
fee load. This is the ase whenever (a) a fund does not get over its initial
high-water mark, (b) when new highs are reahed but not rystallized and
() when the fund sets new high-water marks at every rystallization date.
In the rst two instanes, investors only pay the management fee,
whih is the same for both rystallization frequenies. Of ourse, investors
invest with a positive view on the investment's future performane. An
unintended onsequene of a higher rystallization frequeny is therefore
that the investors will pay more (i.e. there will be a positive dierene in
the fee load) at times when investors are generally less satised with the
fund's performane.
To see this, onsider the following ase. When a fund manager, during
a partiular year, performs very well and ontinuously sets new highs
13
This partiular distribution is also the reason is why all tests of statistial signi-
ane are done using an empirial t-distribution (bootstrap).
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Figure 1.3: Distribution of Dierene in Inentive Fee Load
Percentage of Sample Paths (%)
0 5 10 15 20 25
D
iff
er
en
ce
 in
 In
ce
nt
ive
 F
ee
 (%
)
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
Percentage of Sample Paths (%)
until the end of the alendar year, it does not matter what rystallization
frequeny is applied. However, in ases where the fund's NAV at year-
end drops below a high-water mark set during the year the dierene
in fee load under dierent rystallization frequenies will be positive. In
those ases, investors will be paying higher fees while at the same time the
fund's newly rystallized high-water mark will atually be above the NAV
at the end of the year (i.e. a drop in NAV). This makes it lear that a
higher rystallization frequeny will tend to derease the fund manager's
investment horizon and lower the inentive to perform subsequent to the
rystallization.
When we ondition on those bootstrapped ases where an inentive
fee is atually payable, the dierene in inentive fee load is 78 basis
points higher under quarterly rystallization, as ompared to annual rys-
tallization. Comparing this result to the unonditional average, a 49 basis
points dierene, suggests that in those ases that investors atually pay
an inentive fee, the fee load will be higher than our main results would
suggest.
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Table 1.8: Trade-o between Crystallization Frequeny and Inentive Fee
Inentive Fee (%)
Crystallization
Frequeny
5
10 15 20 25
30
Monthly
2.57%
3.07% 3.60% 4.08% 4.61%
5.24%
Quarterly
2.53%
2.97% 3.46% 3.88% 4.36%
4.94%
Semi-annual
2.50%
2.91% 3.36% 3.75% 4.20%
4.73%
Annual
2.46%
2.84% 3.26% 3.62% 4.03%
4.53%
This table reports the total fee load under dierent ombinations of the both nego-
tiable fators, the inentive fee level and the rystallization frequeny. The manage-
ment fee is paid monthly and xed at 2% p.a. The fee load is estimated by drawing
random three-year sample paths from the gross CTA return data and alulating the
fee load, varying the rystallization frequeny and the level of the inentive fee.
1.4.4 Trade-o between Inentive Fee and Payment
Frequeny
So far, we have assumed a standard 2/20-fee struture to analyse the
impat of dierent payment frequenies. The analysis has shown that,
when investors want to ompare the (expeted) fee load between dier-
ent funds, suh a omparison will be inaurate if funds dier in terms
of the inentive fee payment frequeny. In this subsetion, we quantify
the trade-o that exists between the inentive fee and the rystallization
frequeny, keeping xed the level and payment frequeny of the manage-
ment fee. This trade-o might be relevant if the rystallization frequeny
and inentive fee level are onsidered negotiable fators.
To ensure that our obtained estimates of the fee load are lose to what
an investor an expet in reality, the gures are also based on the blok
bootstrap outlined above. In partiular, we alulate the fee load for
10,000 randomly drawn three-year sample paths of gross returns and vary
the rystallization frequeny and the inentive fee level.
Table 1.8 reports the size of the eet for dierent ombinations of
both negotiable fators. Unlike what inentive fee headline levels would
suggest, the table illustrates that hanges in the rystallization frequeny
lead to onsiderable dierenes in total fee load. For example, the results
suggest that a 15% inentive fee with monthly rystallization leads to a
similar total fee load as a 20% inentive fee with annual rystallization
(not signiantly dierent).
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1.5 Robustness Cheks
We now perform a number of robustness heks with regard to the level
of the eet. Relaxing or imposing additional restritions on the dataset
used in the analysis will not hange our nding that higher rystallization
frequenies inrease investors' fee load. However, it might have an inu-
ene on level of the fee loads and the eonomi signiane of the eet
of rystallization.
1.5.1 Impat of Bakll Bias
In our baseline analysis we aount for bakll bias by disarding the
rst twelve observations of a fund's trak reord. Here we investigate the
importane of this assumption for our baseline results.
To this end, we perform the following analysis. We redo the bootstrap
analysis used in setion 1.4.3 a 100 times, both for the baseline gross return
data set and the newly obtained gross return data that does not orret
for bakll bias. Then, we test whether the results in both ases dier
signiantly. Panel A of Table 1.9 reports the result. In line with our
expetations, we nd that a potential bakll bias tends to upward bias
the obtained inentive fee loads. Nevertheless, the size of the dierene in
fee loads remains similar in both instanes, both in terms of magnitude
and statistial signiane.
1.5.2 Impat of Fund Size
Another possible onern, raised by Kosowski, Naik, and Teo (2007), is
that funds with assets under management below MUSD 20 might be too
small for many institutional investors. To ensure that the magnitude of
fee load dierenes is representative and do not deviate too muh from
the fee load institutional investors an expet, we perform the following
robustness hek.
Similar to the previous robustness hek, we redo the bootstrap anal-
ysis a 100 times, but impose an additional restrition when seleting a
sample path. In partiular, we only selet a sample path if at the start
the orresponding fund's assets under management are above MUSD 20.
To avoid look-ahead bias, the fund's size is allowed to drop below MUSD
20 in subsequent months. Results are reported in panel B of Table 1.9.
Consistent with the nding that small funds tend to outperform more
18
Table 1.9: Results Robustness Cheks
Robustness hek Baseline
Result
Result under
Robustness Chek
p-
value
Bakll Bias Monthly 4.11% 4.38% 0
Quarterly 3.91% 4.17% 0
Semi-Annual 3.78% 4.03% 0
Annual 3.66% 3.89% 0
Fund Size Monthly 3.65% 0
Quarterly 3.49% 0
Semi-Annual 3.37% 0
Annual 3.26% 0
Risk-taking Behavior Monthly 4.11% 0.48
Quarterly 3.92% 0.07
Semi-Annual 3.79% 0.04
Annual 3.71% 0
This table reports the total fee load for a three-year investment horizon for the base-
line ase, and a set of three robustness heks.
The reported p-values test the dierene in means using the empirial t-distribution
(bootstrap).
mature funds, we nd that the fee load is lower when we omit smaller
funds.
1.5.3 Impat of Risk-taking Behavior
To perform the bootstrap in the baseline ase, we assume that every sam-
ple path drawn from the gross return dataset starts in January. However,
Nanda and Aragon (2012) show that hedge funds take part in tournament
behavior. Hedge funds tend to inrease their risk-prole in the seond
half of the year when they are underperforming, relative to their peers.
As suh, the funds' risk-prole ould dier throughout the alendar-year,
and thus have an impat on our reported fee loads. To hek whether this
is the ase, we redo the bootstrap and selet sample paths that orrespond
to atual alendar-years.
The results are reported in panel C of Table 1.9. The p-values in Panel
C indiate that in most ases, the total fee load is somewhat higher if we
use atual alendar-years. We interpret this nding as being in line with
the results by Aragon and Nanda (2012) on risk-taking behavior among
hedge funds. Our results indiate that, taking into aount intra-year
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patterns in the funds' returns, we nd higher total fee loads. This result
therefore suggests that funds atively hange their exposure to safeguard
arued inentive fees, ausing our results to exhibit slightly higher fee
loads if we take these intra-year patterns into aount.
1.6 Conlusion
The fee load of investors does not depend on the headline fee levels
alone. Other aspets of the fee struture should also be onsidered when
analysing fee strutures that inlude inentive fees and a high-water mark
provision. One suh fator is the frequeny with whih hedge funds update
their high-water mark.
To the best of our knowledge we are the rst to doument the im-
pat of the rystallization frequeny on hedge funds' fee loads. Using a
bootstrap based on a omprehensive data set of CTAs, our main nding
is that, under a 2/20-fee struture, quarterly rystallization leads to a
fee load whih is on average 49 basis points p.a. higher than under an-
nual rystallization. This dierene is eonomially large and should be
a relevant onsideration when disussing the fee struture. Our results
are relevant for alloators who want to assess the fee load of fee shemes
whih dier in terms of rystallization frequeny. Moreover, we nd that
dierent headline fee levels an lead to similar total fee loads, one the
rystallization frequeny is taken into onsideration.
A failure to take into aount the frequeny with whih the high-water
mark is updated leads to erroneous estimates of funds' gross returns. In
partiular, assuming an annual payment of the inentive fee when the in-
dustry standard of a number of hedge fund ategories is akin to quarterly
rystallization, will lead to the underestimation of the gross returns of
those hedge fund ategories. As suh, while annual rystallization might
be ommon among some hedge fund ategories, we doument that quar-
terly rystallization is the most ommon rystallization frequeny among
CTAs.
Our analysis of the rystallization frequeny suggests several avenues
for future researh. First, we did not go into the impliations of the pay-
ment frequeny on the risk-taking behavior of hedge funds and CTAs.
Changes in the rystallization frequeny alter the horizon over whih the
impliations of the high-water mark on risk-taking behavior should be
evaluated. As suh, it an be expeted that a higher rystallization fre-
queny leads to a shorter trading horizon, and thus might onit with
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a fund's stated strategy horizon. Seond, we only over one hedge fund
ategory. As suh, there might be onsiderable dierenes in the rys-
tallization frequenies applied by dierent hedge fund ategories. These
dierenes might be related to hedge fund harateristis suh as the liq-
uidity of the strategy.
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Appendix: Desription Algorithm for Gross
Returns
Here we desribe the algorithm we use to ompute monthly gross re-
turns from reported monthly net-of-fee returns. Our approah allows for a
monthly estimation of gross returns under dierent rystallization regimes
(monthly or lower frequeny).
The algorithm is based on the following set of assumptions:
1. The Gross Asset Value at the fund's ineption (GAV0) is equal to
100.
2. The algorithm is based on a single-investor assumption.
3. The management fee is paid monthly
14
.
We start by dening the unoberved Gross Return at the end of month t
(GrossRett):
GrossRett =
GAVt
GAVt−1
− 1 (1)
where GAVt and GAVt−1 are the unobserved Gross Asset Value at the
end of month t and t− 1, respetively.
The amount of Management Fee (MgtFeet) paid in month t equals:
MgtFeet = NAVt−1 · (1 +GrossRett) ·
MF%
12
(2)
where MF% is the management fee (p.a.). The Total Management
Fee Paid up to month t (TotalMgtFeePaidt) is then:
TotalMgtFeePaidt =
t∑
i=1
MgtFeei (3)
In addition to the management fee, we also alulate the amount of
Interest Earned (InterestEarnedt) by the fund manager on exess ash
and ash deposited in the margin aount:
14
This assumption an easily be relaxed to a dierent payment frequeny by handling
the payment of the management fee in the same way as the inentive fee. We never-
theless x the payment frequeny to monthly beause an analysis of the managment
fee is not the thrust of the analysis.
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InterestEarnedt = NAVt−1 ·Rft (4)
where Rft is the risk-free rate in month t. We take Interest Earned
into aount beause CTAs typially hold up to 80% of the money in a
ash aount and earn interest on this ash. In the ase of most other
hedge fund strategies, this adjustment for Interest Earned is not required
and an easily be omitted. Total Interest Earned on ash deposited
(TotalInterestEarnedt) is the sum of all interest earned up to month
t:
TotalInterestEarnedt =
t∑
i=1
InterestEarnedi (5)
Using the above denitions, we dene the Preliminary Net Asset Value
at time t (PrelNAVt) as:
PrelNAVt = NAVt−1·(1+GrossRett)−TotalMgtFeePaidt−TotalIntEarnedt
(6)
As suh, we subtrat the management fee and the interest earned from
the gross inrease in NAVt−1. Using PrelNAVt for the alulation of the
inentive fee ensures that the manager only harges an inentive fee on
performane in exess of any management fee harged and any risk-free
return earned on ash. For the next set of equations, we introdue an in-
diator (Crystt) that takes on the value 1 in months where rystallization
ours, and zero otherwise.
The Arued Inentive Fee (AccrIncFeet) is a fration of the perfor-
mane  the inentive fee IF%  in exess of the urrent High-Water Mark
(HWMt−1):{
max(0, P relNAVt −HWMt−1) · IF% if Crystt = 0
0 if Crystt = 1
(7)
This means that, when no rystallization ours, we only arue the
inentive fee. However, when rystallization does take plae, the arued
inentive fee is paid to the fund manager. In that ase we add any arued
inentive fee over the period sine the last rystallization to the Inentive
Fee Paid variable (IncFeePaidt):
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{
IncFeePaidt−1 if Crystt = 0
IncFeePaidt−1 +max(0, P relNAVt −HWMt−1) · IF% if Crystt = 1
(8)
At this point in time, the High-Water Mark (HWMt) is also updated
to the urrent Preliminary Net Asset Value if it exeeds the previous
High-Water Mark:{
HWMt−1 if Crystt = 0
max(PrelNAVt, HWMt−1) if Crystt = 1
(9)
The Net Asset Value at time t (NAVt) equals:
NAVt = PrelNAVt + TotalInterestEarnedt − IncFeePaidt (10)
Sine no losed-form solution is available, we solve for the unobserved
GAVt numerially. In partiular, we determine the value of GAVt that
equates the NAVt omputed in equation (10)  based on GAVt  to the
observed NAV at time t. We then store the obtained value of GAVt and
move to the next month, solving for GAVt in an iterative way. When we
harge fees in the main analysis, we also use the above equations to go
from GAVt to NAVt.
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Chapter 2
An Analysis of the
Risk-Return Charateristis
of Serially Correlated
Managed Futures
1
The Journal of Futures Markets
Vol. 36, No. 10, 9921013 (2016)
2.1 Introdution
The historial trak-reord remains the most important piee of information in
the evaluation of potential hedge fund managers. This is the ase as information
on the alpha-models used by the managers an only be inferred from their trak-
reord. The models themselves remain stritly proprietary. As a onsequene,
past returns will remain a key element in manager seletion. An important
onsideration in this regard, is the degree of persistene in managers' reported
returns. If fund managers' returns exhibit persistene at ertain frequenies,
then manager seletion based on past performane an potentially add value
along this time series dimension.
In this artile we provide empirial evidene that value an potentially be
added through inorporating serial orrelation patterns in Managed Futures'
self-reported returns in the investment proess. In partiular, we nd that
Managed Futures funds that exhibit higher degrees of positive serial orrelation
 based on the unweighted sum of autoorrelations  exhibit distintly dierent
risk-return proles and outperform funds that exhibit lower degrees of serial
1
This hapter is based on joint work with Péter Erd®s (RPM Risk & Portfolio Management)
and John Sjödin (RPM Risk & Portfolio Management and Ghent University).
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orrelation. A portfolio of more positively autoorrelated Managed Futures
funds displays higher risk-adjusted performane and lower drawdowns.
Appliation of multifator models, inluding models using the reently pro-
posed risk fators suggested by Baltas and Kosowski (2012) as well as the more
ommonly used hedge fund risk fators of Fung and Hsieh (2004), indiate a
signiantly positive risk-adjusted exess return (`alpha') of approximately 6
perent p.a. Interestingly, the models univoally suggest a lower explanatory
power in the ase of the more positively serially orrelated Managed Futures
funds. This nding of a low explanatory power of multifator models oupled
with risk-adjusted outperformane orroborates some reent ndings in the lit-
erature on performane persistene in both the hedge fund and mutual fund
performane literature.
2
In partiular, Sun, Wang, and Zheng (2012) propose a Strategy Distin-
tiveness Index (SDI) onstruted as 1 minus the orrelation between a hedge
fund's historial returns and the returns of its peers. The objetive of Sun,
Wang, and Zheng their measure is to apture the degree to whih hedge fund
managers follow unique investment strategies. The authors nd that higher
strategy distintiveness is assoiated with better future fund performane. Sim-
ilarly, Titman and Tiu (2011) show that that hedge funds with lower R2s with
regard to systemati fators have higher Sharpe ratios, higher information ra-
tios, and higher alphas. They onjeture that funds that have more ondene
in their abilities will expose their investors less to fator risk.
Our results are onsistent with the above ndings. Sorting Managed Fu-
tures funds on the degree of serial orrelation results in a subset of funds that
outperform peers exhibiting lower degrees of serial orrelation. Coinidentally,
these more positively serially orrelated funds' returns are found to be less well
explained by existing multifator models. This seems to suggest that the se-
rial orrelation we observe is a onsequene of the unique investment strategies
followed by these managers.
However, self-reported returns do not neessarily reet all risks inherent to
investing in hedge funds and thus might overstate the atual return experiene
of investors. Therefore, we explore several alternative explanations for the ob-
served premium. Amongst others, we onsider attrition rates and the assoiated
delisting bias as well as exposure to tail risk as potential explanations for the
observed outperformane. Despite slightly higher attrition rates among more
positively serially orrelated managers, we nd that a potential delisting bias is
unable to fully explain the observed outperformane.
The rest of this paper is strutured as follows. The relevant literature is
summarized and disussed in setion 2.2. Setion 2.3 desribes the Managed
Futures spae onsidered for the analysis. In setion 2.4 we outline the method-
ology used to determine the degree of persistene in Managed Futures funds'
self-reported returns. We analyze the risk-return harateristis and potential
drivers for the observed premium in setion 2.5. Setion 2.6 onludes.
2
We thank an anonymous referee for alling attention to this onnetion with the reent
literature.
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2.2 Related Literature
Evidene of performane persistene among hedge funds is, of ourse, not new.
Although early hedge fund literature gravitates towards a lak of performane
persistene in hedge funds' self-reported returns (see inter alia ?Brown and
Goetzmann, 2003; Capoi and Hübner, 2004; Malkiel and Saha, 2005), more
reent ontributions present evidene of performane persistene.
In partiular, Agarwal and Naik (2000) nd persistene at the monthly fre-
queny,Baquero, ter Horst, and Verbeek (2005) nd persistene at the quar-
terly level, and Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009) and Kosowski, Naik, and Teo
(2007) nd evidene of persistene among funds at annual horizons. Regarding
Managed Futures, Shneeweis, Spurgin, and MCarthy (1997) nd, based on a
limited set of CTAs, that there is some performane persistene and that multi-
advisor Managed Futures funds display more persistene than single advisor
CTAs. More reently, Gregoriou, Hübner, and Kooli (2010) nd performane
persistene over horizons of at least one quarter. A the same time, they note
that most of this persistene disappears when evaluating managers' ability to
remain within the top quartile of top performing funds.
There is, however, one potential ompliation that aompanies muh of
the observed performane persistene in hedge funds' returns. The observed
preditability may, to a large extent, be driven by illiquidity in the funds' un-
derlying positions. Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) show that illiquidity,
aused by stale pries, an lead to spurious serial orrelation in hedge funds'
self-reported returns. The authors onlude that the performane persistene
doumented by Agarwal and Naik (2000) and others an be traed down to
spurious serial orrelation. These results are orroborated by Eling (2009) who,
based on a review of the existing literature as well as new evidene, shows that
illiquid hedge fund ategories suh as Arbitrage and Emerging Markets exhibit
very high levels of performane persistene, while more liquid hedge fund strate-
gies have low levels of persistene. Still, Kosowski, Naik, and Teo (2007) argue
that some hedge funds in their sample ontinue to exhibit performane persis-
tene at annual horizons, even after ontrolling for the impat of spurious serial
orrelation as detailed above.
Managed Futures funds' self-reported monthly returns, however, are a no-
table exeption. Unlike most other hedge fund ategories, Managed Futures
funds' returns do not exhibit autoorrelation, on average.
3
This empirial nd-
ing is onsistent with the partiular nature of Managed Futures funds' strategies.
These funds only trade highly liquid seurities and are therefore very unlikely
to exhibit positive autoorrelation due to illiquidity and smoothing.
4
3
In the ase of Managed Futures and Dediated Short Bias hedge funds, Getmansky, Lo,
and Makarov (2004) obtain smoothing-parameter estimates that suggest that no unsmoothing
of the returns is needed.
4
This point is worth stressing, espeially in light of reent evidene that performane
preditability in equity hedge funds tends to weaken when taking into aount liquidity risk
(Brandon and Wang, 2013). Sadka (2010) nds that sorting Managed Futures into deiles
based on their exposure to an (equity) liquidity risk fator does not yield a signiant (Fung-
Hsieh 7-fator) alpha. However, as Managed Futures do not trade individual equities, existing
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In spite of the liquid nature of Managed Futures funds' strategies and the
absene of high levels of serial orrelation, Khandani and Lo (2011) neverthe-
less nd evidene that, among the dierent hedge fund ategories they onsider,
Managed Futures exhibit the largest `illiquidity' premium. More speially,
the authors onlude that Managed Futures funds that exhibit higher degrees
of positive autoorrelation outperform funds that exhibit lower degrees of pos-
itive autoorrelation. This nding is intriguing as this hedge fund ategory
provides a speial ase where positive autoorrelation is unlikely to be driven
by illiquidity. This suggests that there is ross-setional variation in the degree
of serial orrelation in Managed Futures funds' returns that onveys information
on future performane.
Two apparent hedge fund return proles an be expeted to yield persis-
tene. First, we an imagine funds that exhibit highly persistent small positive
returns. While suh a return prole an be the result of onsistently exploit-
ing a mispriing, it an also be the result of a manager's deision to adopt a
`short-option' or `short-volatility' prole. If the latter proves to be the ase, one
should see a breakdown in the protability of these funds in periods of market
stress. Seond, we would also observe persistene in returns among managers
that report return proles that show oasional high positive return months,
but many small negative months in between. In that ase, the return behavior
resembles a `long-option' or `long-volatility' prole. Suh a prole arries a num-
ber of harateristis of CTAs' trend-following nature. For example, Fung and
Hsieh (2001) make use of long-option strategies (lookbak-straddles) to model
the performane of trend following funds.
Furthermore, trend-following is a divergent risk-taking strategy (see Rzepzyn-
ski, 1999; Chung, Rosenberg, and Tomeo, 2004; Greyserman and Kaminski,
2014). That is, unlike onvergent strategies where a manager will onsider
adding to an existing position when a pereived mispriing inreases, trend-
following approahes generally ditate losing positions when trends fail to ma-
terialize. This suggests that trend-followers an be expeted to inur a lot of
small losses, perhaps for extended periods of time, until market onditions allow
lear trends to emerge. We attempt to determine the extent to whih Managed
Futures funds sorted on serial orrelation exhibit one of the above-mentioned
return proles similar to being short- or long volatility and whether their per-
formane breaks down in periods of market stress.
Our work is similar in spirit to the work of De Souza and Gokan (2004), who
propose using a measure of pure persistene, the Hurst exponent, to aid in hedge
fund manager seletion. The authors nd that portfolios of hedge funds with
a high Hurst exponent exhibit higher returns, lower standard deviations, and
lower drawdowns. Unfortunately, their work does not over Managed Futures.
Autoorrelation in Managed Futures funds' returns has been a topi of in-
terest in reent empirial work. Burghardt and Liu (2013) demonstrate that
trend-following Managed Futures exhibit negative autoorrelation over short
liquidity measures based on (individual) equities might prove unsatisfatory in analyzing a
potential liquidity risk to whih Managed Futures are exposed.
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horizons of up to six months. The authors note that failing to aount for
negative autoorrelation in returns might yield biased performane statistis
when saling estimates of volatility. Another important question, whih has not
been addressed to the authors best knowledge, is the relationship between auto-
orrelation patterns in Managed Futures' returns and subsequent performane.
Khandani and Lo (2011) their nding of a positive `illiquidity' premium in Man-
aged Futures seems to suggest a positive relationship. However, a more in-depth
analysis is needed, as the autoorrelation patterns might in fat be indiative
of spei risks taken by these managers. In what follows, we attempt to shed
light on this matter.
2.3 Data
The data ome from BarlayHedge. We rely on BarlayHedge as this is the most
omprehensive database on Managed Futures that is available to researhers and
pratitioners. In addition, Joenväärä, Kosowski, and Tolonen (2012), in their
omparison of ve major publily available hedge fund databases, nd that
BarlayHedge has the largest perentage of defunt funds (65%), thus making
it least likely to suer from survivorship bias. Following related literature,
we only inlude the post-1994 period to avoid potential survivorship bias, as
most databases only started olleting information on defunt funds from 1994
onwards.
We lter the dataset in several respets. First, we lassify the Managed
Futures programs in dierent ategories based on the funds' self-reported strat-
egy desription.
5
In the proess, we remove funds whose desription indiates
that they invest exlusively in options. If a fund reports multiple share lasses
for the same program, we only inorporate the fund's agship program, whih
we identify as the share lass with the longest trak-reord and highest assets-
under-management (AUM). Seond, we only inlude programs denominated in
USD and EUR, and onvert the EUR-denominated returns and AUM to USD
using the end-of-month spot USD/EUR exhange rate. We remove funds with
missing observations as well as zero-return observations at the start and end of
a fund's trak-reord. To aount for bakll bias, we also remove the rst 12
observations of a fund's trak-reord (see, for example, Kosowski, Naik, and Teo
(2007)). To ensure that our results apply to funds that an be onsidered part
of the investable universe for investors, we remove funds whose returns exhibit
unusually low levels of variation. To this end, we disard funds for whih the
standard deviation of the observed returns is lower than 2% p.a.
Similarly to Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) and Khandani and Lo
(2011) we require a trak-reord of at least 5 years for a fund to be inluded.
This minimum requirement on the trak-reord is needed to ensure a suient
number of observations to be able to properly estimate the autoorrelation pat-
tern in a fund's self-reported returns. Imposing this additional requirement,
5
Despite the possibility of strategi self-mislassiation, Brown and Goetzmann (2001)
nd that self-reported desriptions do almost as well as return-based proedures.
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we obtain a dataset of 677 Managed Futures programs, 207 urrently live and
470 that have stopped reporting (`defunt') as of the end of 2013. Summary
statistis for the funds are reported in Table 2.1.
The statistis on the standard rst order autoorrelation oeient (ρ1) or-
roborate the nding of no autoorrelation, on average, among Managed Futures
(see Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov, 2004). Finally, the reported AUM indiate
that our dataset overs US$ 157.2bn, as of the end of 2013.
2.4 Methodology
To measure the degree of autoorrelation in Managed Futures funds' returns,
we alulate a fund's autoorrelation funtion based on the past ve years of
return data. Given the generally low levels of serial orrelation in Managed
Futures, we opt for an approah where we sum up the autoorrelation funtion
up to lag 12, rather than fousing on the rst order autoorrelation.
6
As suh,
our measure of serial orrelation beomes,
Pˆ =
12∑
i=1
(
ρˆt−i +
1
T − i
)
(2.1)
where ρˆt−i is the estimated autoorrelation at lag i and T is the sample
size. Kendall and Stuart (1976) show that under the null hypothesis of serial
independene, the i− th sample autoorrelation is biased in small samples and
has an expeted value of
−1
T−i
. Therefore, our measure inludes a small sample
bias-orretion whose importane is meaningful in this ase as we have only 60
observations (T = 60).
Levih and Rizzo (1999)show that, in the ase of small but persistent auto-
orrelation, the unweighted sum of autoorrelations has higher power in detet-
ing persistene ompared to onventional tests for autoorrelation suh as the
Durbin-Watson h and m tests, Bartlett-test, Box-Piere Q-test, the LM test of
Breush (1978) and Godfrey (1978), and the variane ratio test. The environ-
ment for whih these authors have developed their measures of persistene is
very similar to the ase of Managed Futures. Managed Futures, on average, do
not exhibit signiant autoorrelation, at least, based on onventional measures
(see Table 2.1, panel A). However, this observation does not rule out very small,
but persistent autoorrelation, whih annot be deteted using onventional
tests. Suh a return harateristi an be an indiation of superior managerial
skills, in whih ase it is of onsiderable importane in portfolio seletion.
Therefore, to be able to detet small, but persistent autoorrelation, our
ranking relies on a measure that is almost idential to the one proposed by Levih
and Rizzo (1999). The only dierene is that we aount for small sample bias.
It is important to note that this way, we retain important information ontained
6
12 months is onsistent with the onvention in the momentum literature and the presene
of time-series momentum in futures markets (see Moskowitz, Ooi, and Pedersen, 2012).
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Table 2.1: Managed Futures Data
Panel A: Summary Statistis
Mean Median
Standard
deviation
Mean return 0.81% 0.61% 0.96%
Minimum return -13.74% -10.79% 11.38%
Maximum return 21.21% 15.32% 21.42%
Standard deviation 5.53% 4.41% 4.44%
Skewness 0.544 0.436 0.894
Kurtosis 5.778 4.357 4.401
Size ($US m) 208.43 24.39 1057.78
Age (Years) 9.8 8.3 4.3
ρ1 0.02 0.01 0.13
Panel B: Evolution Data Set
Year
Live
funds
Defunt AUM ($US bn)
1999 308 24 28.93
2000 312 48 27.12
2001 317 71 33.57
2002 332 84 40.23
2003 346 103 68.58
2004 366 123 106.69
2005 395 144 96.77
2006 422 176 132.67
2007 448 194 161.59
2008 452 222 175.89
2009 426 251 180.60
2010 404 273 215.09
2011 367 310 217.75
2012 315 362 176.95
2013 207 470 157.23
Notes: this table reports summary statistis for the data
set of Managed Futures. Panel A reports statistis on the
monthly returns. Panel B reports end-of-year gures.
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in the sign of ρt−i and do not downweight autoorrelation at higher lags whih
ould result to miss out information related to performane persistene.
To provide some rationale how this measure works for deteting performane
persistene, onsider a white noise proess. In this ase, the probability that
the rst N autoorrelation oeients are all positive is onsiderably lower than
the probability that half the oeients are positive and half are negative.
7
In
suh ases, the sum of autoorrelations might be more informative.
On a statistial ground, our measure is losely related to spetral measures.
For example, let f(0) denote the zero frequeny spetrum of the returns. The
spetral density of interest an then be given by
f(0) = ωt−0 + 2
∞∑
i=1
ωt−i (2.2)
where ω stands for the autoovariane funtion. If we divide both sides of
the equation by the variane of the returns,
f∗(0) = 1 + 2
∞∑
i=1
ρt−i (2.3)
that is, the normalized spetrum at frequeny zero is the sum of autoorre-
lations (see among others Cohrane, 1988; Lo and MaKinlay, 1988). In appli-
ations the innite sum on the right-hand side must be trunated. Indeed, we
trunate the estimation and sum the unweighted autoorrelations up to lag 12.
In this sense Eq. (2.1) is losely related to zero frequeny spetrum estimators.
8
It is quite straightforward that after orreting for the small-sample bias,
if Managed Futures funds' returns are unorrelated, Eq. (2.3) is equal to one
and our measure (Eq. (2.1) equals to approximately zero. Under performane
persistene, returns exhibit positive autoorrelation and Eq. (2.1) is above
0. Under long-term mean-reversion in Managed Futures funds' performane,
returns are negatively serially orrelated and P is negative.
7
Assuming a white noise proess and after orreting for small sample bias, the hane
that half of the autoorrelations is positive is exatly 50%. As the number of positive autoor-
relation is binomially distributed in the ase of white noise, if 9 out of the 12 autoorrelation
oeients estimated to be positive, the null hypothesis of white noise an be rejeted at on-
ventional levels of signiane, independently of the magnitude of autoorrelation oeients.
8Pˆ =
fˆ∗(0)−1
2
. Our estimation of Pˆ is mathing the trunated uniform kernel-based
estimation in Andrews (1991). If the trunated kernel is x(i/k), P =
∑
∞
i=1 x(i/k)ρt−i, where
x =
{
1 if i/k ≤ 1
0 otherwise
. Moreover, White (1980) and Hansen (1982) also apply trunated and
unweighted estimators to Eq. (2.3).
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2.5 Results
2.5.1 Risk-Return Charateristis of Sorted Portfolios
Using our measure of return persistene, we rank our sample of Managed Futures
funds and divide them into quintile portfolios, with the highest (lowest) quintile
portfolio onsisting of those funds with the highest (lowest) degree of persistene
measured by the unweighted sum of the rst 12 autoorrelation oeients, as
in Levih and Rizzo (1999). We update the ranking of the funds at the end
of every month, eetively rebalaning the portfolio on a monthly basis. For
the purpose of the analysis, we onstrut quintile portfolios both on an equal-
weighted and asset-weighted basis (using the funds' reported AUM at t − 1.9
To avoid the portfolio onstrution suering from look-ahead bias, we insert a
zero-return the rst month after a fund stops reporting.
10
We report results in Table 2.2 for the quintiles of interest. The ineption date
of the portfolios is 1999, as we require a 5-year burn-in period to estimate the
autoorrelation struture for the set of funds. Absolute performane, measured
using the ompound annual growth rate (CAGR), suggests that more positively
autoorrelated Managed Futures funds' (Q5) outperformed their less positively
autoorrelated peers (Q1) on an absolute return basis over the 1999-2013 period.
The upper quintile portfolio of most positively autoorrelated Managed Futures
posted a CAGR of 7.38% p.a., ompared to 4.52% p.a. for the lower quintile
portfolio. This result is in line with Khandani and Lo (2011) their earlier nding
of the presene of an illiquidity premium in Managed Futures.
Sorting managers based on serial orrelation thus appears to yield portfolios
with higher raw performane. p-values for a standard dierene in means test,
based on a bootstrap with a 1000 repliations, however, suggests that the mean
average returns are not signiantly dierent at onventional levels, with a p-
value of 0.16. Average monthly performane, of ourse, does not onsider the
level of risk taken.
Higher average returns are onsistent with the argument that, as positive
serial orrelation is ommonly onsidered a measure of illiquidity (see Getman-
sky, Lo, and Makarov, 2004) and, thus, illiquidity risk, positively autoorrelated
returns may indiate higher risk. The general absene of illiquidity in Managed
Futures funds' underlying positions makes this nding unexpeted. Still, the
higher expeted returns may be a ompensation for higher risk of some sort. If
this is the ase, we expet the top quintile portfolio (Q5) to exhibit higher levels
of riskiness than the bottom quintile portfolio (Q1).
9
Sine small funds are generally not onsidered for investment, we perform a robustness
hek where we impose the additional requirement that the fund should have at least US$10
million AUM at rebalaning. Results are robust to suh an AUM-based lter. Results available
upon request.
10
In this ase, the information that a fund has stopped reporting in the following month is
not available to an alloator at the time of rebalaning. As suh, to avoid look-ahead bias, we
should assume a ertain alloation to that fund, even though the atual return is not observed.
Later on we relax this arbitrary zero return assumption further, to aount for the bias that
voluntary reporting might indue.
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To analyze is onjeture, we also report several measures of risk and risk-
adjusted performane in Table 2.2. In partiular, we report the monthly stan-
dard deviation, the (autoorrelation-adjusted) Sharpe ratio
11
, maximum draw-
down, and the Sortino ratio. Sine ontrolling downside risk plays an important
role in hedge funds and Managed Futures funds in partiular, measures based
on Lower Partial Moments (see Harlow and Rao, 1989) are also onsidered. The
Sortino ratio (Sortino and Van Der Meer, 1991) is one ommonly used measure
of downside risk. We report this metri with a target return of zero. Finally,
Maximum drawdown (MDD) is reported as this is a metri of partiular rele-
vane for pratitioners in the Managed Futures industry.
The risk-adjusted performane measures indiate that the upper quintile
portfolio outperforms the lower quintile, regardless of the partiular risk measure
used. Interestingly, the outperformane of the top quintile portfolio (Q5) seems
to be mainly driven by lower volatility. As suh, the Sharpe- and Sortino ratio
are onsiderably higher
12
for the top quintile portfolio. Using the hypothesis
testing methodology suggested by Ledoit and Wolf (2008) (heneforth, LW )
we test whether the dierene in Sharpe ratios for the top and bottom quintile
is atually signiantly dierent or not. We nd this to be the ase, as the
dierene is signiant at onventional levels (p-value of 0.0062 and 0.08 for the
AUM-weighted and equal-weighted portfolios, respetively).
This better risk-adjusted performane in terms of reward-to-variability is
partiularly important in Managed Futures spae, as funds' programs are typ-
ially leveraged multiple times to obtain a ertain target-level volatility. Maxi-
mum drawdown statistis indiate that a portfolio onsisting of the most pos-
itively serially orrelated funds exhibits drawdowns notably lower than that of
the other portfolio. This nding suggests that the positive autoorrelation in
Managed Futures, at least at rst sight, does not lead to deeper drawdowns. The
analysis so far yields a set of Managed Futures managers that outperform their
peers. We should nevertheless rst onsider real-life limitations to investing in
hedge funds before we an proeed.
Share restritions suh as the lokup period, advane notie period and the
redemption frequeny an limit an alloator's ability to exploit short-term per-
sistene present in hedge funds
13
. However, ompared to other hedge fund
11
Annualized Sharpe ratios are adjusted for autoorrelation as suggested by Lo (2002). In
partiular, the reported Sharpe ratios are alulated as SR(q) = η(q) · SR with
η(q) ≡ q√
q+2·
∑q−1
k=1
(q−k)·ρk
,
Where SR is the regular Sharpe ratio on a monthly basis, is ρk is the k − th order au-
toorrelation. SR · η(q) is then the annualized autoorrelation adjusted Sharpe ratio with
q = 12.
12
In unreported results, we nd that failing to adjust the Sharpe ratio has a material impat
as it inreases (lowers) the ratio for the top (bottom) quintile portfolios, when ompared to the
adjusted Sharpe ratio. This is beause the quintile portfolios themselves also exhibit positive
(resp. negative) autoorrelation.
13
Lokup refers to the initial amount of time investors are prohibited from withdrawing
their investment. One this lokup period is over, investors are allowed to withdraw their
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ategories, share restritions are less stringent in the ase of Managed Futures.
One likely explanation for the lower restritions is that redemptions are less
ostly for Managed Futures, as liquidity in futures markets makes these funds
better able to sale down positions to meet redemptions. To illustrate this fea-
ture of Managed Futures, we report summary statistis on share restritions
for both Managed Futures and a omposite of the other hedge fund ategories
that report to BarlayHedge. As lok-ups are unommon for most hedge fund
ategories, with 70% of the funds having no lok-up restrition in plae, we
fous on advane-notie periods and redemption frequenies. In order to draw
onlusions from the advane-notie period and redemption frequeny, we need
to analyze both in onjuntion. Consider for example a fund that imposes for a
one-day advane-notie period but nevertheless allows redemptions only quar-
terly. In that ase, although the advane-notie is one day, redemption an take
up to three months.
While a wide range of ombinations is possible, the atual number of om-
binations is more limited in pratie. For parsimony, we report in Table 2.3
the frequenies with whih dierent ombinations of share restritions prevail,
onsidering 40 ombinations (based on 5 advane-notie bins and 8 redemption
frequeny bins).
Results in Table 2.3 illustrate that share restritions are muh less ommon
for Managed Futures than for the other hedge fund ategories. In partiular,
the vast majority of Managed Futures allow investors to redeem onsiderably
more easily. Managed Futures generally allow redemption within the month,
whereas far less the ase for hedge funds.
But even if share restritions are unrestritive, onsiderable turnover re-
quired in maintaining the portfolios might still make implementation unrealisti.
To investigate the turnover required, we report the hange in the omposition
of the portfolios from month-to-month. We nd that, while turnover is non-
negligible, it is lowest for the upper quintile portfolio, at 12.7% per month. The
lower quintile suggests a slightly higher turnover rate of 16.2%. The low turnover
for both portfolios is to some extent the result of the fairly long trak-reord
used in estimating the autoorrelation funtion, ausing the resulting levels of
autoorrelation to be fairly persistent. This suggests that this approah that
relies on autoorrelation might have value in pratie, espeially in manager
seletion.
2.5.2 Performane Evaluation
The results above indiate that portfolios of Managed Futures funds based on
serial orrelation exhibit distintly dierent risk-return harateristis. Now
make use of a multifator approah to try and identify the potential drivers
of the observed outperformane. In partiular, the standard approah in this
ontext onsists of assessing whether partiular fators explain the performane
of the dierent quintile portfolios.
apital only at pre-speied times of the year (ditated by the redemption frequeny), and an
advane notie is required for withdrawal.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistis Sorted Portfolios
Value-weighted Portfolios
Mean Monthly
Return
Standard
Deviation
Sortino Ratio Sharpe
Ratio
MDD CAGR
Q1 (low) 0.41% 2.83% 0.84 0.55 -16.88% 4.52%
Q5 (high) 0.61% 1.56% 2.88 1.19 -5.90% 7.38%
dierene in means (p-val) 0.16 LW -statisti 3.298***
BarlayHedge 0.55% 2.28% 1.53 0.98 -7.77% 6.40%
Equal-weighted Portfolios
Mean Monthly
Return
Standard
Deviation
Sortino Ratio Sharpe
Ratio
MDD CAGR
Q1 (low) 0.55% 2.67% 1.32 0.86 -10.69% 6.32%
Q5 (high) 0.49% 1.61% 2.25 1.15 -5.75% 5.88%
dierene in means (p-val) 0.36 LW -statisti 1.694*
BarlayHedge 0.49% 2.42% 1.31 0.81 -9.27% 5.69%
Notes: this table reports summary statistis on portfolios sorted portfolio exhibiting the highest degree of positive (negative)
autoorrelation. The table reports the mean monthly return, the standard deviation of mean monthly returns, the annual Sortino
ratio, the annual Sharpe ratio, maximum drawdown (MDD), and the ompound annual growth rate (CAGR). A dierene in
means test, using a bootstrap with a 1000 repliations is used to test the dierene in average returns. The Ledoit-Wolf (LW)
statisti tests the statistial signiane of the dierene in Sharpe ratios. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Panel A: Hedge Funds
Redemption Frequeny
Daily Weekly Bi-weekly Monthly Bi-monthly Quarterly Semi-annual Annual
Advane
Notie Period
(days)
0 2.33% 1.04% 0.01% 1.30% 0.01% 0.78% 0.11% 0.09%
1-31 2.62% 2.23% 0.20% 26.28% 0.30% 8.49% 0.56% 0.46%
32-91 0.10% 0.09% 0.00% 13.33% 0.01% 19.91% 1.46% 1.76%
92-180 0.00% 0.03% 0.01% 5.08% 0.00% 8.44% 1.00% 1.76%
> 180 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% 0.08% 0.03% 0.08%
Panel B: Managed Futures
Redemption Frequeny
Daily Weekly Bi-weekly Monthly Bi-monthly Quarterly Semi-annual Annual
Advane
Notie Period
(days)
0 11.72% 1.56% 0.00% 14.84% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1-31 7.03% 7.03% 0.78% 44.53% 1.56% 0.78% 0.00% 0.00%
32-91 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 5.47% 0.00% 1.56% 0.00% 0.00%
92-180 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 3.13% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
> 180 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Notes: this table reports summary statistis on the share restritions for Managed Futures and hedge funds. Results indiate
the frequeny with dierent ombinations of advane notie and redemption frequeny are employed.
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While Managed Futures' dynami nature of their strategies makes it diult
to model their returns, reent advanes on (time-series) momentum in futures
markets by Moskowitz, Ooi, and Pedersen (2012) and Baltas and Kosowski
(2012) have led to an improved understanding of Managed Futures. Moskowitz,
Ooi, and Pedersen (2012) present evidene that futures ontrats' own past
returns predit future returns. To exploit this preditability, the authors im-
plement syntheti trading strategies that take both long- and short positions in
a wide set of futures ontrats, using information inferred from the ontrats'
(12-month) past returns. Their results also suggest these momentum fators
apture the performane of Managed Futures returns and perform better than
of the primitive trend-following strategy metris (PTFS), suggested by Fung and
Hsieh (2001). Baltas and Kosowski (2012) extend Moskowitz, Ooi, and Pedersen
(2012) their approah and onstrut time-series momentum fators over dier-
ent trading horizons. They show that a ombination of these fators and the
seven fators of Fung and Hsieh (2004) onsiderably improves the explanatory
power of the model applied to Managed Futures' returns.
We inorporate these reent advanes on performane evaluation to analyse
the dierent quintile portfolios. In partiular, we retrieve the data for Fung
and Hsieh's 7-fator model and Baltas and Kosowski (2012) their momentum
fators.
14
We then estimate multifator models for the relevant value-weighted
quintile portfolios for the 1999-2013 period for whih all data is available. Re-
sults are reported in Table 2.4.
Examining the observed variane explained aross models, using the adjusted-
R2, we nd that more positively autoorrelated Managed Futures' returns are
less well explained, both in the ase of the momentum fators and a ombina-
tion of the momentum fators and Fung and Hsieh's 7-fator model. The upper
quintile portfolio displays onsiderably lower loadings on the dierent momen-
tum fators, although the momentum fators remain signiant at onventional
levels. Looking at the upper quintile's risk-adjusted performane, we nd that
it is the only portfolio that exhibits a statistially and eonomially signiant
positive alpha (approximately 0.49% per month, or 6% p.a.). Nevertheless, the
models' low explanatory power suggest that these programs are employing truly
dierent strategies than most Managed Futures.
15
The lak of statistial signif-
iane of the fators proposed by Fung and Hsieh (2004) further suggest that
these funds are not loading on any of the other risk-fators ommonly assoiated
with other hedge fund ategories. This result is in aordane of the ndings of
Sun, Wang, and Zheng (2012) who show that hedge fund managers who produe
14
The momentum fators are made available by Baltas and Kosowski (2012)
at http://www3.imperial.a.uk/riskmanagementlaboratory/risklabsetions/
entreforhedgefundsresearh/baltas_kosowski_fators. Data for the PTFS-fators
are retrieved from the David Hsieh`s home page http://faulty.fuqua.duke.edu/~dah7/
DataLibrary/TF-FAC.xls.
15
In unreported tests, we also analyse whether liquidity risk, proxied using a tradable (eq-
uity) liquidity fator of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) their measure of illiquidity (available on
Robert F. Stambaugh's home page http://finane.wharton.upenn.edu/~stambaugh/) sheds
additional light on the outperformane. However, the risk-fator is not statistially signiant
at onventional levels. Results available upon request.
40
Table 2.4: Multifator Model - Momentum Fators and Fung and Hsieh (2004) Fators
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES Q1 Q5 Q5-Q1 BarlayHedge Q1 Q5 Q5-Q1 BarlayHedge
MOMM 0.288*** 0.0669** -0.221*** 0.239*** 0.305*** 0.0697** -0.235*** 0.249***
(0.0599) (0.0333) (0.0621) (0.0373) (0.0673) (0.0314) (0.0693) (0.0393)
MOMW 0.179** 0.0909** -0.0885 0.195*** 0.167** 0.0816* -0.0851 0.180***
(0.0750) (0.0445) (0.0739) (0.0521) (0.0808) (0.0458) (0.0800) (0.0564)
MOMD 0.0539 0.0378 -0.0161 0.0984** 0.0171 0.0117 -0.00543 0.0606
(0.0610) (0.0430) (0.0606) (0.0449) (0.0631) (0.0423) (0.0699) (0.0460)
S&P 500 0.0364 0.0399 0.00358 0.0169
(0.0508) (0.0295) (0.0540) (0.0379)
SCMLC 0.0276 0.0379 0.0103 0.0456
(0.0997) (0.0331) (0.0956) (0.0582)
10Y -0.143** -0.0447 0.0980 -0.122***
(0.0578) (0.0315) (0.0671) (0.0379)
CREDITSPR 0.163** 0.0426 -0.121 0.121**
(0.0776) (0.0428) (0.0908) (0.0531)
PTFSCOM 0.00195 -0.00292 -0.00487 -0.000548
(0.0158) (0.0106) (0.0163) (0.00970)
PTFSFX 0.0235* 0.0188** -0.00477 0.0190*
(0.0133) (0.00828) (0.0130) (0.00995)
PTFSBD 0.0295** 0.0131 -0.0164 0.0275***
(0.0135) (0.00923) (0.0142) (0.0105)
Constant -0.00133 0.00485*** 0.00617*** 0.000332 -0.000951 0.00499*** 0.00594*** 0.000758
(0.00211) (0.00126) (0.00202) (0.00157) (0.00225) (0.00134) (0.00220) (0.00163)
Observations 157 157 157 157 157 157 157 157
Adj. R² 0.285 0.130 0.157 0.416 0.355 0.210 0.183 0.505
Notes: the table analyzes the monthly returns of the dierent quintile portfolios using Baltas and Kosowski (2012) their momentum
fators and a ombination of Baltas and Kosowski (2012) their fators and Fung and Hsieh (2004) their 7-fator model. The Fung
and Hsieh (2004) fators are the Standard & Poors 500 index monthly total return (S&P 500); the spread return between Russell
2000 index monthly total return and Standard & Poors 500 monthly total return (SCMLC); The monthly hange in the 10-year
treasury (onstant maturity) yield (10Y); the monthly hange in the Moody's Baa yield less 10-year treasury onstant maturity
yield (CREDIT SPR); Fung and Hsieh (2001) their Bond Trend-Following Fator (PTFSBD), Curreny Trend-Following Fator
(PTFSPX), and Commodity Trend-Following Fator (PTFSCOM).
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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returns less explainable by fators are more likely to possess managerial skills
as they pursue more distint strategies.
2.5.3 Alternative Explanations for the Premium
While so far our analysis yields notable results with regard to the risk-adjusted
performane of more positively autoorrelated Managed Futures funds, it is
instrutive to explore alternative explanations that might explain the observed
premium. To this end, we examine whether reliane on partiular strategies,
possible dierential performane during adverse market states, attrition rates,
and bakll bias might explain the performane.
2.5.3.1 Relationship with Managed Futures' Strategies and Funds'
Traits
The portfolios' omposition ould be onentrated in Managed Futures ate-
gories that exeute distintly dierent strategies. In partiular, funds ould en-
gage in trading strategies suh as option writing, whih might lead to dierent
risk/return-proles ompared to the more dominant trend-following strategy.
Non-trend-following strategies might therefore generate steady positive returns
that indue positive serial orrelation, but whih might be followed by large
losses. As mentioned in the data desription, we have removed funds that indi-
ate that they rely exlusively on option strategies.
Nevertheless, it is instrutive to report the omposition of the quintiles of
interest in terms of the strategies employed by the onstituents. To this end,
we employ the lassiation performed during the data handling. The results
are reported in Figure 2.1.
The bar harts indiate that, while a portfolio onsisting of positively au-
toorrelated Managed Futures seems to ontain somewhat fewer (systemati)
trend-followers, there are nevertheless no pronouned dierenes in the strate-
gies employed by the managers inluded within every quintile portfolio. This
suggests that the positive autoorrelation is not a feature of a partiular strat-
egy, but rather a feature of ertain funds aross dierent strategies.
There is a seond dimension along whih the strategies the funds follow
might lead to a stronger performane of the upper quintile portfolio, ompared
to the other quintiles. In partiular, dierenes in risk-adjusted performane
might to some extent be driven by diversiation gains. To analyze whether
the potential for diversiation gains diers aross the dierent quintiles, we
report the average pairwise orrelation among the onstituents prior to portfolio
formation. We estimate pairwise orrelations using the 5-year lookbak window
used to estimate the autoorrelation struture.
The results indiate that average pairwise orrelation between any two funds
is indeed lower in the ase of the upper quintile portfolio. In partiular, the
pairwise orrelation equals 0.11 for the upper quintile ompared to 0.2 for the
lowest quintile. This nding indiates that part of the strong performane is
due to diversiation gains. However, it also orroborates our earlier onjeture
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Figure 2.1: Strategy Composition Quintile Portfolios
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Notes: the staked-bars report the omposition of the dierent
quintile portfolios over the sample period.
that these managers do not luster around a partiular investment approah.
Instead, managerial skills might explain the good performane and low pairwise
orrelation with other Managed Futures.
Next to the strategies, we also analyse the average size and age of the funds
inluded within every quintile. Given reent evidene that hedge fund perfor-
mane is related to age and size (see Boyson (2008)), it is possible that the
upper quintile onsists of smaller or younger funds. The results for the average
fund size suggest no dierenes in average fund size. The average fund size
is USD 361m and USD 325m for the lower and upper quintile, respetively. A
onventional t-test allows us to onlude that there are indeed no signiant dif-
ferenes in the average size of funds in the extreme quintiles (p-value of 0.3265).
In unreported results, we also observe that there are no signiant dierenes
in the age of the funds aross quintiles.
2.5.3.2 Tail Risk
Of ourse, it is possible that there is a dierene between what fund managers
say they do, and what they atually do. Therefore we also onsider an alter-
native approah to determine whether more positively autoorrelated Managed
Futures take on tail risk. One manifestation of dierential risk-taking should
be evident when omparing performane during adverse market states. Fung
and Hsieh (1997) are the rst to use suh an approah and show that Man-
aged Futures exhibit a straddle-like pay-o. This feature of Managed Futures
has been oined `risis alpha' by Kaminski and Mende (2011). Good overall
performane of a portfolio investing in more positively autoorrelated Managed
Futures might ome at the expense of risis alpha, i.e. strong performane dur-
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ing risis times. Positively orrelated funds' performane might break down
during adverse market states and thus hamper their diversiation benet in a
portfolio ontext.
We investigate the portfolios' performane during dierent market states, fol-
lowing the approah of Fung and Hsieh (1997). In partiular, we group monthly
returns of MSCI World Gross Total Return into ve market states, ranging from
sharp sellos to rallies, by ranking the monthly gross returns. We then report
the average performane of both the equity index and the portfolios of Managed
Futures in the same period. For omparison, we perform a volatility adjustment
suh that the Managed Futures portfolios, ex-post, exhibit the same degree of
volatility as the equity index. We do the adjustment in the following way
Radjp =
σˆ(Rworld −Rf )
σˆ(Rp −Rf )
· (Rp −Rf ) +Rf (2.4)
where σˆ() stands for the estimated standard deviation. Rworld is the monthly
gross return on the MSCI World Index, Rf is the monthly risk-free rate and
Rp is the monthly return of the portfolio whose volatility we wish to sale.
Sine it is not possible to lever the interest rate omponent (proxied here by the
risk-free rate) inherent in Managed Futures' returns, we subtrat the risk-free
rate from Rp when performing the volatility adjustment and then add it again
afterwards.
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The results are reported in Figure 2.2.
The results suggest that the higher performane of more positively autoor-
related Managed Futures does not lead to a deterioration of performane during
adverse market states.
Another approah to analyzing whether Managed Futures funds in the top or
bottom quintile are exposed to tail risk an be done using a regression approah.
As desribed in the introdution, a likely explanation as to why we might expet
persistene in the returns of Managed Futures has to do with the observation
that their payo resembles long volatility. To analyze whether the quintile
portfolios of interest exhibit behavior similar to that of a put-option writing
strategy, we proxy the performane of suh a strategy using monthly returns
on the CBOE S&P 500 PutWrite Index. Table 2.5 reports the results when we
inlude this additional risk fator.
The outperformane of the upper quintile does not seem to be the result
of taking on tail risk by engaging in (short) put-option writing on the S&P
500. In addition, the results on the long/short portfolio indiate that the upper
and bottom quintiles' exposure with regard to this risk fator does not dier
signiantly. Interestingly, the BarlayHedge index appears to load positively
on this risk fator, even after inlusion of the Fung and Hsieh (2004) fators.
16
While a Managed Futures program an be levered several times by hanging the amount
of margin held, this is not the ase for the return earned on the ash held (i.e. risk-free rate).
One should therefore subtrat this return imbedded in a Managed Futures program's reported
return when adjusting the volatility of a program.
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Table 2.5: Multifator Model - Portfolio Returns and Option Writing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES Q1 Q5 Q5-Q1 BarlayHedge Q1 Q5 Q5-Q1 BarlayHedge
MOMM 0.290*** 0.0688** -0.222*** 0.240*** 0.305*** 0.0704** -0.235*** 0.250***
(0.0606) (0.0322) (0.0625) (0.0374) (0.0681) (0.0315) (0.0694) (0.0382)
MOMW 0.209*** 0.116*** -0.0928 0.218*** 0.183** 0.0982** -0.0848 0.205***
(0.0721) (0.0411) (0.0740) (0.0498) (0.0866) (0.0477) (0.0842) (0.0597)
MOMD 0.0800 0.0600 -0.0200 0.119** 0.0455 0.0405 -0.00496 0.105**
(0.0623) (0.0441) (0.0625) (0.0477) (0.0648) (0.0434) (0.0705) (0.0484)
S&P 500 -0.0314 -0.0290 0.00247 -0.0891
(0.0938) (0.0544) (0.0873) (0.0695)
SCMLC 0.0159 0.0259 0.0101 0.0273
(0.0989) (0.0342) (0.0956) (0.0562)
10Y -0.137** -0.0391 0.0981 -0.113***
(0.0583) (0.0326) (0.0679) (0.0397)
CREDITSPR 0.150* 0.0289 -0.121 0.0997*
(0.0793) (0.0463) (0.0942) (0.0557)
PTFSCOM -8.74e-05 -0.00499 -0.00490 -0.00373
(0.0158) (0.0109) (0.0162) (0.00999)
PTFSFX 0.0220 0.0172** -0.00480 0.0166*
(0.0133) (0.00838) (0.0130) (0.00984)
PTFSBD 0.0282** 0.0118 -0.0164 0.0255**
(0.0137) (0.00939) (0.0145) (0.0102)
PUTWRITE 0.0987* 0.0840** -0.0146 0.0793* 0.126 0.128 0.00206 0.198**
(0.0584) (0.0365) (0.0600) (0.0446) (0.125) (0.0780) (0.122) (0.0924)
Constant -0.00240 0.00393*** 0.00633*** -0.000533 -0.00183 0.00409*** 0.00593*** -0.000624
(0.00223) (0.00128) (0.00219) (0.00160) (0.00230) (0.00131) (0.00222) (0.00172)
Observations 157 157 157 157 157 157 157 157
Adj. R² 0.295 0.155 0.157 0.426 0.359 0.225 0.183 0.520
Notes: the table analyzes the monthly returns of the dierent quintile portfolios using Baltas and Kosowski (2012) their momentum
fators and a ombination of Baltas and Kosowski (2012) their fators and Fung and Hsieh (2004) their 7-fator model. The Fung
and Hsieh (2004) fators are the Standard & Poors 500 index monthly total return (S&P 500); the spread return between Russell
2000 index monthly total return and Standard & Poors 500 monthly total return (SCMLC); The monthly hange in the 10-year
treasury (onstant maturity) yield (10Y); the monthly hange in the Moody's Baa yield less 10-year treasury onstant maturity
yield (CREDIT SPR); Fung and Hsieh (2001) their Bond Trend-Following Fator (PTFSBD), Curreny Trend-Following Fator
(PTFSPX), and Commodity Trend-Following Fator (PTFSCOM). Finally, an option strategy involving writing out-of-the-money
put options on the S&P 500 is aptured using CBOE PutWrite index (PUTWRITE).
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Figure 2.2: Performane During Dierent Market States
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Notes: the bar hart reports the average monthly return during dif-
ferent market states. Market states are identied by ranking monthly
gross returns of the MSCI World into 5 dierent quintiles. Average
(volatility-adjusted) monthly returns for the quintile portfolios during
the orresponding months are reported.
2.5.3.3 Attrition and Delisting Bias
While dierenes in risk-taking might not be evident from the trading strate-
gies employed or performane during adverse market states, suh dierenes
may nevertheless show up when examining the funds' attrition rates. Attrition
rates allow us to quantify potential risks not aptured by the funds' self-reported
returns. hedge funds in general and Managed Futures in partiular have high
attrition rates, as is evident from Table 2.1. Arnold (2013) notes that while attri-
tion of Managed Futures is high, real failures are onsiderably lower, suggesting
that many liquidations may not be damaging to investors. Nevertheless, given
the voluntary nature of hedge fund databases, managers might fail to report
further losses to the investors by not reporting last months' performane. Con-
sequently, returns might not reet the atual losses of investors. The delisting
bias that suh behaviour indues, has been analysed in ontext of hedge fund
databases. Edelman, Fung, and Hsieh (2013) onlude that missing returns
of suessful funds tend to oset the delisting bias in the missing returns of
liquidating funds.
Nevertheless, we analyse attrition rates and the possible impat of bakll
bias on our results. We start by ounting the number of fund delistings that
our for every quintile portfolio in the period immediately after rebalaning. In
partiular, we ount the number of instanes where our portfolio onstrution
would have invested in funds that no longer report in the subsequent period.
This provides a rst useful proxy of risks that do not show up in the funds'
self-reported returns.
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We nd that the fration of delistings is slightly higher in the ase of the
upper quintile portfolio with an attrition rate of 26% (108 delistings), ompared
to 22% (88 delistings) in the ase of the lower quintile. These results suggest
that there are more fund failures among positively autoorrelated Managed
Futures, although subdued. Nevertheless, this result does suggest that perhaps
the outperformane is be driven by delisting bias.
Therefore, we attempt to expliitly orret for the delisting bias. In partiu-
lar, we repeat the portfolio approah outlined above, but assume a -4.5% return
in the rst month that the fund fails to report to the database. This -4.5%
return orresponds to the average ompounded omitted return for the Lipper
TASS and HFR database found by Jorion and Shwarz (2013). Correting for
delisting bias in this way takes into aount the higher inidene of fund delist-
ings in ertain quintile portfolios. This is neessary as the likelihood of a fund
beoming delisted seems to be positively orrelated to higher degrees of positive
autoorrelation in the programs' returns. The results for the value-weighted
quintile portfolios are reported in Table 2.6.
We nd that the performane of positively autoorrelated Managed Futures
seems to persist, even when we orret for delisting bias using a onservative
-4.5% return. This is partiularly the ase for the AUM-weighted portfolios, but
appears to be the less the ase for the equal-weighted portfolios.
2.6 Conlusion
In this paper, we developed and applied a measure for deteting low but per-
sistent levels of performane persistene in hedge funds' self-reported returns.
We applied this measure to Managed Futures, a hedge fund ategory that is
unlikely to exhibit spurious serial orrelation due to smoothing and illiquidity
in underlying positions.
We make several ontributions to the existing literature on autoorrelation
patterns in hedge funds and Managed Futures in partiular. First, we orrob-
orate earlier ndings in that we provide additional evidene of the existene
of a premium in Managed Futures, using an alternative hedge fund database.
Seond, using a multifator analysis, we nd that the observed outperformane
of funds sorted on the degree of persistene in their returns annot be explained
using existing models. This suggests that the returns generated by these funds
are distintly dierent. Third, we show that the premium is unlikely to be
explained by a reliane on partiular strategies, fund size, a ompensation for
tail risk, attrition rates, and delisting bias. Given onsiderably lower share
restritions for Managed Futures, our results suggest that inorporating serial
orrelation may improve the manager seletion and alloation proess.
The above results suggest that the observed persistene might be a proxy
of fund skills. If a fund manager has a good trading approah that ts the
prevailing market environment at a given period in time, that fund is expeted
to persistently generate gains. Of ourse, a partiular trading approah should
not be expeted to work indenitely sine the market environment regularly
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Table 2.6: Results Corretion for Delisting Bias
Value-weighted Portfolios
Mean Monthly
Return
Standard
Deviation
Sortino Ratio Sharpe
Ratio
MDD CAGR
Q1 (low) 0.40% 2.83% 0.81 0.53 -17.14% 4.39%
Q5 (high) 0.57% 1.59% 2.56 1.12 -6.61% 6.91%
Dierene in means (p-val) 0.19 LW -statisti 2.94**
BarlayHedge 0.55% 2.28% 1.53 0.98 -7.77% 6.40%
Equal-weighted Portfolios
Mean Monthly
Return
Standard
Deviation
Sortino Ratio Sharpe
Ratio
MDD CAGR
Q1 (low) 0.50% 2.68% 1.18 0.78 -10.93% 5.71%
Q5 (high) 0.43% 1.62% 1.88 0.96 -8.22% 5.09%
Dierene in means (p-val) 0.38 LW -statisti 1.34
BarlayHedge 0.43% 1.62% 1.53 0.98 -7.77% 6.40%
Notes: this table reports the results for a robustness hek where we repeat the portfolio onstrution, but at the same
time impose a hypothetial -4.5% return in the rst month a fund stops reporting to Barlayhedge. The table reports the
mean monthly return, the standard deviation of mean monthly returns, the annual Sortino ratio, the annual Sharpe ratio,
maximum drawdown (MDD), and the ompound annual growth rate (CAGR).A dierene in means test, using a bootstrap
with a 1000 repliations is used to test the dierene in average returns. The Ledoit-Wolf (LW) statisti tests the statistial
signiane of the dierene in Sharpe ratios. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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hanges. As suh, rebalaning the portfolio is required. Finally, we note that
our results suggest that, while it is unlikely that the outperformane of more
positively autoorrelated Managed Futures funds is driven by delisting bias,
slightly higher attrition rates require lose monitoring and risk management.
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Chapter 3
Intraday momentum in FX
markets: disentangling
informed trading from
liquidity provision
1
Journal of Finanial Markets
In Press
3.1 Introdution
Market partiipants need time to interpret and reat to new information.
Consequently, the dissemination of news potentially leaves room for pre-
ditability over short horizons of time. Theoretially, partiipants' trades
are likely to be informative of future returns, given that they ontain
private information (Lyons, 1995).
A number of papers show that interdealer order ow in foreign ex-
hange (FX) markets is indeed preditive of future returns. Payne (2003)
shows that trades arry information and have a substantial permanent
impat on pries. Similarly, Chordia et al. (2005) show that order ow
1
This hapter is based on joint work with Kevin Lampaert (Ghent University) and
Mihael Frömmel (Ghent University).
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is preditive of future returns over the very short horizon. More reently,
Chordia et al. (2008) nd that very short-term preditability is dimin-
ished when bid-ask spreads are narrower, indiating that liquidity en-
hanes market eieny through inreased arbitrage ativity. This nd-
ing suggests that liquidity also plays a role in the short-term preditability
of returns.
Although most of the above studies fous on very short horizons, Gao
et al. (2015) take a onsiderably longer perspetive while staying in the
eld of intraday high-frequeny data. In partiular, they investigate the
preditability of a seurity's rst half-hour return on its last half-hour
return and nd that the former is positively preditive of the latter. This
nding suggests that, in addition to preditability over very short periods
of time, there also appears to be preditability over onsiderably longer
periods of time during the trading day. To date, however, no researhers
have empirially tested the likely drivers of this intraday momentum.
Our ontribution to the literature on FX mirostruture is twofold.
First, by using a long sample of transation-level FX market data at tik
frequeny, we onstrut high-frequeny measures of the likely drivers of
intraday momentum in the ruble market. Using these measures, we ana-
lyze whether intraday momentum is stronger on days with more informed
trading or when demand for liquidity is higher. These hypotheses apture
the likely explanations of how market partiipants' behavior may generate
the observed intraday momentum eet.
For the RUB-USD FX market, and ontrary to the results of Gao et al.
(2015) for the equity market, we do not nd any evidene supporting the
idea that intraday momentum is the result of strategi informed trading
during the opening and losing of the trading session. This nding is
onsistent with the earlier nding that informed traders in the RUB-USD
FX market mainly trade during the opening of the trading sessions in the
Mosow Interbank Curreny Exhange (MICEX) (Menkho and Shmel-
ing, 2010). Instead, our results for the ruble market indiate that opening
half-hour returns are positively preditive of losing half-hour returns on
days when bid-ask spreads are high during the opening half-hour. We hy-
pothesize that high spreads are onsistent with higher levels of liquidity
provision by some market partiipants following heavy trading early in
the morning. Taken together, our results lend support to the argument
that risk aversion to overnight holdings and a potential disposition eet
among liquidity-providing market partiipants drive intraday momentum
in the ruble market.
Seond, our ndings also ontribute to a better understanding of in-
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traday momentum along several other dimensions. In partiular, we or-
roborate the nding of Gao et al. (2015) that the trading hours of the
non-major urreny's domesti market matter for intraday momentum.
Although these authors observe a general lak of intraday momentum in
major urrenies vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar when onsidering U.S. trading
hours, they nd some weak evidene of intraday momentum when they
determine impliit trading hours, based on inreases in volume in inter-
national equity index futures. Our results for the RUB-USD urreny
pair show that, by onsidering the expliit trading hours of the MICEX,
signiant levels of intraday momentum are present. Clearly, the expliit
nature of the trading hours helps to identify the relevant periods over
whih intraday momentum ours in this FX market. Finally, our results
also support the earlier observation that intraday momentum is more pro-
nouned during nanial risis periods.
The remainder of this paper is strutured as follows. In Setion 3.2,
we provide an overview of the related literature and formulate the dif-
ferent mehanisms that may drive intraday momentum. In Setion 3.3,
we desribe the data used for our empirial analysis. In setion 3.4, we
outline the onept of intraday momentum and present the methodology
used to measure the degree of informed trading and liquidity demand. In
setion 3.5, we disuss the results. In setion 3.6, we assess the robustness
of the results. We onlude in Setion 3.7.
3.2 Motivation and related literature
Gao et al. (2015) suggest two potential mehanisms that may drive in-
traday momentum in nanial markets. First, the intraday pattern an
be the result of liquidity provision by some market partiipants (e.g., day
traders, market makers, et.). With prie dissemination being the highest
at the beginning of a trading session (Bloomeld et al., 2005) when market
partiipants reat to maroeonomi news released overnight before the
start of the trading session, temporary imbalanes may arise when mar-
ket partiipants reat similarly to news. Day traders and market makers
may be motivated to take opposite positions to provide liquidity to the
market. However, although these traders may quikly lose out winning
positions throughout the day, they may be more relutant to rapidly lose
out losing positions. However, the prospet of having to hold positions
overnight may onvine traders and market makers to lose out the po-
sitions nonetheless. Gao et al. (2015) point to a disposition eet among
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(day) traders (Odean, 1998; Loke and Mann, 2005) to motivate suh
asymmetri behavior. The risk management praties of nanial insti-
tutions, however, may similarly fore traders to lose out positions before
the end of the day. This behavior of (foreign exhange) dealers' ooading
undesired inventory has been widely doumented in the literature (Lyons,
1995; Bjønnes and Rime, 2005).
Seond, intraday momentum is also theoretially onsistent with the
strategi behavior of informed traders. Theoretially, Kyle (1985) and
Admati and Peiderer (1988) argue that informed traders will time their
trades during high-volume periods to hide their informational advantage
and to limit the prie impat. Doing so will fore informed traders to
trade during high-volume periods (see Bloomeld et al., 2005). Given the
well-known U-shape in intraday trading volume, the impliation is that
they will trade at the beginning and near the end of the trading day. If
informed traders indeed plae their trades during periods of heavy trading
and if their trading has a (permanent) prie impat, then this may also
drive the observed preditability in intraday returns.
Both explanations are losely related to the existing FX mirostru-
ture literature on the preditability of returns in FX markets. Researh
indiates that fundamentals, proxied with maroeonomi variables, per-
form poorly in foreasting future exhange rate movements (e.g., Evans
and Lyons, 1999); however, this is not the ase for order ow and liquid-
ity. In partiular, it is well founded that order ow is preditive of returns
over the very short term. For example, Payne (2003) shows that market
partiipants' trades arry information and have a substantial permanent
impat on pries. Similarly, Chordia et al. (2005) show that order ow is
preditive of future returns over the very short horizon.
Theoretially, the preditability of future returns based on order ow
is onsistent with strategi order splitting among informed traders. Given
that information among market partiipants is heterogeneous, some par-
tiipants are likely to partiipate in strategi trading to disguise their
superior information. One way to lower the impat of their trades is
through order splitting (Chakravarty, 2001), whih results in orrelated
trades.
Love and Payne (2008) show that there is short-term preditability
through order ow when publi information is released, whih suggests
that the preditability is driven by information proessing. Simultane-
ously, Evans and Lyons (2005) show that FX markets inorporate news
only gradually, over the matter of a few days, rather than instantaneously.
Similarly, Rime et al. (2010) onrm gradual learning and show that order
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ow is a strong preditor for daily returns. The above literature indiates
that both transitory and permanent prie impats seem to be preditable
from past order ow, at least over short horizons.
There are reent reports that liquidity is also an important explana-
tory variable in the prie disovery proess. Chordia et al. (2008) nd
that very short-term preditability is diminished when bid-ask spreads
are narrower, indiating that liquidity enhanes market eieny through
inreased arbitrage ativity. More reently, Boudt and Petitjean (2014)
show that hanges in order imbalanes are informative of prie disovery.
This nding suggests that liquidity also plays a role in the short-term
preditability of returns.
3.3 Data desription and institutional features
3.3.1 Data
We use a partiularly long-time span of intraday transation-level data
at tik frequeny on the Russian ruble-United States dollar. We obtain
the data from the MICEX, the largest urreny exhange in Russia and
Eastern Europe. Spot trading in the RUB-USD urreny pair equals
1.66% of total FX spot trading volume in 2013, meaning that the urreny
pair ranks as the 12th mostly heavily traded globally.
We obtain data for the January 12, 2005 to Deember 30, 2014 pe-
riod. Although onstrained to one partiular urreny pair, the data set
oers several advantages. First, a long data span avoids a number of short
sample problems that researhers often enounter in the mirostruture
literature, suh as possible strutural breaks or biases in the estimated pa-
rameters. Seond, the sample period features both the 2007-2009 Global
Finanial Crisis and the more reent 2014 Russian urreny risis, during
whih the ruble was the objet of the risis. Figure 3.1 illustrates the
evolution of the RUB-USD exhange rate over the sample period.
Both the 2007-2009 Global Finanial Crisis and the 2014 Russian ur-
reny risis are learly disernible in Figure 1, with both instanes leading
to a meaningful depreiation in the value of the ruble versus the dollar.
The gure also suggests somewhat higher volatility post-2008 ompared
to the rst ouple of years of the sample period.
The MICEX trading platform was jointly developed with Reuters and
has features similar to the platform of Reuters or Eletroni Brokerage
Servies (EBS). Partiipants an observe the prie, the trading volume,
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Figure 3.1: Evolution U.S. dollar - Russian ruble (2005-2014)
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and the bid and ask pries with standing volumes. In ontrast to most
other FX markets, it is only possible to submit limit orders to the plat-
form. However, market orders an be synthetially reated by submitting
marketable limit orders. The MICEX overs all domesti spot trading
in Russia. Oshore trading in the RUB-USD is performed through and
limited to non-deliverable forward ontrats. To illustrate the fat that
both platforms are very similar and that the MICEX is the main exhange
for spot trading in RUB-USD worldwide, we note that trading on Thom-
son Reuters is transmitted to the MICEX during trading hours when the
MICEX is open. Refer to Menkho and Shmeling (2010) for further
details on ruble trading on the MICEX.
The data set ontains the following information for every trade exe-
uted on the MICEX; a time-of-day time stamp (to the milliseond), the
prie at whih the order is exeuted, and the size of the trade. Simultane-
ously, we also have information on the best bid- and ask prie at the time
every order is exeuted. From the transation-level data, we alulate
half-hour (30 minutes) log returns for eah trading day t as follows:
rj,t = log
(
pj,t
pj−1,t
)
, (3.1)
where rj,t represents the half-hour return at day t for intraday interval
j and pj,t represents the exhange rate at day t (the value of one dollar
quoted in rubles) at the end of intraday interval j. The rst half-hour
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Table 3.1: Summary statistis RUB-USD exhange rate
Panel A: Full Sample
Period (2005-2014)
Panel B: Finanial Crises
(2007-2009 & 2014)
First
Half-hour
Returns
Last
Half-hour
Returns
First
Half-hour
Returns
Last
Half-hour
Returns
Mean
-0.001% 0.004% 0.004% 0.004%
St. Dev.
0.589% 0.124% 0.798% 0.159%
Skewness
-1.842 -5.204 -2.278 -7.060
Kurtosis
56.896 138.337 45.945 132.897
Min
-8.932% -2.943% -8.932% -2.943%
Max
6.265% 1.218% 6.265% 0.735%
# of Obs.
2,342 2,342 922 922
This table reports summary statistis for the RUB-USD exhange rate. We report
statistis for both the rst and the last half-hour return. Panel A ontains the
statistis for the full sample period 2005-2014, while Panel B ontains the statistis
for the risis periods (2007-2009 & 2014).
return of eah day is alulated based on the previous day's losing prie.
This way we also apture the overnight return omponent, whih might
drive the informed trading and liquidity demand we wish to analyze. At
the same time, by using the previous day's losing prie we avoid relying on
the opening prie. This is an important onsideration, sine the opening
prie is prone to priing errors that may bias opening returns (see Amihud
and Mendelson, 1987). Table 3.1 reports the summary statistis for the
rst and last half-hour returns we use. We report statistis both for the
full sample period and for the risis periods separately.
We observe that opening half-hour returns are onsiderably more vari-
able than losing half-hour returns, whih reets information proessing
at the start of the trading session. In addition, both return series are neg-
atively skewed, suggesting that large negative returns are onsiderably
more prevalent than large positive returns.
3.3.2 Institutional features
The data set we onsider has several features. First, and spei to the
MICEX, the exhange hanged the opening and losing hour on several
oasions over the sample period. In all instanes, the hange in trading
hours led to an inrease in the number of hours that the MICEX is open.
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Table 3.2: Overview trading sessions on the MICEX exhange for the
RUB-USD
Period Opening Closing
01/01/2005 - 11/11/2008 10:00 14:00
12/11/2008 - 12/04/2013 10:00 15:00
13/04/2013 - 31/12/2014 10:00 17:00
Trading hours in Mosow loal time (GMT+3).
Table 3.2 provides an overview of the hanges in trading hours.
The hanges in the number of trading hours imply that the amount
of time between the rst half-hour return and the last half-hour return,
the returns of interest, is not onstant throughout the sample period.
Beause intraday momentum is expeted to our mainly during the start
and the end of the trading day, however, we expet that the phenomenon
is unaeted by the partiular time of day with whih the trading half-
hours orrespond.
Seond, we note that foreign exhange markets are generally onsid-
ered to be open virtually around the lok, with at least one major ex-
hange trading the major urreny pairs virtually at any point in time
during the week. As suh, the notion of rst half-hour and last half-
hour returns in the ase of foreign exhange markets may seem inap-
propriate. Although this is true, trading intensies onsiderably when
a urreny's domesti nanial market ommenes trading. Furthermore,
returns, spreads, and volatility are impated by the market ativity of var-
ious nanial enters (Andersen and Bollerslev, 1997). Therefore, it an
be argued that foreign exhange markets generally have impliit opening
and losing trading hours. In the ase of our data set, trading in the ur-
reny pair is organized during a xed trading session, providing us with
expliit opening and losing hours.
Nonetheless, to the extent that market partiipants trade outside the
trading hours of the MICEX, this partiular feature of the FX market may
work against nding intraday momentum. Simultaneously, both explana-
tions for intraday momentum ruially depend on liquidity onsiderations.
Thus, if the observed intraday momentum desribed above is driven by
the partiular behavior of traders suggested by both explanations, then
they will likely trade during the trading hours of the MICEX.
Finally, we also briey onsider the partiular institutional irum-
stanes implied by FX markets. It is well known that trading on these
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markets is reserved to major banks and large institutions. This diret
trading between major dealers overs the vast majority of foreign ex-
hange traded volume and is often referred to as the rst tier or wholesale
tier. Our data set overs the trades exeuted on this wholesale tier mar-
ket. Retail investors, mutual funds, and large non-nanial rms are,
however, not diretly ative on this tier. Instead, these investors transat
bilaterally with banks or brokers who provide quotes. Depending on the
inventories of the banks and brokers with whih these investors transat,
these investors' orders may or may not be passed on to the wholesale
tier. This partiular market struture means that retail investors, mutual
funds, and large non-nanial rms will only indiretly impat the foreign
exhange market. As suh, it is ultimately the manner in whih market
makers pass the resulting inventory hanges to the wholesale tier that
matters. We suggest that, if the liquidity needs of investors in the retail
tier are large enough to materially impat the inventories of the market
makers, then the eet will propagate to the trading on the wholesale tier.
Despite the trading that follows from the two-tier struture of foreign ex-
hange markets, trading on the wholesale tier strongly outweighs trading
on the retail tier. The fores driving intraday momentum an be at play
between partiipants in the wholesale tier, and we diretly observe (the
prie impat of) this trading in our sample.
We onlude that the partiular struture of FX markets does not, a
priori, rule out the possibility of intraday momentum in foreign exhange
markets, although some features likely work against observing an intraday
momentum eet.
3.4 Methodology
To determine the existene of intraday momentum, we losely follow the
approah used by Gao et al. (2015) and estimate preditive regressions.
These authors note that the preditive regressions orrespond to autore-
gressive (AR) models. Although this is true, hanges to the trading hours
by the MICEX over the sample period imply that, in our ase, the ex-
at lag length of the AR model varies over time (see Setion 3.3). We
therefore express the preditive regression as follows:
rl,t = α+ βrf,t + ǫt, (3.2)
where rf,t is the rst half-hour return, rl,t is the last half-hour return
and ǫt is the error term. We also onsider the preditive value of the
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penultimate return, whih we denote as rsl,t. The inlusion of this term
allows us to ontrol for any short-term persistene in the exhange rate
during the day and to isolate the preditive value of the last half-hour
return.
To investigate the relation between informed trading and intraday
momentum, we onstrut the dynami probability of informed trading
(DPIN) measure suggested by Chang et al. (2014). This measure builds
on the empirial work of Campbell et al. (1992) and Avramov et al. (2006)
and allows us to measure the degree of informed versus uniformed trad-
ing based on high-frequeny transation-level data. More speially, this
approah allows us to measure and trak the presene of informed trades
throughout the trading day based on a high frequeny. The fat that -
nanial markets are beoming inreasingly omputer-driven  potentially
making private information inreasingly short-lived  makes measuring
informed trading at the intraday level inreasingly important. The ap-
proah of Chang et al. (2014) allows us to avoid a degradation to lower
frequenies of the PIN measure originally proposed by Easley et al. (1997).
Following Chang et al. (2014), we rst perform a regression to isolate
the unexpeted half-hour return omponent (ǫt) from the return series
while ontrolling for day-of-the-week eets (using dummy variables de-
noted D
day
j ), time-of-day-eets (using dummy variables denoted D
int
j ),
and lagged half-hour returns (rt−k)
2
:
rt = α0 +
4∑
i=1
α1i ·D
day
i +
J∑
j=1
α2j ·D
int
j +
12∑
k=1
α3k · rt−k + ǫt. (3.3)
Autoorrelation patterns in unexpeted returns (or a lak thereof)
indiate the presene of uninformed (informed) trading. In partiular,
Avramov et al. (2006) note that trades that take liquidity generate (fu-
ture) prie reversals. At the same time, sell trades in the presene of
positive unexpeted returns do not exhibit any autoorrelation and there-
fore indiate informed trading. Chang et al. (2014) argue that this an be
extended to buy-side trades. The authors point out that buy-side trades
in the presene of negative unexpeted returns do not exhibit any auto-
orrelation, whih again implies informed trading. Following Chang et al.
(2014) our measure of informed trading is alulated as follows:
2
Where J equals the number of intraday half-hour intervals in the spei period.
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DPINt =
NBt
NTt
· (ǫt < 0) +
NSt
NTt
· (ǫt > 0), (3.4)
where NBt, NSt, and NTt are the number of buy, sell, and total trades,
respetively, made during the half-hour interval from t to t−1 and (ǫt < 0)
and (ǫt > 0) are sign indiators that equal one when the unexpeted return
is smaller and larger than zero, respetively, and zero otherwise.
To analyze the alternative explanation, i.e., whether liquidity provision
to some extent drives intraday momentum, we require a measure that
identies the trading days in whih market partiipants an be expeted
to provide liquidity to the market. For purposes of analysis, we fous
on the tightness dimension of liquidity (Kyle, 1985). This is the main
dimension of liquidity and is measured using the equal-weighted quoted
spread (EWQS). This metri measures the average bid-ask spread over a
given period of time. We hypothesize that, on days where the EWQS was
higher during the rst half-hour, more liquidity was demanded by market
partiipants (e.g., as a onsequene of eonomi news that was released
overnight), meaning that some day traders or market makers are more
likely to have provided the required liquidity.
3.5 Results
In this setion, we rst establish the presene of intraday momentum and
assess the eonomi signiane of the eet. Then we explore the relation
between intraday momentum, informed trading, and liquidity demand.
3.5.1 Intraday momentum in RUB-USD
We start by running a set of preditive regressions in the spirit of Gao
et al. (2015). In partiular, we explore whether the rst half-hour return,
the penultimate half-hour return, and a ombination of both indepen-
dent variables are preditive of the last half-hour return. The results are
reported in Table 3.3.
The results for the entire sample, reported in Panel A of Table 3.3,
indiate that there is no signiant relation between the last half-hour
return and the rst half-hour return. Although the oeient has the
expeted sign, it is not signiant at onventional levels, with a p-value
of 0.12. The results for the penultimate half-hour return are similar,
although the relation appears to be even weaker. When we inlude both
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Table 3.3: Preditability of last half-hour return
Panel A: Full Sample Panel B: Crises
(2007-2009 & 2014)
Panel C: Exluding Crises
Variables rl rl rl rl rl rl rl rl rl
rf 0.0428 0.0412* 0.0698* 0.0656** -0.0097 -0.0097
(0.028) (0.025) (0.038) (0.031) (0.011) (0.011)
rsl -0.1642 -0.1493 -0.2716 -0.2271 0.0020 0.0033
(0.148) (0.124) (0.234) (0.178) (0.054) (0.053)
Interept 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 2,342 2,342 2,342 922 922 922 1,420 1,420 1,420
R² (%) 4.3 1.9 5.9 12.2 5.1 15.7 0.2 0.0 0.2
This table reports the results for the sample period from January 12, 2005 to Deember 30, 2014 by regressing the
losing half-hour return (rl) on the rst half-hour return (rf ) and the seond last half-hour return (rsl). Panel A
ontains the results for the full sample period, whereas Panel B reports the results for the risis periods. Panel
C ontains the results for the non-risis periods. Newey and West (1987) robust standard errors in parentheses.
Signiane at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels indiated by ***, **, and *, respetively.
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intraday returns in the preditive regression, however, the oeient on
the rst half-hour return beomes signiant at onventional levels, albeit
only at the 10% level. One potential reason ould be mirostrutural issues
suh as bid-ask bounes, whih ause intraday returns to exhibit mean-
reverting behavior over short intervals. These results, although suggestive,
are somewhat thin.
Seond, we examine whether the relation diers during periods of -
nanial stress. We lassify the 2007-2009 Global Finanial Crisis and the
2014 Russian urreny risis as periods of nanial distress. The results,
reported in Panels B and C of Table 3.3, indiate that intraday momen-
tum is onsiderably more pronouned during periods of nanial stress.
During non-risis periods, however, the relation does not appear signi-
ant. This nding is onsistent with the ndings of Gao et al. (2015), who
nd that intraday momentum is more pronouned during the 2007-2009
Global Finanial Crisis.
Third, to test the preditive ability of intraday momentum out-of-
sample (OOS), we also perform OOS foreasts. In partiular, we run
the above preditive regression with expanding windows, adding one day
at a time. Using the estimated oeients of the preditive regression
(denoted using hats) and the value of the preditive variable at time s,
we an generate a foreast of the return at time s+ 1:
rˆl,s+1 = αˆ+ βˆrf,s. (3.5)
We perform these estimations for s = s0, ..., t − 1, thus generating a
time series of OOS return foreasts. s0 is the initial sample size used to
estimate the model (in our appliation, four years). We then estimate the
OOS R² to measure OOS foreastability:
OOS R2 = 1−
1
T−s0
∑T−1
s=s0
(rl,s+1 − rˆl,s)
2
1
T−s0
∑T−1
s=s0
(rl,s+1 − r¯l,s) 2
, (3.6)
where r¯l,s is the historial mean of the last half-hour return, alulated
from the expanding window of last half-hour returns. To test the signi-
ane of the OOS R², we employ the F -statisti of MCraken (2007). In
Table 3.4, we report the results for the OOS R².
Similarly to Gao et al. (2015), we obtain a signiant OOS R² of
approximately 1.6%. This level of OOS R² is very substantial ompared
to other works (e.g., Campbell and Thompson, 2008; Ferreira and Santa-
Clara, 2011). Simultaneously, the penultimate return does not seem to
have any OOS preditive power.
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Table 3.4: OOS preditability
OOS R² MSE-F
rf 1.609% 21.948***
rsl -0.086% -1.151
rf and rsl 1.640% 22.371***
This table reports the out-of-sample preditability results of the last half-
hour by the rst half hour return and the seond-to-last half-hour return,
using a set of reursive regressions. The initial sample period (s0) is four
years (2005-2008). Asterisks indiate statistial signiane of the OOS R²
using the MSE-F test
MSE − F = (T − s0)
(
MSEm −MSEp
MSEp
)
.
Asymptoti ritial values for the MSE test provided by MCraken (2007)
used to test signiane. Signiane at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels given by
*, **, and ***, respetively.
A seond method of testing the eonomi signiane of the results
is by analyzing the returns aruing to a simple market timing strategy
that uses signals based on the rst half-hour return. In partiular, every
trading day we take a long or short position at the beginning of the nal
half-hour period, depending on the return of the opening half-hour, and
lose out the position at the end of the trading day. We benhmark the
performane of this partiular strategy to a onstant long strategy that
always goes long at the beginning of every nal half-hour and that loses
out the position at the end of every trading day.
3
The results in Table 3.5 indiate that, at least for the full sample pe-
riod, the market timing strategy does not outperform the always long
strategy. Interestingly, however, the returns to the intraday momentum
strategy are positively skewed. This nding is in ontrast to the always
long series whih, similar to the original rst and last half-hour returns, is
strongly negatively skewed. The disappointing performane of the strat-
egy over the full sample mathes the earlier observation that intraday
momentum appears to be more pronouned during nanial rises.
When we restrit the sample to the two risis periods dened above,
the market timing strategy performs partiularly well. The strategy posts
a higher return, a higher Sharpe ratio, and a higher suess rate than the
always long strategy. Interestingly, the returns to the intraday momentum
3
We note that the returns to both strategies are omparable beause both strategies
have idential turnover and thus inur similar levels of transations osts.
67
Table 3.5: Performane intraday momentum market timing strategy
Panel A: Intraday
Momentum
Strategy
Panel B: Always
Long Strategy
Full Sample Crises Full sample Crises
Mean return 0.001% 0.009% 0.004% 0.004%
Sharpe 0.426 2.637 1.261 1.124
Skewness 5.196 7.279 -5.413 -7.060
Kurtosis 137.582 131.327 138.342 132.897
Suess rate 49.530% 51.410% 52.135% 51.193%
This table reports summary statistis on the performane of a market tim-
ing strategy based on intraday momentum and an always-long trading strat-
egy. The market timing strategy goes long when the rst half-hour return
is positive, and short otherwise. The always-long strategy always goes long
the last half-hour of the trading day. The results are reported for the full
sample and for the risis periods.
strategy are again positively skewed, whereas the always long strategy
exhibits negative skewness. As suh, the intraday momentum trading
strategy appears to limit downside risk.
Overall, these ndings suggest that, although this fairly naïve market
timing strategy does not generate attrative returns overall, the market
timing strategy does appear to generate attrative returns in bad market
states.
3.5.2 Informed trading versus liquidity provision
Having established the presene of intraday momentum in the RUB-USD
market, we explore the likely drivers of intraday momentum outlined in
the introdution. We rst analyze how volume is distributed over the
trading day. In Figure 3.2 we report the average half-hour trading volume
(in USD) for the dierent trading hour regimes.
4
Figure 3.2 shows that volume, on average, does not exhibit a U-shape,
as is typial in equity markets (e.g., Jain and Joh, 1988). The box plots
indiate that there is nevertheless onsiderable time series variation in
the volume traded during every half-hour of trading. The fat that the
4
For ompleteness, we report similar gures for DPIN and EWQS in the Appendix.
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of volume (in U.S. dollars) over the trading day
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RUB-USD market does not exhibit a U-shaped distribution in volume over
the trading day has an important impliation for the informed trading
hypothesis. This suggests that, although we nd intraday momentum,
informed trading may not be the main driver beause there is generally no
reason for informed traders to postpone their trading to the last half-hour
of the trading day. This idea is onsistent with the nding of Menkho
and Shmeling (2010), who, using a short sample of data on the MICEX
that inludes anonymized trader identiers, nd that informed traders
mainly trade during the opening of the trading sessions in the MICEX.
Naturally, informed traders may have other onsiderations in addition to
the trading volume for spreading trades over the trading day.
To formally analyze the relation between intraday momentum, in-
formed trading, and liquidity demand, we estimate several model spe-
iations. To be onise, we fous on the two risis periods, for whih
we nd intraday momentum to be most pronouned.
5
For purposes of
omparison, we rst repeat the baseline preditive regression of interest.
The results are reported in olumn (1) of Table 3.6.
In Table A.2 of the Appendix, we observe that intraday momentum is
related to the realized volatility and trading volume over the rst half-hour
of trading.
6
To ontrol for both eets, we inlude the realized volatility
during the rst half-hour and the (ommon log of) volume as ontrols in
the regression and report the results in olumn (2). Controlling for volume
and realized volatility, we observe no hange in the sign, magnitude, or
signiane of the estimated oeients. For ompleteness, we report the
pairwise orrelations between the variables of interest in Table A.3. of the
Appendix.
7
Turning to the other speiations, olumn (3) of Table 3.6 reports
the results for the speiation examining the relation between intraday
momentum and periods of low and high levels of informed trading. In
partiular, we onstrut a set of dummy variables that equal 1 depend-
ing on whether the level of informed trading during the rst half-hour is
in the top (DH), middle, or bottom (DL) terile, respetively. We then
5
The results for the full sample, reported in Table A.1 of the Appendix, remain
qualitatively the same.
6
Gao et al. (2015) show that intraday momentum is positively assoiated with
volume and volatility. We repeat their analysis and nd that intraday momentum is
positively assoiated with volume and volatility (see Table A.2 of the Appendix).
7
The pairwise orrelation between the EWQS and DPIN is high (0.69). However,
the oeients for the speiations in whih we omit one of the two variables (fr.
infra) do not hange meaningfully (see Table A.3), suggesting that multiollinearity is
not an issue.
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Table 3.6: Disentangling liquidity and informed trading during rises
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables rl rl rl rl rl
rf 0.0656** 0.0608** 0.0954* 0.0071 0.0368
(0.031) (0.025) (0.051) (0.017) (0.037)
rsl -0.2271 -0.2467 -0.2299 -0.2458 -0.2338
(0.178) (0.168) (0.144) (0.162) (0.142)
DL(DPIN) · rf -0.0447 -0.0354
(0.059) (0.056)
DH(DPIN) · rf -0.0756 -0.0765
(0.056) (0.054)
DL(EWQS) · rf 0.0136 0.0214
(0.027) (0.027)
DH(EWQS) · rf 0.0642* 0.0671**
(0.036) (0.031)
Opening σ2
RV
-0.0955 -0.0941 -0.0925 -0.0902
(0.078) (0.070) (0.075) (0.067)
Opening log(V olume) -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Interept 0.0000 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 922 922 922 922 922
R² (%) 15.7 19.0 21.7 20.2 23.0
This table presents regression results for the sub-sample that overs the 2007-
2009 Global Finanial Crisis and the 2014 Russian urreny risis. In the
regression for the results in olumn (1), we regress the losing half-hour return
(rl) on the rst half-hour return (rf ) and the seond last half-hour return
(rsl). In the regression for the results in olumn (2), we ontrol for volume
and realized volatility during the rst half-hour of trading. Column (3) reports
the results for an evaluation of the impat of informed trading on the losing
half-hour return. In olumn (4), we measure the impat of liquidity on the
losing half-hour return. Finally, in the regression for the results in olumn
(5) we ombine both speiations. Newey and West (1987) robust standard
errors in parentheses. Signiane at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels indiated
by ***, **, and *, respetively.
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interat these dummy variables with the observed return during the rst
half-hour of trading, omitting the middle terile to serve as the baseline.
The results in olumn (3) suggest that the preditive relation is not signif-
iantly stronger during periods of above-average or below-average levels
of informed trading in the rst half-hour of the trading day.
We also analyze the alternative hypothesis, whih relates intraday mo-
mentum to liquidity provision by day traders during the start of the trad-
ing session. Similar to the ase of informed trading, we divide all trading
days into three dierent teriles, depending on the value of the EWQS
over the opening half-hour interval. We report the results in olumn (4)
of Table 3.6.
All else being equal, higher quoted spreads an also be the result of
high volatility. However, beause we inlude the realized volatility over
the rst half-hour of trading as a ontrol variable, the regression spei-
ation in olumn (4) of Table 3.6 should ontrol for this eet and allow
us to better isolate the impat of liquidity provision following strong liq-
uidity demand. In this regression, we also interat the resulting dummy
variables with the rst half-hour return. Interestingly, we nd that the
rst half-hour return in olumn (4) beomes insigniant. Instead, the
interation term that interats the rst half-hour return with the dummy
in periods of high quoted spreads beomes positive and signiantly so.
This nding suggests that intraday momentum is the result of high liq-
uidity demand by market partiipants during the opening ombined with
dealers' risk aversion to overnight inventory. Finally, we ontrol for the
level of informed trading; see olumn (5). Menkho and Shmeling (2010)
nd that informed traders in the MICEX tend to trade when spreads are
higher, implying that we need to ontrol for the level of informed trading.
Interestingly, ontrolling for informed trading in olumn (5) of Table
3.6, we nd that the relation beomes even more pronouned from a sta-
tistial perspetive. This result suggests that intraday momentum tends
to our during trading days when quoted spreads are high, even when
ontrolling for the potential eet of informed trading on spreads. We
interpret this nding as supportive of the hypothesis that intraday mo-
mentum is to a ertain extent driven by a high liquidity demand during
the morning, ombined with a strong risk aversion to overnight holdings
potentially driven by risk management poliies, the disposition eet or
habits among market makers.
Are there institutional irumstanes that may inform why intraday
momentum in the ruble market appears to be the result of liquidity provi-
sion, rather than informed trading? The main dierenes between foreign
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exhanges and other nanial markets are the sheer size of FX markets
and the fat that these markets are only aessible by major dealers. We
suggest that, beause the FX market is onsiderably larger in terms of
notional value, informed trading is less likely to impat pries. Simultane-
ously, however, if a suiently large fration of the market's partiipants
reats similarly to a news announement, then liquidity demand an be
expeted to meaningfully impat pries (albeit temporarily).
8
Seond, the results suggest that the traders who provide liquidity to
these early trades lose their positions and thus take exatly the same
diretion as the information-driven trades at the start of the day. Beause
these traders mirror the information-based trades in the morning, what
is their motivation and why do they not adjust their behavior?
We note that in the mirostruture theory, the bid-ask spread onsists
of three omponents: an order proessing omponent, an adverse seletion
omponent, and an inventory holding omponent (Huang and Stoll, 1997).
Changes in the bid-ask spread, in this ase, are likely to be driven by
hanges in the latter two omponents.
9
One reason why the intraday pattern, if it is indeed driven by liquidity
provision during the opening session, may ontinue to exist is the follow-
ing. We an assume that, when market makers set their pries, they will
most likely take into onsideration the ease with whih they will be able
to eliminate the position. As suh, a market maker will be willing to
8
A seond reason why liquidity may be the prime driver of intraday momentum
is the following. Informed traders attempt to hide their informational advantage by
splitting large orders (Chordia and Subrahmanyam, 2004) into several smaller, medium-
sized transations (Chakravarty, 2001). Thus, their trading will be geared towards
avoiding a meaningful prie impat. To the extent that traders are suessful at hiding
their informational advantage, we will not observe any intraday momentum. Moreover,
although exess inventories require trading near the end of the trading day, the informed
trading hypothesis provides no rationale for informed traders to always trade in both
the morning and the afternoon. Beause informed traders want to monetize their
informational advantage as quikly as possible (Bloomeld et al., 2005), it is less likely
that they will want to wait until the end of the trading day, espeially, in markets
as deep as the FX markets. Moreover, earlier work using the same data on the same
market onludes that FX traders on the MICEX mainly trade during the opening
session through medium-sized orders (Menkho and Shmeling, 2010).
9
The order proessing omponent refers to market makers' xed osts. The adverse
seletion omponent ompensates the market maker in ases when he or she is trading
against a ounterparty who may have superior information. For example, aggressive
(market) orders may indiate that the ounterparty has private information and thus
may motivate the market maker to inrease the spread. Finally, the inventory holding
omponent refers to a premium that the market maker requires for providing liquidity
during periods of unbalaned ows.
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provide liquidity provided that the premium (i.e., the inventory holding
omponent) reeived is higher than the likely ost of having to liquidate
the position later that day. In other words, the prot from providing
liquidity during the rst half-hour should oset the expeted loss from
fored liquidation later that trading day. This may provide explanatory
power for why the eet persists and why traders who generate the eet
ontinue to survive.
3.6 Robustness heks
We now present the results of additional regressions to test the robustness
of the intraday momentum eet on several dimensions. In partiular, we
analyze whether the eet is robust aross dierent subsamples, dier-
ent return sampling frequenies, alternative denitions of liquidity, and
hanges in the estimation method.
3.6.1 Subsample analysis
We repeat the analysis for both risis periods separately. If intraday
momentum in the RUB-USD market is indeed primarily a risis-based
phenomenon, we should observe a signiant relation during both risis
periods. We report the results for the 2007-2009 Global Finanial Crisis
and the 2014 Russian urreny risis in Panels A and B of Table 3.7,
respetively.
Although the relation is signiant in both instanes, the results in
Table 3.7 show that intraday momentum is espeially pronouned during
the 2014 Russian urreny risis. This nding should not ome as a sur-
prise, given that the ruble was to a large extent the objet of the risis.
This was not the ase during the 2007-2009 Global Finanial Crisis, where
equity and redit markets played the leading part.
3.6.2 Choie of the return frequeny
The use of half-hour returns stritly follows earlier work on intraday mo-
mentum in nanial markets. However, this usage leaves unanswered the
question of whether the peak of momentum preditability indeed is sit-
uated around this partiular frequeny. A natural question that arises
is whether the observed intraday momentum is robust to the use of dif-
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Table 3.7: Robustness hek - 2007-2009 Global Finanial Crisis & 2014 Russian urreny risis
Panel A: 2007-2009 Global
Finanial Crisis
Panel B: 2014 Russian
urreny risis
Variables rl rl rl rl rl rl
rf 0.0214* 0.0214* 0.0926* 0.0820**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.051) (0.039)
rsl 0.0053 0.0045 -0.4832 -0.3836
(0.066) (0.066) (0.376) (0.271)
Interept 0.0001** 0.0001** 0.0001** -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 686 686 686 236 236 236
R² (%) 1.4 0.0 1.4 19.7 12.3 27.2
This table presents the results for the sample periods of January 10, 2007 to Deember
30, 2009 and January 10, 2014 to Deember 30, 2014 regressing the losing half-hour
return (rl) on the rst half-hour return (rf ) and the seond last half-hour return
(rsl). Newey and West (1987) robust standard errors in parentheses. Signiane at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels indiated by ***, **, and *, respetively.
7
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Table 3.8: Robustness hek - sensitivity of intraday momentum to the
return frequeny
rf/rl 60 Minutes 30 Minutes 15 Minutes
60 Minutes 0.0457** 0.0667* 0.0245*
30 Minutes 0.0513** 0.0698* 0.0269**
15 Minutes 0.0214 0.0330* 0.0273**
This table presents regression results for the return frequeny sensitiv-
ity analysis. The oeients for the speiation under equation (2)
for alternative opening and losing return frequenies are displayed.
Signiane using Newey and West (1987) standard errors at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels are indiated by ***, **, and *, respetively.
ferent frequenies.
10
To test whether intraday momentum is sensitive to
the frequeny and whether half-hour returns are the peak of the observed
preditability, we re-run the regression in equation (1) for dierent ombi-
nations of return frequenies. In partiular, we perform K×K regressions
to analyze all potential ombinations of the rst and nal 15-minute, half-
hour, and one-hour returns. We report the oeients of interest in Table
3.8.
In Table 3.8, we nd that intraday momentum is robust to the fre-
queny employed. In partiular, the prie ation at the start of the trading
day is preditive of the prie evolution near the end of the trading day, and
the relation is robust to the partiular interval hosen. In eonomi terms,
the eet is strongest for opening half-hour returns on losing half-hour
returns.
Next, we analyze the robustness of the main results to a hange in
frequeny. Beause both proposed mehanisms that may drive intraday
momentum an be expeted to be at play espeially during the very start
and end of the trading session, we re-run the main analysis, alulating
all variables of interest over the rst 15 minutes of trading, and try to
predit the return during last 15 minutes of the trading session. The rst
olumn of Table 3.9 reports the results. Our ndings ontinue to hold,
indiating that the mehanism that drives intraday momentum is at play
at the very start of the trading session.
10
We thank an anonymous referee for alling attention to this point.
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Table 3.9: Robustness hek - alternative denitions and estimation
method
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables rl rl rl rl
rf 0.0031 0.0507 0.0418 0.0368
(0.019) (0.036) (0.038) (0.036)
rsl -0.0826 -0.2285 -0.2312 -0.2338*
(0.088) (0.143) (0.142) (0.141)
DL(DPIN) · rf 0.0035 -0.0413 -0.0346 -0.0354
(0.020) (0.058) (0.055) (0.055)
DH(DPIN) · rf -0.0307 -0.0743 -0.0763 -0.0765
(0.027) (0.055) (0.054) (0.054)
DL(EWQS) · rf 0.0193 0.0214
(0.019) (0.027)
DH(EWQS) · rf 0.0398** 0.0671**
(0.018) (0.031)
DL(ES) · rf 0.0165
(0.037)
DH(ES) · rf 0.0491*
(0.027)
DL(VWQS) · rf 0.0049
(0.027)
DH(V WQS) · rf 0.0623**
(0.030)
Opening σ2
RV
-0.0827* -0.0919 -0.0902 -0.0902
(0.047) (0.069) (0.067) (0.067)
Opening log(V olume) -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Interept 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 922 922 922 922
R² (%) 11.3 22.2 23.0
This table reports the results for the robustness heks. Column (1)
reports the results of the main speiation using an alternative return
frequeny of 15-minutes for the rst- and last half-hour return. Col-
umn (2) presents the results using the eetive spread as a measure of
liquidity. Column (3) similarly presents the results using the volume-
weighted quoted spread as a liquidity measure. Finally, olumn (4)
reports the results obtained from estimation of the main speiation
using a two-step GMM.Newey and West (1987) robust standard er-
rors in parentheses in olumn (1), (2), and (3). Signiane at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels indiated by ***, **, and *, respetively.
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3.6.3 Alternative liquidity measures
Next, we assess the robustness of our main results to dierent measures
of liquidity. To that end, we repeat the speiations for Table 3.6 using
several alternative measures of liquidity that we an onstrut from our
data. First, we employ eetive spread (ES) as the liquidity metri. The
result is shown in olumn (2) of Table 3.9 and onrms our baseline results
and the results desribed above. In partiular, we ontinue to nd that
liquidity appears to be the main driver of intraday momentum in the
RUB-USD FX market.
Seond, we replae the EWQS variable from our baseline analysis with
the volume-weighted quoted spread (VWQS). This measure weights the
bid-ask spreads by the volume of trades, and therefore, it takes into on-
sideration the size of the trade mathing the observed bid and ask pries.
We report the results in olumn (3) of Table 3.9. Here too, we nd that
the intraday momentum eet is stronger when bid-ask spreads are high
during the opening half-hour.
3.6.4 Estimation method
The estimations we have performed so far are based on OLS. Return se-
ries, however, tend to exhibit volatility lustering, whih, from a statistial
perspetive, indues heterosedastiity. In addition, high-frequeny data
often exhibit signiant levels of negative autoorrelation over very short
intervals (Roll, 1984) and positive autoorrelation over slightly longer in-
tervals. Some of these patterns are the result of mirostruture-related
issues suh as the bid-ask boune, whereas others follow from the fat that
information proessing takes time (Chordia et al., 2005). Using Newey
and West (1987) robust standard errors, we have so far aounted for
suh eets on the estimation results.
Nonetheless, beause we do not know the full shape of the distribution
of the data, we re-estimate the main results using generalized method of
moments (GMM). Although the moments we impose are idential to the
moments under OLS, a two-step GMM allows us to eiently estimate the
model when we fae heterosedastiity and autoorrelation of an unknown
form. We report the result in the nal olumn of Table 3.9. The results
indiate that our ndings are robust to the partiular estimation method
employed.
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3.7 Conlusion
In this paper, we use a long sample of transation-level data at tik fre-
queny on the Russian ruble-U.S. dollar urreny pair from the MICEX
to investigate the likely drivers of intraday momentum in this FX market.
We ontribute to the emerging literature of momentum at the intraday
level in several ways. First, we nd no evidene that intraday momentum
in the ruble market is the result of market partiipants' strategi trading
during high-volume periods. Two observations motivate this onjeture.
First, there is no reason for informed traders in the ruble market to post-
pone trading until the last half-hour of trading, given that volume in the
market does not exhibit a U-shape intraday pattern. This is onsistent
with work by Menkho and Shmeling (2010), who nd that informed
traders in this partiular market mainly trade during the opening of the
trading session. Seond, we do not nd a stronger intraday momentum
pattern on days with more informed trading in the rst half-hour of trad-
ing.
Instead, we nd evidene that losing half-hour returns are positively
related to opening half-hour returns on days when spreads in the ruble
market are high during the opening half-hour. These high spreads are
onsistent with a strong liquidity demand by market partiipants in the
rst half-hour of trading. This nding lends support to the argument that
dealers and other liquidity providers in the ruble market are trying to of-
oad unwanted inventories (Lyons, 1995; Bjønnes and Rime, 2005) due
to their risk aversion to overnight holdings. This interpretation is onsis-
tent with the empirial ndings of Bjønnes et al. (2005), who show that
non-nanial ustomers are the main liquidity providers in the overnight
foreign exhange market.
Seond, we provide additional evidene that orroborates the nding of
Gao et al. (2015) that expliit trading hours matter for intraday momen-
tum. The partiular nature of the RUB-USD FX market, a urreny pair
for whih spot trading is only possible on the MICEX, provides a unique
ase where FX trading is subjet to expliit trading hours. Finally, our
results lend further support to the nding that intraday momentum is
more pronouned during nanial rises.
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Chapter 4
Duration Dependene,
Behavioral Restritions,
and the Market Timing
Ability of Commodity
Trading Advisors
1
International Review of Finane
In Press
4.1 Introdution
In general, the value potentially added through ative management an
stem from one or two soures. First, there is the traditional seurity sele-
tion, i.e. the ability to add value by seleting seurities that subsequently
outperform. Seond, managers ould also add value by suessfully anti-
ipating market trends and reating to these trends by entering or exiting
the market aordingly. This is referred to as market timing ability and
has reeived onsiderable attention over the last two deades.
1
This hapter is based on joint work with Mihael Frömmel (Ghent University) and
Alexander Mende (RPM Risk & Portfolio Management AB).
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However, empirial evidene on whether managers do in fat add value
through one or both approahes is mixed. One of the rst prominent stud-
ies on mutual fund performane is Sharpe (1966). He nds no evidene of
exess performane for funds ompared to the DJIA over the period 1954-
1965. This result is onrmed by Jensen (1968), who shows that the aver-
age `alpha' of mutual funds in his dataset is not signiantly dierent from
zero. Subsequent evidene is more mixed, but seems to gravitate to the
null hypothesis of no signiant outperformane by mutual funds. While
`alpha' aptures seurity seletion, other studies fous on fund managers'
market timing ability, i.e. the ability to adjust ones market exposure in
antiipation of future (stok) market movements. The majority of these
studies nds no (or sometimes even negative) market timing ability for
mutual funds (see e.g. Admati et al., 1986; Beker et al., 1999; Ferson
and Shadt, 1996; Henriksson and Merton, 1981; Jensen, 1972; Lehmann
and Modest, 1987; Merton, 1981, Kao et al., 1998).
As suh, the onsensus for mutual funds seems to emerge that mutual
fund managers, on average, add little value for investors. To some extent,
fees harged by these funds seem to explain most of the lak of perfor-
mane: Many studies, most reently Fama and Frenh (2010), nd that
funds' gross returns outperform the market, while the net-of-fee returns do
not. This suggests that fund managers are apturing the outperformane
through fees.
Evidene for market timing among hedge funds is also mixed, although
more reent work indiates some market timing skill for these managers.
Whereas Fung et al. (2002) do not nd evidene for market timing ability
among hedge funds Chen et al. (2010) study a sample of self-delared
market timing hedge funds and nd evidene of market timing ability.
Chen (2007), who examines the timing ability of hedge funds with regard
to their fous markets, also nds evidene that a number of ategories of
hedge funds (CTAs and Global Maro) an suessfully time ertain asset
markets. Finally, Kazemi and Li's (2009) ndings suggest that CTAs
generate their returns mostly from suessful market timing.
However, whereas early studies use monthly returns to test for timing
ability, more reent studies suh as Bollen and Busse (2001) and Jiang
et al. (2007) who use daily data ome to more enouraging onlusions
about managers' market timing abilities. These results provide evidene
that onrm the ndings by Goetzmann et al. (2000) that the use of daily
data appears to inrease the power of the market timing models to detet
market timing ability. Chane and Hemler (2001) analyze daily expliit
reommendations by market partiipants and also nd evidene of market
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timing ability. Results in both papers further suggest that, when monthly
data is used, the evidene of positive market timing ability disappears.
One major drawbak in applying existing market timing models to
monthly data is that the researher impliitly assumes that the trading
frequeny is also monthly. Goetzmann et al. (2000) are the rst to point
out this behavioral restrition. The authors propose an adjustment that
assumes daily timing but that does not require olleting daily returns.
Nevertheless, they note that applying market timing models diretly to
daily data is preferable. However, the appliation to daily data reates a
potential onit: Standard tests for market timing (Treynor and Mazuy,
1966; Henriksson and Merton, 1981) use the market's exess return as
benhmark for market timing. While this might be a reasonable assump-
tion at lower frequenies, for daily observations it is probably inonsistent
with managers' atual timing praties. Both a lak of preditability in
daily returns and high transation osts make suh an approah improb-
able for most funds. Instead, portfolio managers rather think in trends
(Menkho, 2010). We therefore relax this somewhat restritive behavioral
assumption that is impliit in the appliation of market timing models on
daily data. Instead we use ex-post lassied trends as benhmarks.
2
As-
suming trend following behavior is partiularly justied for CTAs (Fung
and Hsieh, 2001). CTAs manage lient assets and take long or short posi-
tions in highly liquid equity, xed-inome, foreign exhange, metals, and
ommodity futures markets. Thus, CTAs follow diretional strategies and
are often desribed as trend following. Beause of CTAs' similarities to
hedge funds, they are usually onsidered a hedge fund ategory.
Our ontribution to the existing literature is twofold. First, we adapt
the original Henriksson and Merton market timing model in a way that
makes it more realisti and avoids imposing a partiular timing frequeny.
In partiular, we replae the `periodi' timing deision based on monthly
or daily exess returns with a denition of timing that depends on (u-
mulative) past prie hanges. Obviously, our adjustment also onstitutes
a re-speiation of the market timing denition. Chen and Knez (1996)
note, that any performane evaluation is generally arbitrary, a notion that
is strongly related to benhmark seletion. This also applies to the hoie
of the benhmark for market timing tests. Our denition of market tim-
2
The fat that we use an ex-post trend deomposition model does not ause method-
ologial problems, sine we do not model managers' deision proess. Insofar we are
in line with standard market timing models whih also rely on ex-post realized market
returns. Furthermore, and again in analogy with standard market timing tests, it does
not matter whether the deteted trends are deterministi or stohasti.
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ing diers from the existing exess return-based denition and will lead
to dierent onlusions as to whether CTAs have timing ability. Our al-
ternative denition strongly follows a strand of literature that fouses on
formalizing `bull' and `bear' states in nanial markets using peaks and
troughs (see Lunde and Timmermann, 2004; Harding and Pagan, 2002;
Pagan and Sossounov, 2003). If suessful market timing means suess-
fully timing bull and bear market states, using suh a denition provides
a natural and meaningful extension of existing market timing models.
Seond, we extend the literature on market timing abilities of CTAs
using a proprietary dataset of realized audited daily returns of CTAs be-
tween 1994 and 2012. Sine we use realized instead of reported returns
our dataset does not suer from survivorship bias, bakll bias, or sele-
tion bias. Suh biases an be meaningful. For example, Bhardwaj et al.
(2014) report that the ombined bakll and survivorship bias in publi
hedge fund databases sum up to approximately 7.8% annualized. Further-
more, sine the returns we employ are not manipulated, they annot be a
smoothed version of the true realized returns. Spurious serial orrelation
that results from suh smoothing an yield misleading performane statis-
tis (see Getmansky et al., 2004; Agarwal et al., 2011). As the dataset
overs the period 1994-2012, it inludes the reent nanial risis as well.
The paper proeeds as follows. Setion 4.2 desribes the methodology
inluding the benhmark model by Henriksson and Merton (1981) and
our adaption of the model. Setion 4.3 presents the dataset. Setion
4.4 disusses our empirial results and onduts a number of robustness
heks. Finally, in Setion 4.5, we summarize and onlude.
4.2 Methodology
Starting point is the model proposed by Henriksson and Merton (1981)
(heneforth HM model). This model assumes that the fund manager
alloates apital between a risk-free asset and equities based on a foreast
of the market exess return in the next period. To test a manager's market
timing ability, the model tests whether the fund's market beta is higher
during up-markets than down-markets. To apply the model to data on
hedge funds ative in multiple markets, we need to extend the approah to
a multifator version of the HM model (see Aragon, 2005; Chen (2007)):
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rp,t = α+
M∑
m=1
βmrm,t +
M∑
m=1
γmDm,t · rm,t + λp + µp,t (4.1)
where λp is the time-invariant rm eet of fund p,rp,t is the exess
return of fund p at time t,rm,t is the exess return in market m, and µp,t
is the error term. In the original HM model Dm,t is an indiator variable
that takes the value 1 if rm,t > 0 and zero otherwise. The oeient
γm measures the dierene in betas in down- vs. up-markets. γm will
be signiantly positive for a manager who suessfully times market m.
The HM model does not allow the manager to vary her exposure in any
but the most restritive way. In partiular, depending on her foreast, the
manager hooses two levels of β. While this assumption an be onsid-
ered restritive or inappropriate in the ase of mutual funds, the model
adequately desribes the trading strategy of ertain types of hedge funds
and CTAs in partiular. CTAs either buy or sell futures ontrats in a
partiular market, whih is arguably the type of systemati risk variation
assumed under the HM model.
Previous researh on the timing ability of hedge funds relied on on-
struting equal-weighted portfolios (see Chen, 2007; Kazemi and Li, 2009)
to test for market timing ability among hedge funds. However, sine we
have a panel of daily CTA observations, we have onsiderably more de-
grees of freedom than previous work whih ommonly employed monthly
data. Therefore, a panel approah is more appropriate as it allows more
aurate inferene of the model parameters.
We estimate the model using xed eets for eah fund. This esti-
mation approah allows us to aount for managers' xed eets that are
unrelated to market timing ability. For example, some funds in the sample
ould be persistently more protable for reasons that we do not observe.
At the same time, we also luster the standard errors by manager beause,
although the xed eet dummies handle the fund eets, the dummies
will not handle some other relevant forms of orrelated errors (Thompson,
2011).
In addition to manager xed eets, time xed eets might also be
present. Given that the managers are atively trading the same futures
markets, it is unlikely that the observations on the dierent managers
within every time period are not orrelated. As suh, the dataset an
be expeted to ontain time eets beyond those we are interested in.
Moreover, these time eets are probably not xed. We an imagine that
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some CTAs perform better than others, depending on the partiular mar-
ket environment. However, while our panel is extremely unbalaned, any
bias present in the standard errors due to time eets is likely to disap-
pear sine we have a lot of observations along this dimension. This also
explains why we luster on the less numerous (i.e. manager) dimension.
The onstrution of the dummy Dm,t is a key omponent of the HM
model. The HM model, however, imposes a timing frequeny that mathes
the return frequeny used to estimate the model. As we have already dis-
ussed in the introdution, performane evaluation is generally arbitrary
(Chen and Knez, 1996). This observation also applies to the benhmark of
what onstitutes proper market timing. Consequently, the alternative def-
inition of market timing we put forth below diers from the above exess
return-based denition and might therefore lead to dierent onlusions as
to whether CTAs have timing ability under either denition. Our deni-
tion borrows extensively from reent literature that fouses on formalizing
bull and bear market states in nanial markets using peaks and troughs
(see Lunde and Timmermann, 2004; Harding and Pagan, 2002; Pagan and
Sossounov, 2003). If by suessful market timing investors mean suess-
fully timing bull and bear states, then our denition provides a natural
extension of existing market timing models. In addition, suh a denition
is in line with the observation that market professionals think in terms of
trends, rather than in terms of exess returns (Menkho, 2010).
Therefore, a dummy variable based on a trend identiation sheme
seems to be a reasonable alternative to assuming that funds in general,
and CTAs in partiular, make preditions only about the next period's
exess return. This might be espeially relevant when evaluating funds'
performane over very short time horizons. However, an appliation of
existing market timing models on daily data implies exatly that. Tem-
porary drops or inreases in asset pries over several days an be expeted
to be short-lived and might only indue partial adjustments or no adjust-
ment at all. This is espeially the ase if we onsider transation osts,
whih an make daily adjustments based on daily foreasts of exess re-
turns ostly.
We identify trends in asset markets by drawing on the aademi liter-
ature that proposes methods to determine bull and bear states in stok
markets. This literature oers both parametri and nonparametri ap-
proahes.
3
We rely on a threshold lter reently suggested by Lunde
3
The most popular parametri approah imposes a Markov-swithing model (Hamil-
ton, 1990) that allows for two regimes, booms and busts. Examples of appliations of
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and Timmermann (2004), whih is desribed in the Appendix. This l-
ter has the advantage that it allows for duration dependene and does
not impose a phase length.
4
The threshold lter proposed by Lunde and
Timmermann identies bull and bear markets based on a minimum prie
hange (`threshold') sine the last peak or trough. Whereas an exess
return-based measure will lassify a given period of negative prie move-
ments as a bear market, the Lunde and Timmermann lter will not as
long as the drop does not exeed a ertain threshold.
The drawbak of this rules-based method is that we need to speify
the thresholds that dene bull and bear markets.
5
Lunde and Timmer-
mann (2004) suggest suh thresholds only for equity markets, based on
gures for bull and bear markets ommonly reported in the nanial press.
However, sine we also want to explore CTAs' market timing ability in
other asset markets, we rst have to derive additional thresholds. Sine
previous literature has not yet proposed a method to ome up with suh
thresholds, we employ an approah inspired by the work of Wegsheider
(1994). This method aims to identify trends, store their magnitude, and
subsequently remove them in an iterative way until all trends are identi-
ed. The advantage of this algorithm is that, rather than imposing some
arbitrary struture on the data, it fouses on the spei features of the
original data series to ome up with thresholds. What we obtain is a set
of trends, starting from very small trends that last just one day to trends
that last several months. This makes it an ideal tool to derive appropri-
ate thresholds for the Lunde and Timmermann lter. We desribe the
algorithm in detail in the Appendix.
this approah in the ontext of stok markets are Maheu and MCurdy (2000) and
Chen (2009). Nonparametri approahes rely on lters or dating algorithms that lo-
ate turning points (peaks and troughs) orresponding to loal maxima and minima
of the nanial series. Pagan and Sossounov (2003) modify the algorithm developed
by Bry and Boshan (1971) using denitions on the duration of bull and bear markets
found in nanial press. Lunde and Timmermann (2004) onstrut a lter that iden-
ties bull and bear markets based on a minimum prie hange sine the most reent
peak or trough.
4
Duration dependene means that bull and bear hazard rates  that is, the proba-
bility that a bull or bear market terminates in the next period  depend on the age of
the market (Lunde and Timmermann, 2004, p253).
5
We want to avoid mislassiation through imposing restritions on the timing
frequeny. Therefore, we annot make use of the algorithm of Bry and Boshan (1971),
sine this approah requires hoosing the phase length.
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Figure 4.1: Evolution CTA Index
4.3 Data
We arry out the empirial analysis using a proprietary dataset of daily
returns on 33 CTAs for the period January 1994 to May 2012. The data
is provided by a Swedish CTA speialist and fund of funds manager.
6
We
fous on CTAs beause CTAs an be onsidered a hedge fund ategory
that atively attempts to perform market timing. Returns are raw returns
in that they exlude manager fees and trading ommissions and, thus,
provide an unbiased aount of realized returns. The dataset does not
suer from most of onventional biases found in publi data bases due to
voluntarily reporting by funds. In partiular, the data base does not suer
from survivorship bias, bakll bias, or seletion bias. Furthermore, sine
the returns are not reported returns, they annot be a smoothed version
of the true realized returns. This is important, sine the spurious serial
orrelation resulting from suh smoothing yields misleading performane
statistis (see Getmansky et al., 2004).
In the sample of CTA funds, 26 are ative aross dierent asset markets
(`diversied'), four funds trade exlusively in nanials, and three funds
invest only in ommodity futures. The time frame overs a variety of
market onditions inluding several nanial rises. During 1994-2012,
markets have experiened pronouned diretional moves. This makes the
sample period ideal to test for market timing ability. In Figure 4.1, we
plot the performane of an equally-weighted index of the CTAs' returns
and ompare it to the Russell 3000 Total Return Index. Shaded areas
orrespond to bull market phases (as dened below).
To test for market timing ability for the main asset lasses CTAs invest
6
We do not identify the names of the CTAs in the dataset.
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in, we use daily observations for the following market indies: the Russell
3000 for equities, Barlays US Aggregate Bond Index, the S&P GSCI
Agriultural Commodities Spot Index, the S&P GSCI Energy Spot Index,
the S&P GSCI All Metals Spot Index and the Fed's trade-weighted US
Dollar Index.
7
These market indies enompass the dierent asset lasses
managed futures managers are ative in.
In partiular, we follow Fung and Hsieh (1997) and Agarwal and Naik
(2000; 2004). With some variation regarding partiular indies used, these
authors onsider a broad US stok market index, a US bond index, the
Fed's trade-weighted US Dollar index, and the Goldman Sahs Commod-
ity Index (GSCI) as proxy for markets that hedge funds have exposure
to. We deviate from the above studies in that we break down the Gold-
man Sahs Commodity Index in its various omponents. We do this be-
ause CTAs have historially been ative mostly in ommodity markets
for whih futures were rst available. They might therefore have skills
partiularly in these markets. The pairwise orrelations between the in-
dies, reported in Panel C of Table 4.1, are relatively low. This indiates
that the o-movement on a daily basis between the dierent markets is
generally limited. The pairwise orrelation is highest among ommodity
indies but it is still suiently low to justify a separate treatment.
4.4 Results
We start by applying the algorithm proposed by Wegsheider (1994) to the
various markets. One we have identied the trends in dierent markets,
we selet the 99 perentile of trends found. In Table 4.2 we report the
results of the approah. Following Lunde and Timmermann (2004) we
allow for dierent ut-o values in the ase of upward and downward
trends. This allows us to aount for a positive drift in ertain asset
lasses and potential asymmetries in up and down trends.
For the equity market index, our results indiate that the top 1 per-
entile of upward trends exeeds 19.04% while the orresponding value for
downward trends is only -10.22%. These values are lose to the ones re-
ported in the nanial press and the ones Lunde and Timmermann (2004)
use (20% and 10% for bull and bear markets, respetively). Cut-o val-
ues for the other asset lasses dier onsiderably from the values for stok
markets. For example, large trends in the bond market that are similar in
7
In line with Lunde and Timmermann we use daily prie indies to identify trends
in the dierent markets.
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Table 4.1: Desriptive Statistis of the Dataset
Panel A: Summary Statistis CTAs
Mean Min P25 P50 P75 Max
Return 0.0150% -0.0743% 0.0001% 0.0161% 0.0360% 0.0703%
Standard deviation 0.72% 0.21% 0.54% 0.79% 0.89% 1.19%
Age 3.9 0.3 1.5 2.7 4.9 13.9
Skewness -0.152 -2.006 -0.468 -0.221 0.154 3.523
Kurtosis 9.058 3.258 5.582 6.798 9.259 66.580
Panel B: Summary Statistis Fators
Market Index Mean return Standard deviation Min Max
EQUIT Russell 3000 TR 0.01% 0.54% -4.23% 4.72%
BOND Barlays US Aggr. Bond 0.00% 0.11% -0.77% 0.59%
AGRI S&P GSCI Agri. Commodity 0.00% 0.52% -3.32% 3.11%
ENER S&P GSCI Energy Spot 0.02% 0.84% -6.25% 4.26%
METAL S&P GSCI All Metals Spot 0.01% 0.50% -3.11% 2.90%
CUR Fed's Trade-Weighted USD 0.00% 0.14% -1.25% 1.24%
Panel C: Correlation Market Indies
Market EQUIT BOND AGRI ENERGY METAL CUR
EQUIT 1.00
BOND -0.12 1.00
AGRI 0.15 -0.09 1.00
ENERGY 0.15 -0.07 0.28 1.00
METAL 0.21 -0.09 0.31 0.30 1.00
CUR -0.13 -0.02 -0.23 -0.21 -0.39 1.00
This table reports summary statistis for the set of CTAs and the fators used in the multifator approah.
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Table 4.2: Results Identiation Bull and Bear Markets
Cut-o values
Upward trends Standard deviation Downward trends Standard deviation
Russell 3000 TR Index 19.04% 6.08% -10.22% 2.81%
Barlays US Aggregate Bond Index 2.56% 0.58% -4.63% 0.99%
GSCI Agriultural Commodities Index 13.85% 2.68% -19.58% 4.23%
GSCI Energy Spot Index 23.90% 9.18% -19.71% 4.62%
GSCI All Metals Spot Index 10.61% 2.36% -16.01% 3.60%
Fed's Trade-weighted USD Index 4.07% 1.23% -4.59% 4.44%
Panel B: Conordane Index
Market EQUIT BOND AGRI ENER
EQUIT 1
BOND 0.576 1.000
AGRI 0.644 0.649 1.000
ENER 0.676 0.640 0.663 1.000
METAL 0.560 0.570 0.468 0.555
CUR 0.474 0.386 0.242 0.421
The onordane index measures the fration of the time the yles are in the same state. If the index is unity, trends
in both markets are exatly pro-ylial, while a value of zero indiates that they are perfetly ounterylial. For
two series yt and xt and a sample size of T , the index an be alulated as:
Iˆ = 1
T
[∑T
t=1 Sx,tSy,t +
∑T
t=1(1− Sx,t) · (1 − Sy,t)
]
where Sx,t and Sy,t are dummies that equal 1 in the ase of an upward trends and zero otherwise.
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Figure 4.2: Bull and Bear Markets Identied
frequeny only exeed 2.56% for up markets and -4.63% for down markets.
The largest trends are reported for the S&P GSCI energy market, with
upward trends of over 23.90% and downward trends exeeding -19.71%.
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The results support our view that a separate trend lassiation for ev-
ery asset lass is neessary. It would prove unrealisti to generalize the
equity-based thresholds from the nanial press to other asset lasses.
Based on the thresholds derived above we an employ the lter sug-
gested by Lunde and Timmermann to obtain a lassiation of the mar-
kets into bull and bear market periods. The results are reported in Figure
4.2 with bull markets periods shaded grey. Obviously, the lter iden-
ties major market events suh as the dotom bubble, the bull market
between 2003 and 2006 for stoks. It also aptures major surges in agri-
ultural ommodity, energy, and metal pries. To measure the degree of
o-movement between the trends, we employ the onordane index, pro-
posed by Harding and Pagan (2002). The results, reported in Table 4.2,
show that markets are in the same market state about half to two-thirds
of the time, depending on the markets under onsideration. Of ourse,
this does not neessarily mean that they start and end at the same time.
Two markets might be trending upwards two-thirds of the time, but both
market might nevertheless experiene bear markets at dierent points in
time.
8
A similar analysis was performed using the S&P 500 as the equity index, yielding
19.00% and -10.80%, respetively.
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In unreported tests, we test for the presene of duration dependene
given our lassiation. In partiular, we apply the tests by Shapiro and
Wilk (1972), Brain and Shapiro (1983), and Ohn et al. (2004) for du-
ration dependene. All tests indiate statistially signiant duration
dependene in both the equity and urreny market. For agriultural
ommodities, only the result from the Shapiro and Wilk (1972) test is
signiant at the 10% level. These results onrm our view that duration
dependene plays a role in an number of markets under onsideration and
that the threshold lter of Lunde and Timmermann should be preferred.
4.4.1 Market Timing Ability
We now turn to our main analysis, testing whether CTAs are able to
suessfully time the bull and bear markets identied above. We report
the results for the main regressions in Table 4.3.
The rst set of regression results, orresponding to our baseline model
outlined in Setion 4.2, suggests that CTAs exhibit market timing abil-
ity in all of the markets onsidered. All the interation terms measuring
timing ability are highly signiant and show the expeted sign.
9
The
interept, whih is the average value of the manager xed eets, is sig-
niantly negative. Although returns of the funds are before fees and
transation osts, nevertheless, they reet impliit transation osts. In
partiular, the negative oeient on the interept likely reets bid-ask
spreads.
Turning to the eonomi signiane of the timing oeients reported
in Table 4.3, we see that the magnitude of the observed market timing
is meaningful. For example, a 1% inrease in bond markets when bond
markets exhibit a positive trend is assoiated, on average, with a 1.28%
(0.313% + 0.967%) return to the fund. When bond markets are delining,
however, the funds' returns are only assoiated with a derease by 0.313%
on average for every 1% derease in bonds. In other words, funds tend to
exhibit a signiantly positive beta to bond markets during up-markets,
but an insigniant beta during down-markets. Similarly, all else equal,
a 1% inrease in the trade-weighted US dollar index during up-trends is
9
We note that these results do not allow us to infer the extent to whih a manager
antiipates trends in a partiular asset lass on a stand-alone basis. In partiular,
managers' timing ability in one market an be the result of suessfully antiipating the
trends in other markets. The high degree of overlapping in market states, as evidened
by the onordane index alulated in Table 4.2, makes this a likely possibility. For
example, we an imagine that if a manager expets a strong reversal in the stok
market, she will use that information to adjust her exposure to, say, energy markets.
96
Figure 4.3: (Monthly) Exess Return-based Classiation
assoiated to a 0.389% (0.938%-0.549%) inrease in the funds' returns,
whereas the funds seem to gain 0.549% for every 1% derease in the index
during down-markets.
Next, we ontrast these ndings with the results obtained for two
existing models. First, we apply the HM model to daily data, where the
dummy variable is one when the exess return for the month is positive
and zero otherwise. A visual illustration of the lassiation that results
from the HM model is shown in Figure 4.3.Clearly, this lassiation leads
to a more dispersed set of up- and down market periods.
Column (2) of Table 4.3 reports the results when we employ this def-
inition of bull and bear markets. The oeients of the timing variables
suggest that in this ase, too, i.e. CTAs exhibit timing ability in four out
of six markets onsidered. This result reveals that also under the tradi-
tional denition of market timing ability, CTAs show lear evidene of
market timing skill.
Finally, we also onsider the daily version of the HM model suggested
by Bollen and Busse (2001), where instead of using monthly exess re-
turns, we look at dailies. In days where the exess return is positive, the
dummy is one, while it is zero otherwise. This approah is ommonly fol-
lowed when researhers have aess to daily data. The results, reported
in olumn (3) of Table 4.3, are striking. The estimates suggest that when
using this denition of market timing, CTAs do not exhibit any timing
skill. On the ontrary, we nd evidene of signiantly negative timing
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Table 4.3: Market Timing Ability of CTAs
(1) (2) (3)
Equities -0.161*** -0.121*** -0.145***
(0.0388) (0.0316) (0.0227)
Equities ·D1,t 0.158*** 0.0454 0.0649
(0.0411) (0.0311) (0.0522)
Bonds 0.313 0.700*** 1.188***
(0.190) (0.167) (0.183)
Bonds ·D2,t 0.967*** 0.563*** -0.527***
(0.245) (0.164) (0.127)
Agri. Commodities -0.0237 -0.0480** -0.00113
(0.0223) (0.0181) (0.0223)
Agri. Commodities ·D3,t 0.0714** 0.114*** 0.0277
(0.0278) (0.0232) (0.0266)
Energy -0.0284 0.0304* 0.0635***
(0.0194) (0.0178) (0.0188)
Energy ·D4,t 0.157*** 0.0682*** -0.0134
(0.0276) (0.0220) (0.0169)
Metals 0.0349 0.156*** 0.214***
(0.0392) (0.0279) (0.0358)
Metals ·D5,t 0.146*** -0.0115 -0.144***
(0.0415) (0.0234) (0.0320)
Currenies -0.549*** -0.204* -0.119
(0.104) (0.120) (0.120)
Currenies ·D6,t 0.938*** 0.209* -0.00406
(0.132) (0.118) (0.108)
Constant -0.000169*** 3.36e-05 0.000578***
(6.04e-05) (4.27e-05) (0.000146)
Observations 32,450 32,450 32,450
Adj. R-squared 0.070 0.044 0.040
Number of funds 33 33 33
This Table reports the results for Eq (1), using dierent denitions for the
market timing dummies. Column (1) reports the results for the speia-
tion that employs a bull- and bear market denition using the approah
of Lunde and Timmermann (2004). Column (2) reports the results using
the denition proposed by Henriksson and Merton (1981). Finally, ol-
umn (3) reports the results using the speiation of Bollen and Busse
(2001).
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. Signiane at 1%, 5%,
and 10% level indiated by ***, **, and *, respetively.
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skill. The reason for this result might relate to the behavioral restrition
that is impliit in a diret appliation of the HM model to daily data.
Suh an appliation of the model impliitly assumes that market timing
is exeuted on a daily basis, but as mentioned above this restrition seems
too binding for the funds under onsideration.
4.4.2 Robustness Cheks
To verify whether our proposed approah, i.e. analyzing funds' market
timing ability in terms of trends rather than in terms of exess returns,
indeed adds value, we perform a number of robustness heks.
4.4.2.1 Correlation aross Time
To test the signiane of the results, we have ignored the potential impat
of orrelation aross time. We luster on the less numerous (i.e. by rm)
dimension following the suggestions of Petersen (2008) and Thompson
(2011). In partiular, if the time dimension is onsiderably larger than the
rm dimension, the bias due to orrelation an be expeted to disappear
as long as one (single)-lusters on the less numerous dimension. It may
nevertheless be instrutive to luster by time as well, sine the regressors
vary by time but not by rm.
To this end, we perform a number of robustness heks to test whether
our results are robust to orrelation aross time. First, we inlude the
regression results where we inlude time xed eets. At the same time, we
still luster the standard errors by fund. This is one way of simultaneously
handling rm and time xed eets, although there are also limitations
to suh an approah (see Thompson, 2011). The rst olumn of Table
4.4 reports the results, where we omit the dummy for 1994 to serve as
referene ategory. We nd that our results are robust to time xed
eets.
Next, we also report the results where standard errors are lustered
by time and lustered both by time and by rm (two-way lustering).
Clustering simultaneously by time and rm follows the work of Thompson
(2011) and Petersen (2009). Column (2) and (3) of Table 4.4 report the
results for lustering by time and two-way lustering, respetively. We
nd that our results are robust to lustering along both dimensions.
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Table 4.4: Robustness to Correlation aross Time
(1) (2) (3)
Equities -0.1603*** -0.1589*** -0.1589***
(0.041) (0.034) (0.047)
Equities ·D1,t 0.1669*** 0.1630*** 0.1630***
(0.045) (0.046) (0.057)
Bonds 0.3102 0.3041* 0.3041
(0.190) (0.171) (0.234)
Bonds ·D2,t 0.9702*** 0.9789*** 0.9789***
(0.248) (0.222) (0.307)
Agri. Commodities -0.0276 -0.0256 -0.0256
(0.024) (0.038) (0.040)
Agri. Commodities ·D3,t 0.0777** 0.0760* 0.0760
(0.029) (0.045) (0.048)
Energy -0.0265 -0.0257 -0.0257
(0.020) (0.025) (0.030)
Energy ·D4,t 0.1565*** 0.1538*** 0.1538***
(0.029) (0.030) (0.039)
Metals 0.0451 0.0438 0.0438
(0.042) (0.044) (0.055)
Metals ·D5,t 0.1553*** 0.1551*** 0.1551***
(0.044) (0.049) (0.060)
Currenies -0.5649*** -0.5456*** -0.5456***
(0.111) (0.119) (0.153)
Currenies ·D6,t 1.0043*** 0.9638*** 0.9638***
(0.145) (0.166) (0.200)
Constant -0.000295 -0.000275*** -0.000275***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Time Fixed Eets Yes
Observations 32,450 32,450 32,450
Adj. R-squared 0.069 0.067 0.067
This Table reports the results for a robustness heks where we test the
robustness of the speiation in the rst olumn of Table 4.3 for orrela-
tion aross time. Column (1) reports the results for a speiation where
we inlude time xed eets. Column (2) reports the results when we
luster by time. In olumn (3), we report the results from lustering both
by time and by rm (two-way lustering). Standard errors in parentheses.
Signiane at 1%, 5%, and 10% level indiated by ***, **, and *, respe-
tively.
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4.4.2.2 Thresholds
We also test whether the baseline result in Setion 4.4 is robust to the
thresholds used. While the thresholds for the stok market are lose to the
ones proposed by Lunde and Timmermann (2004), the other thresholds
are not well-established yet. Therefore, we redo the analysis with bigger
(smaller) thresholds. In partiular, we inrease (derease) the absolute
value of the thresholds by one standard deviation to look at whether our
results still hold for somewhat higher (smaller) trends. The results, re-
ported in olumn (1) and (2) Table 4.5, suggest that our baseline results
are only to a minor extent driven by the partiular set of thresholds ob-
tained in Setion 4.4. Espeially, CTAs seem to be suessful at timing the
larger trends in urrenies, sine for the smaller trends the managers show
negative timing ability. Similarly, the funds do not show timing ability
for the very large trends in agriultural ommodities. Nevertheless, the
explanatory power of our model seems to be inreasing with the size of
the trend. This suggests that CTAs' market timing ability takes the form
of suessfully timing the larger trends in the dierent markets.
4.4.2.3 Mirostruture issues
The use of daily fund data might lead to mirostruture related issues suh
as possible thin or nonsynhronous trading and stale priing (Sholes and
Williams, 1977). It is unlikely that our results are driven by suh issues,
given the nature of the futures markets CTAs trade in. Nevertheless, we
re-estimate our baseline model but inlude lagged values for the market
fators (Dimson, 1979). In that ase, the model hanges to:
rp,t = α+
M∑
m=1
β1,mrm,t +
M∑
m=1
β2,mrm,t−1 +
M∑
m=1
γmDm,t · rm,t + λp + µp,t
(4.2)
The results, reported in olumn (3) of Table 4.5, show that these
onerns are unwarranted. Inluding lagged market fators does not ma-
terially impat results for the variables of interest.
4.4.2.4 Conditional Performane
To ensure that funds indeed add value in suessfully timing markets, we
also investigate the performane onditional on publi information. This
approah, suggested by Ferson and Shadt (1996), is motivated from the
101
Table 4.5: Robustness Cheks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Equities -0.162*** -0.173*** -0.173*** -0.120*** -0.230*** -0.199***
(0.0356) (0.0397) (0.0402) (0.0393) (0.0363) (0.0456)
Equities ·D1,t 0.187*** 0.196*** 0.165*** 0.191*** 0.206*** 0.135**
(0.0421) (0.0434) (0.0413) (0.0375) (0.0685) (0.0643)
Bonds 0.109 0.269 0.317 0.0506 0.110 0.260
(0.220) (0.175) (0.192) (0.219) (0.184) (0.216)
Bonds ·D2,t 1.204*** 1.102*** 0.984*** 0.747*** 0.241 0.0474
(0.289) (0.186) (0.251) (0.262) (0.228) (0.302)
Agri. Com 0.0237 -0.0975*** -0.0181 -0.00107 0.0692 0.00185
(0.0236) (0.0212) (0.0219) (0.0272) (0.0438) (0.0296)
Agri. Com ·D3,t -0.00011 0.200*** 0.0640** 0.0769** -0.0372 0.0673
(0.0267) (0.0263) (0.0273) (0.0302) (0.0458) (0.0442)
Energy -0.0166 0.00772 -0.0239 0.0332** 0.0348 0.0215
(0.0184) (0.0150) (0.0185) (0.0147) (0.0317) (0.0234)
Energy ·D4,t 0.151*** 0.105*** 0.153*** 0.109*** 0.0186 0.0356
(0.0280) (0.0205) (0.0267) (0.0208) (0.0377) (0.0342)
Metals 0.0113 0.0454 0.0472 0.0942** -0.135 -0.0706
(0.0459) (0.0390) (0.0391) (0.0436) (0.0813) (0.0445)
Metals ·D5,t 0.175*** 0.148*** 0.137*** 0.0921** 0.164** 0.126*
(0.0510) (0.0433) (0.0412) (0.0407) (0.0800) (0.0706)
Currenies -0.809*** 0.00974 -0.580*** -0.451*** -0.411*** -0.395**
(0.118) (0.115) (0.110) (0.134) (0.134) (0.148)
Currenies ·D6,t 1.277*** -0.334** 0.912*** 0.860*** 0.472*** 0.427**
(0.144) (0.123) (0.130) (0.138) (0.134) (0.166)
Constant -0.0001** -0.0001** -0.0002** -0.00014** -0.0014 -0.0060*
(5.57e-05) (5.91e-05) (6.13e-05) (5.33e-05) (0.0019) (0.0034)
Time Fixed
Eets
Yes
Controls for
maro-eonomi
information
Yes
32,450 32,450 32,449 32,449 1,486 1,486
Observations 0.079 0.062 0.073 0.106 0.088 0.064
Adj. R-squared 33 33 33 33 33 33
This Table reports the results for a number of robustness heks. In olumn (1) and (2) we test
the robustness of the results to higher and lower thresholds, respetively. In olumn (3) we inlude
lagged market fators to aount for potential mirostruture issues. In olumn (4) we ontrol for
publily available information, following Ferson and Shadt (1996). Column (5) and (6) report
the results from estimating the bull and bear market and the Henriksson-Merton speiation the
using monthly data.
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. Signiane at 1%, 5%, and 10% level indiated by
***, **, and *, respetively.
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idea that protable trading strategies relying on publi information should
not yield superior performane. To estimate this model, we make use of
four dierent maroeonomi variables to ontrol for publily available in-
formation: a dividend yield, a liquidity premium, a default risk premium,
and the risk-free rate.
10
All four variables are onstruted using daily
data. Following Ferson and Shadt (1996), the variables are demeaned
and their lagged values are interated with the market fators.
The model takes the following form:
rp,t = α+
∑M
m=1 β1,mrm,t +
∑M
m=1 β2,mrm,t−1 +
∑M
m=1 γmDm,t · rm,t
+
∑M
m=1
∑
4
n=1 ∅m,nrm,t · cn,t−1 + λp + µp,t
(4.3)
where cn,t−1 represent the lagged and demeaned maroeonomi vari-
ables. These interation terms pik up the movements through time of
the onditional betas as they relate to the market indiators. Column
(4) of Table 4.5 reports the onditional market timing performane of the
CTAs, whih suggests that the CTAs' suessful time-varying exposure
to the dierent fators annot be explained by publily available infor-
mation. Inidentally, the inlusion of these maro-eonomi variables also
ontrols for potential ommon shoks. This speiation therefore pro-
vides omplementary evidene that our results are robust to time xed
eets.
4.4.2.5 Return Frequeny
Next, we test the impat of the frequeny of the return data on our results.
Previous literature ommonly relied on monthly data, mainly due to data
availability issues. Bollen and Busse (2001) show that evidene of monthly
timing ability tends to disappear when daily data is employed. To ver-
ify whether our results are also sensitive to the data frequeny, we redo
the analysis using monthly data. In partiular, we redo both the spe-
iation bull and bear market speiation and the exess return-based
speiation.
10
The term spread, whih proxies for the liquidity premium, is alulated as the
dierene between the US Treasury 10 year yield and the (annualised) three-month
US T-Bill yield. The latter also serves as the risk-free rate. The quality spread is
the dierene between the US Corporate Bonds Moody's Seasoned AAA and the US
Corporate Bonds Moody's Seasoned BAA rate. The dividend yield is the daily dividend
yield of the S&P 500.
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Results are shown in olumns (5) and (6) of Table 4.5. When employ-
ing our baseline model to monthly data, we nd the evidene of positive
timing ability disappearing for half of the markets under onsideration.
The results for the original HM model using monthly data yield idential
results. The evidene of positive timing ability reported in olumn (2) of
Table 4.3 is no longer present in olumn (6) of Table 4.5. These results
are in line with previous literature and illustrate the importane of using
daily data for testing market timing ability.
4.4.2.6 Impat of fees
An analysis of alpha after fees provides another dimension along whih
we an evaluate the robustness of our results. Suh an analysis is relevant
sine hedge funds' fee struture impats net-of-fee returns in a non-linear
way. This is the ase sine part of hedge fund managers' ompensation
is based on performane relative to a high-water mark. To assess the
impat of fees, we re-estimate the main speiations in the paper (Table
4.3) using after fee returns. The results are reported in Table 4.6.
We nd that our results are robust to the use of net-of-fee returns.
The only hange that we observe, is a slight drop in the onstant. This is
onsistent with the ndings of Kazemi and Li (2009) who note that, sine
CTAs do not engage in seurity seletions, the slightly negative onstants
may be the result of fees and transation osts.
4.4.2.7 Subsample Analysis
Finally, we perform a subsample analysis to investigate how CTAs' market
timing ability has evolved over time. We use subsamples dened by events.
In partiular, we look at the period up to the dotom rash (1994-1999),
the period of the rash and subsequent bull market (2000-2007) and nally
the reent nanial risis (2008-2012). We report the results for the three
sample periods in Table 4.7.
In general, we nd that there has been some time variation in CTAs'
timing ability of trends in the dierent markets under onsideration. For
the period 1994-1999, CTAs exhibit positive timing ability in markets,
although only signiantly so in half of the ases. In ontrast, while
timing ability with regard to equity markets improves onsiderably during
the seond sub-period, the results suggest a lear absene of timing ability
in agriultural markets. Finally, the period 2008-2012 suggests an overall
improvement in the timing ability of CTAs, ompared to the previous two
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Table 4.6: Market Timing and Net-of-fee Returns
(1) (2) (3)
Equities -0.1593*** -0.1157*** -0.1388***
(0.041) (0.033) (0.022)
Equities ·D1,t 0.1637*** 0.0418 0.0600
(0.044) (0.034) (0.053)
Bonds 0.3055 0.7086*** 1.2023***
(0.188) (0.169) (0.185)
Bonds ·D2,t 0.9771*** 0.5416*** -0.5560***
(0.244) (0.174) (0.129)
Agri. Commodities -0.0275 -0.0487** -0.0007
(0.024) (0.019) (0.024)
Agri. Commodities ·D3,t 0.0795*** 0.1173*** 0.0291
(0.029) (0.025) (0.028)
Energy -0.0261 0.0305* 0.0639***
(0.020) (0.018) (0.019)
Energy ·D4,t 0.1540*** 0.0678*** -0.0143
(0.029) (0.021) (0.017)
Metals 0.0420 0.1714*** 0.2344***
(0.042) (0.030) (0.041)
Metals ·D5,t 0.1578*** -0.0117 -0.1545***
(0.044) (0.024) (0.037)
Currenies -0.5523*** -0.1877 -0.1015
(0.111) (0.125) (0.127)
Currenies ·D6,t 0.9762*** 0.2033 -0.0093
(0.141) (0.123) (0.114)
Constant -0.000279*** -6.30e-05 0.000524***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 32,450 32,450 32,450
Adj. R-squared 0.067 0.042 0.038
Number of funds 33 33 33
This Table reports the results for a robustness heks where we re-estimate
the speiations in Table 3 using net-of-fee returns, rather than gross returns.
Column (1) reports the results based on a bull- and bear markets using the
algorithm of Lunde and Timmermann (2004). Column (2) reports the results
for the speiation that uses the lassiation of Henriksson and Merton
(1981). Finally, olumn (3) reports the results using the approah of Bollen
and Busse (2001).
Standard errors, lustered by fund, in parentheses.
Signiane at 1%, 5%, and 10% level indiated by ***, **, and *, respetively
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Table 4.7: Subsample Analysis
1994-1999 2000-2007 2008-2012
Equities -0.182 -0.286*** -0.0800*
(0.141) (0.0418) (0.0455)
Equities ·D1,t 0.190 0.334*** 0.0670
(0.143) (0.0413) (0.0460)
Bonds -1.183** 0.198 1.176***
(0.239) (0.261) (0.159)
Bonds ·D2,t 3.101** 1.004*** -0.0800
(0.614) (0.232) (0.222)
Agri. Commodities -0.120* 0.116** 0.00374
(0.0391) (0.0421) (0.0217)
Agri. Commodities ·D3,t 0.412 -0.110** 0.0879***
(0.227) (0.0390) (0.0259)
Energy -0.0849* 0.0104 -0.0886**
(0.0295) (0.0168) (0.0314)
Energy ·D4,t 0.316*** 0.124*** 0.174***
(0.0339) (0.0242) (0.0503)
Metals -0.206** 0.143** 0.0134
(0.0388) (0.0682) (0.0377)
Metals ·D5,t 0.331*** 0.0459 0.178***
(0.0504) (0.0713) (0.0462)
Currenies 0.0676 -1.004*** -0.213**
(0.214) (0.146) (0.0773)
Currenies ·D6,t 0.986 1.407*** 0.508***
(0.480) (0.250) (0.169)
Constant -0.000194 -7.47e-05 -0.000337***
(0.000155) (4.79e-05) (0.000112)
Observations 2,724 17,857 11,846
Adj. R-squared 0.119 0.090 0.070
Number of funds 33 33 33
This Table reports the results for a subsample analysis. Cluster-robust stan-
dard errors in parentheses. Signiane at 1%, 5%, and 10% level indiated
by ***, **, and *, respetively.
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sub-periods. With the exeption of bonds and equities, CTAs seem to have
suessfully timed the other markets under onsideration. This nding is
onsistent with the lear trends that emerged during the nanial risis.
The absene of timing ability in stok and bond markets is onsistent with
anedotal evidene that CTAs got whipsawed in these markets following
the risk-on/risk-o environment after 2009.
4.5 Conluding Remarks
In this paper we extend the well-established Henriksson-Merton model
for market timing by using a less restritive assumption on managers'
objetives. In partiular, we assume that the manager attempts to time
bull and bear markets, rather than expeted exess returns over the next
period (i.e. next month or next day). As suh, our analysis bridges the lit-
erature on bull and bear market identiation and tests for market timing
ability. Our approah builds on the observation that market professionals
think in trends rather than in terms of exess returns.
Sine any performane evaluation is generally arbitrary, we test whether
market partiipants sueed in timing the trends we identify using our
proposed denition. In partiular, we test whether CTAs, a hedge fund
ategory that attempts to prot from trends, are able to suessfully time
bull and bear periods in the asset lasses they are generally ative in. Our
results suggest that CTAs exhibit market timing ability and are generally
able to suessfully time trends in nanial markets.
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Appendix
Threshold Filter by Lunde and Timmermann (2004)
Let It be an indiator that takes on the value 1 if the stok market is in a
bull state and 0 otherwise. The stok prie at the end of period t is xt. Let
λ1 be a salar fration dening the threshold of the movement required
to go from a bear to a bull market. Similarly, let λ2 be the fration for
shifts from a bull market to a bear market. Suppose that at t0, the stok
market is at a loal maximum, i.e. It0 = 1. Set x
max = xt0 where xt0 is
the value of the stok prie at time t0. We an then apply the following
lter to lassify stok markets:
Step 1: If It−1 at time t equals 1:
1. In the ase where xt > x
max
, the peak is updated so that xmax = xt.
It is set equal to 1.
2. If xt < (1−λ1) ·x
max
, there is a swith from a bull to a bear market.
Retroatively apply It = 0 sine last peak up to time point t.
3. If xt > (1− λ1) · x
max
and xt < x
max
, it is set equal to 1.
If It−1 at time t equals 0:
1. In the ase where xt < x
min
, the trough is updated so that xmin =
xt. It is set equal to 0.
2. If xt > (1+λ2) ·x
min
, there is a swith from a bear to a bull market.
Retroatively apply It = 1 sine last trough up to time point t.
3. If xt < (1 + λ2) · x
min
and xt > x
min
, it is set equal to 0.
Step 2:
Go bak to step 1 until the end of the time series is reahed. 
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Trend Identiation Algorithm by Wegsheider (1994)
Let T ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , N} be a nonlinear subset of observations. The left
orner point tmin of T being the smallest value, the right ornerpoint tmax
being the largest value of T . All other points are alled inner observations
of T . We write T< for T {tmax}. For t ∈ T with t > tmin, tL is the
preeding observation of t in T . Formally:
tL = max{t
′ : t′ ∈ T, t′ < t}
Similarly, tR is the subsequent observation of t in T for t < tmax .
Let (xt)t∈T with T0 ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , N} be a time series of at least two
values. The size of a partiular trend is denoted as γp and determined as
follows:
Step 1: For all t < tmax with xtR − xt = 0, observation t is removed.
Let T1 be the set of remaining observations.
Step 2: If T1 ontains only one element, there is no trend and the
iteration is anelled. All inner points t of T1 with xtL < xt < xtR
and xtL > xt > xtR respetively, share the same trend and are therefore
removed. Let T2 be the set of remaining observations.
Step 3: Let t′ be the rst observation, at whih the smallest dierene
between two onseutive observations in T2 starts:
t′ = min{t : t ∈ T<
2
, | xtR − xt |= min{| xsR − xs |: s ∈ T
<
2
}
Trend γp is dened by the following arithmeti return:
γp =
x
t
′
R
−x
t
′
x
t
′
When t′ and tR′ are both inner observations or both orner observa-
tions of T2, the size of the trend is saved and both t
′
and t′R are removed.
For t′ = tmin and t
′
R < tmax, the size of the trend is saved and t
′
is
removed.
For t
′
R = tmax and t
′ > tmin, the size of the trend is saved and tmax is
removed.
Let T3 be the set of remaining observations.
Step 4: Set T2 = T3 and go bak to step 3 until T2 is empty. 
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Chapter 5
Adaptive Time Series
Momentum: Incorporating
Trend Signal Strength and
the Performance of
Managed Futures1
5.1 Introduction
According to BarclayHedge, a public hedge fund database with an exten-
sive coverage of Managed Futures funds, total assets under management
(AUM) in the Managed Futures or Commodity Trading Advisors (CTAs)
industry stood at 333 billion USD at the end of the third quarter of 2015.
This makes the Managed Futures industry the second biggest hedge fund
category after Fixed Income Arbitrage.
Until recently, no commonly accepted asset-based benchmarks were
available for the CTA industry. Instead, practitioners commonly bench-
marked CTAs' performance against manager-based indices. To some ex-
tent, the reliance on manager-based benchmarks is related to the challenge
with constructing appropriate benchmarks for CTAs, as there is generally
1This chapter is based on joint work with Péter Erd®s.
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no long bias in CTAs' trading strategies. While a manager will generally
disclose the markets he or she is active in, the actual position at any point
in time will be long or short, depending on the manager's assessment of
the prevailing trend in the underlying market.
Benchmarking against peers has its limitations, however. Manager-
based benchmarks reflect both the returns to potential market inefficien-
cies that the constituents in the index attempt to exploit as well as indi-
vidual managers' skill. Moreover, Fung and Hsieh (2004) point out that
hedge fund indices can be expected to inherit some of the biases that are
inherent in hedge fund databases. As a consequence, the alpha estimated
from such models for any individual manager may not accurately reflect
managerial skill.
Instead of benchmarking against peers, an alternative approach that
consists of benchmarking managers against a naïve trend-following strat-
egy which is completely asset-based may be more valuable. Moskowitz,
Ooi, and Pedersen (2012) are the first to propose a futures-based trading
strategy that captures the returns to systematic trend-following in futures
markets.2 The authors coin the observed trend effect time series momen-
tum, and show that time series momentum cannot be explained by the risk
factors proposed by Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997). Baltas
and Kosowski (2013) build on the work of Moskowitz, Ooi, and Pedersen
(2012) to suggest a set of the Futures-Based Trend-Following Strategies.
Considering weekly and daily strategies in addition to monthly strategies,
the authors show that their proposed TSMOM factors significantly im-
prove the explanatory power of multifactor models applied to Managed
Futures funds' returns.
In this paper, we contribute to the literature on the performance eval-
uation of Managed Futures funds in two ways. First, we evaluate the
performance of a trend-following strategy that combines short-term time
series momentum signals with longer-term time series momentum signals.
Whereas a standard time-series momentum approach relying on binary
signals does not capture trend strength, aggregating time series momen-
tum signals of different lookback horizons results in a signal that measures
the strength of a trend in a particular market. This allows us to allocate
to a position in proportion to the signal strength.
We hypothesize that incorporating signal strength may yield a more
2For completeness, we note that Fung and Hsieh (2001) propose so-called Primitive
Trend-following Factors (PTFS) for trend-following funds. These factors capture the
returns to market timing using constructed lookback-straddle prices. To the best of
our knowledge, these factors have not gained industrywide traction.
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robust time series momentum factor that better anticipates reversals. In
addition, incorporating signal strength can be expected to be closer to
the actual practices of trend-following asset managers. Coincidentally,
the aggregation over a wide range of potential parametrizations avoids
an arbitrary choice of certain parametrizations and considerably reduces
data mining and calibration concerns. Diversification considerations more
generally may be another reason for combining signals over different hori-
zons. Baltas and Kosowski (2013), for example, show that time series
strategies over different lookback horizons have low correlations, implying
considerable diversification benefits.
To provide some intuition on why diversifying among or combining
different trend-following signals may add value and improve the overall
performance of a strategy, consider the following hypothetical example.
Suppose we have two securities, whose price paths are reported in Table
5.1.
[Table 1 about here.]
We note that both securities have the same initial value and terminal
value, and that the securities' returns exhibit identical levels of volatility
over the period considered. In other words, both securities only differ in
their interim price path. Application of a simple (long-term) time series
momentum strategy over the period t through t − 3 yields a long signal
in both instances. When we include the intermediate signals, however,
we observe that the trends in both securities are considerably different.
Aggregating all the time series momentum signal suggests that a reversal
may be taking place for security A, whereas at t there is a strong and
persistent trend in security B. This simple example suggests that aggre-
gating signals over different lookback periods may add value as it captures
additional features on the nature of the trend.
Second, in implementing the above approach, we incorporate a number
of market frictions and real-life limitations, such as contract-specific trans-
action costs, the impact of exchange rate risk on contracts' profit-and-loss,
and delays between signal generation and trade execution. Earlier work
by Hurst, Ooi, and Pedersen (2013) points out the importance of some
of these frictions. Incorporating practical implementation issues ensures
that the factor is both an investable asset-based factor, which allows a
meaningful analysis of stand-alone performance, and that it is investable.
The latter implies that the our factor can be used as a somewhat more
realistic benchmark for the CTA industry. Not taking these frictions into
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consideration may raise the bar for managers too much, hampering a
meaningful interpretation of fund alpha.
We find that our strategy, which we coin adaptive time series momen-
tum (ATSMOM), matches the stylized facts of manager-based indices
along a number of dimensions. Moreover, our benchmark significantly
outperforms existing benchmarks in explaining the returns of Managed
Futures funds. Decomposing the ATSMOM factor, we find that a second
significant factor, which we coin the speed factor, appears to be present
in time series momentum's returns. This speed factor, which we extract
using a principal component analysis (PCA) and which buys longer-term
and sells shorter-term TSMOM strategies, is similar but not identical to
the speed factor proposed by Greyserman and Kaminski (2014). We find
that Managed Futures funds tend to load negatively on the speed factor.
Interestingly, however, we find that fund alpha is positively related to
speed factor exposure.
Turning to performance evaluation using our new factors, we find that
smaller Managed Futures funds exhibit a nearly even exposure to every
asset class under consideration. At the same time, larger funds tend to
overweight more liquid (futures) markets, predominantly Fixed Income.
Although our asset-based factors capture much of the return variation of
CTA managers, we find that some CTA managers continue to outperform
on a risk-adjusted basis.
To investigate the drivers of the observed alpha, we analyze the rela-
tionship between risk-adjusted performance and fund characteristics. We
find that fund characteristics only account for a small fraction of the cross-
sectional variation in fund alphas, suggesting that the estimated alphas
are indicative of managerial skill. Interestingly, we also document strong
persistence in the estimated alphas, in that good annual performance in
one year tends to repeat in the subsequent year. Finally, we find that
contemporaneous fund flows do not affect the risk-adjusted performance
of managers. This suggests capacity constraints are less of an issue for
CTAs. These results echo the findings of Baltas and Kosowski (2013), who
rigorously test for capacity constraints in trend-following strategies. Their
results suggest that futures markets are liquid enough to accommodate
the trading activity of the CTA industry.
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5.2 Literature Review
Mutual funds are commonly benchmarked against a combination of mar-
ket indices and risk factors such as the factors suggested by Fama and
French (1993) and Carhart (1997). Similarly, most hedge fund cate-
gories are evaluated against Fung and Hsieh's seven-factor (or eight-factor)
model (Fung and Hsieh, 2004). While these factor models perform well in
explaining the returns of mutual funds and most hedge fund categories,
their performance in explaining Managed Futures funds' return variation
is limited. Instead, the Managed Futures industry still largely relies on
manager-based indices. Such indices reflect the average performance of
the selected funds and provide a measure of the industry's performance.3
This practice is in stark contrast to the above-described practices for mu-
tual funds and other hedge fund categories and may have a number of
limitations, as pointed out in the introduction.
There have nevertheless been several studies that attempt to model
the returns generated by Managed Futures funds. Fung and Hsieh (2001)
are among the first to focus on replicating trend-following hedge funds'
returns. The authors suggest the use of primitive trend-following strate-
gies (PTFS) based on lookback straddles, which capture the returns of a
market timer. While implementing these factors in practice is possible,
Harvey et al. (2016) note that it is neither straightforward nor cheap.
More recently, there has been renewed attention for modelling the re-
turns accruing to Managed Futures funds. Moskowitz, Ooi, and Pedersen
(2012) are the first to document, in a systematic manner, the presence of
a trend effect for a broad range of futures and forward contracts. They
coin this effect time series momentum (TSMOM), which relies solely on
the continuation of the price direction of the asset under consideration.
Moskowitz, Ooi, and Pedersen (2012) show that a portfolio of TSMOM
strategies, diversified across different asset classes, consistently delivers
large and significant excess returns. Time series momentum is related,
but not identical to cross-sectional (or Carhart) momentum which relies
on past winners outperforming past losers.
Baltas and Kosowski (2013) build on the work of Moskowitz, Ooi, and
Pedersen (2012) to suggest a set of the Futures-Based Trend-Following
Strategies. The authors extend the existing literature on time series mo-
3For completeness, we note that the Société Générale (formerly Newedge) Trend
Indicator index, which relies on a 20/120 moving average crossover futures-based model,
is also sometimes used by practitioners to capture the returns accruing to Managed
Futures funds.
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mentum by considering weekly and daily strategies. Baltas and Kosowski
(2013) also provide clear evidence that Managed Futures funds attempt to
exploit momentum in the time series domain. In particular, the authors
show that their suggested TSMOM factors significantly improve the ex-
planatory power of multifactor models applied to Managed Futures funds'
returns and outperform the PTFS suggested by Fung and Hsieh (2001).
Our approach borrows from and extends the works of Moskowitz, Ooi,
and Pedersen (2012) and Baltas and Kosowski (2013). In particular, we
investigate the economic gains of using more than one or just a few time
series momentum signals. The use of multiple signals can be motivated
along several lines. First, aggregating a large number of signals results in a
combined signal that captures signal strength. This addresses a limitation
in existing applications of time series momentum strategies where the
binary nature dictates a either a long or short allocation, regardless of the
strength of the trend. As a consequence, risk is allocated across different
securities and sectors without regard to the strength of the trends in
the different markets. It seems reasonable to assume that a reliance on
an aggregate or several signals is closer to the CTA industry's practice.
Second, an investor ex ante does not know the performance of a particular
(e.g. a twelve month) parametrization. From a diversification perspective,
it may be more prudent to combine a considerable number of signals.
The choice of the strategy parameters is also an important consider-
ation from a performance evaluation perspective. One can question the
investabilitity of a benchmark that is based on just one signal, since such
a strategy is underdiversified and suffers from a hindsight bias. This
hindsight bias is inherent when relying on specific parametrizations that
performed well historically and it may raise the bar for managers too
much, as pointed out by Hurst, Ooi, and Pedersen (2012). Combining
different candidate signals, however, we avoid having to select a specific
set of parameter specifications, thereby reducing model risk while at the
same time enhancing 'signal' diversification.
The idea of combining trend signals from different lookback periods
matches a recent new avenue in academic research. In particular, Han,
Zhou, and Zhu (2016) analyze the economic gains of combining signals
from short-, intermediate, and long-term moving average signals in equi-
ties. They find that combining the price trend information outperforms
the price trends separately. Our work is similar in spirit, but it has a
different scope in terms of assets. Additionally, since we focus only on
signals of up to one year we do not have to consider price reversals which,
literature suggests, tend to occur over horizons beyond one year.
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Our adjustment to existing time series momentum strategies implies
that our work is also strongly related to other recent contributions that at-
tempt to improve time series momentum strategies. Baltas and Kosowski
(2015) investigate the impact of different volatility estimators on the strat-
egy's turnover and find that more efficient estimation of volatility can
substantially reduce rebalancing costs. They continue to show that tak-
ing into consideration pairwise correlations among assets further improves
time series momentum's performance by limiting downside risk.
5.3 Data
We employ data from several distinct data sources. To construct the
ATSMOM strategy, we employ daily futures contract data obtained from
CSI Data. We retrieve monthly data on Managed Futures funds from the
BarclayHedge database. In addition, in-house data from RPM Risk &
Portfolio Management AB complements the subsection where we estimate
the transaction costs for CTAs.4
5.3.1 Futures Data
The futures dataset that we use consists of daily Close Price, Open In-
terest, and Volume for 98 futures contracts across four asset classes. In-
dividual futures contract data are obtained from CSI Data and cover the
period from January 1990 to September 2015. We report the list of futures
contracts covered in Table 2. Since some contracts only started trading
or were discontinued during the sample period, we also report the period
over which each contract is actually included in the subsequent analysis.
[Table 2 about here.]
[Table 2 (cont.) about here.]
Since futures contracts are short-lived contracts that expire at a pre-
determined date, we first construct a continuous time series of futures
prices for each contract. In the online appendix, we describe the par-
ticular approach used. The daily returns calculated from the continuous
4RPM Risk & Portfolio Management AB, a specialist investment manager based in
Stockholm, Sweden is a fund-of-funds specializing in Managed Futures strategies and
liquid Global Macro managers.
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futures prices, are equivalent to fully collateralized (unleveraged) returns
in excess of the risk-free rate (for a thorough discussion, refer to Baltas
and Kosowski (2015) and references therein). As such, the daily excess
returns are constructed as
ri,t =
Fi,t − Fi,t−1
Fi,t
(5.1)
where Ft corresponds to the futures price of asset i at time t. The list of
futures contracts that we employ is one of the most comprehensive used
in the literature, as we include a number of metal-related futures and a
number of currency pairs that are commonly traded by CTAs.
5.3.2 Managed Futures Data
To analyze the relationship between our proposed strategy and Managed
Futures funds' performance we collect monthly net-of-fee returns of live
and dead funds labeled CTA in the BarclayHedge Database. Although
reporting to hedge fund databases is voluntary, Joenväärä, Kosowski, and
Tolonen (2012)  in an analysis of the different publicly available hedge
fund databases  conclude that BarclayHedge is the most comprehensive
hedge fund database, especially for Managed Futures funds. We restrict
the data on Managed Futures funds to the period from January 1994 to
September 2015. We employ data from January 1994 to mitigate a poten-
tial survivorship bias, since most databases only started collecting infor-
mation on defunct programs from 1994 onwards (see Joenväärä, Kosowski,
and Tolonen, 2012).
We filter the sample of funds by looking at their self-declared strategy
description and remove funds whose description is not consistent with the
definition of CTAs. In the process, we discard duplicates by excluding
multiple share classes and focus on the fund's flagship program that at-
tracts the largest assets-under-management (AUM). To account for back-
fill bias, we drop the first 12 observations (see Kosowski, Naik, and Teo,
2007).5 We also drop funds with (AUM) below 10 million USD to restrict
the set of funds to the investable universe. Finally, we focus on funds that
report their returns either in USD or EUR. The EUR-denominated re-
5By keeping track of the number of months that are backfilled when a fund is first
included in BarclayHedge database, we have tracked backfill bias for the period 2005-
2010. For that sample period, the median (average) backfill bias was twelve (fourteen)
months.
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turns and AUM are converted to USD using the end-of-month EUR/USD
spot rate provided by the Bank of England.
We focus on systematic trend-following CTAs, which we select based
on funds' self-declared strategy description as well as an analysis of their
return characteristics. We focus on systematic trend-following managers
as their performance is most clearly related to the concept of time series
momentum. These managers do not make discretionary decisions and
show a high correlation with manager-based benchmark indices such as
the SG Trend Index. These programs are usually diversified and invest
across many liquid futures markets. Applying the above adjustments,
we obtain a sample of 433 systematic trend-following CTA funds. From
this set of funds, we construct both an AUM-weighted and an equal-risk
weighted index. Both portfolios are rebalanced monthly.
5.4 Methodology
We construct a portfolio which follows a strategy that we will refer to
as ATSMOM, and which is diversified both across time and across asset
classes. The aim is to construct a portfolio that is more representative of
systematic trend-following CTAs than a time series momentum approach
based on a single lookback period. We can imagine that diversification
benefits across time and assets result in fund performance that is less
sensitive to inevitable trend reversals.
The construction of the ATSMOM builds on the works of Moskowitz,
Ooi, and Pedersen (2012) and Baltas and Kosowski (2013) (hereinafter
MOP and BK, respectively). Analytically, using daily returns, a diversi-
fied TSMOM strategy can be constructed as follows
rT+1 =
1
L
L∑
t=1
sgn(rT−j,T−1,l) · 0.4/
√
261
σT−60,T−1,l
· rT+1,l (5.2)
where sgn is the signum function, that is, sgn(rT−j,T−1,l) is the sign of
the return over the lookback horizon [T − j, T − j + 1, . . . , T − 1] lagged
two days, L is the number of assets in the strategy and σT−60,T−1,l is
the two-day lagged RiskMetrics' standard exponentially weighted moving
average (EWMA) estimator of volatility with a 60-day rolling window.6
6We first convert the daily returns of futures contracts denoted in a foreign currency
to USD, since the weighting scheme in Eq. 5.1 is aimed at obtaining a (ex post) level
of volatility in USD.
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Algebraically, the EWMA estimator in Eq. 5.2 is calculated as follows
σ2T = (1− λ) ·
T∑
t=0
λt−1 · (rt − r¯)2 (5.3)
where λ is the decay factor, which we choose such that the center of
mass is at around 60 days. We follow MOP in using this simple model
for estimating volatility. The correction factor of 0.4 to the estimated
volatility in Eq. (2) is suggested by MOP as to achieve an ex ante volatil-
ity of 40% per security. This is motivated from the observation that a
40% scaling factor can be expected to yield risk factors with an ex post
volatility of around 12% per annum, which roughly matches the volatility
of the equity risk factors of Fama and French (1993) (see Moskowitz, Ooi,
and Pedersen, 2012).
The ATSMOM strategy is defined as a time series momentum strategy
whereby we average the signal for any given security in the portfolio over
a wide set of lookback horizons. Algebraically7,
rT+1 =
1
L
L∑
t=1
(∑260
j=10 sgn(rT−j,T−1,l)
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)
· 0.4/
√
261
σT−60,T−1,l
· rT+1,l (5.4)
We do not consider lookback periods of strictly less than 10 trading
days. In the case of such relatively short trading intervals, the high degree
of noise makes the type of signal extraction used here unlikely. Momentum
trading at such short intervals can be expected to be based on additional
information (e.g. order flow) rather than closing prices alone. Such short-
term strategies likely also employ intraday rebalancing. Results for a
trading strategy that also includes horizons between 1 and 9 days are
qualitatively unchanged and are available up on request. This equivalent
to a strategy where the strategy trades the net position of every futures
contract across the different lookback portfolios.
From eq. (5.4) it is clear that the signal for every futures contract will
vary between minus one and plus one (i.e. St ∈ [−1, 1]) depending on the
strength of the trend. This is a desirable charactistics as a simple TSMOM
strategy based on one lookback period can be criticised on the fact that
7An alternative way to think about the ATSMOM strategy is by viewing it simply
as an equal-weighted portfolio of diversified TSMOM portfolios over different lookback
horizons. The overall strategy only trades the net position of every futures contract
across the different lookback portfolios.
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it is a binary signal. As a result, a standard time-series momentum signal
does not capture signal strength. As we illustrated in the introduction,
our approach will mechanically allocate more to the futures contracts that
exhibit `clearer' trends. When trends start to fade, however, the short-
term signals will force the strategy to lower exposure more quickly than in
the case of a strategy that only considers one long-term signal, and vice
versa. At the portfolio-level, the strategy reduces exposure to markets
where trends become less pronounced and adds to futures contracts where
trends are or become more pronounced, in a more `adaptive' way than a
standard TSMOM strategy based on a single lookback horizon.
In addition to constructing an adaptive TSMOM strategy, we also at-
tempt to improve existing TSMOM strategies or CTA benchmarks along
several other dimensions. First, the available benchmarks imply signal
generation and trade execution on the same day, that is, for example, sig-
nal generation at the close price and entering the market during the same
closing session. When rebalancing frequency is low, such as in the case of
Moskowitz, Ooi, and Pedersen (2012) who employ monthly rebalancing,
the impact of the exact closing price employed may be limited. In our
case, however, the impact may be sizeable as we rebalance and thus may
shift positions daily.
In line with the work of Hurst, Ooi, and Pedersen (2013), we systemat-
ically skip one trading day between signal generation and trade execution.
For example, we only enter a position at Tuesday's closing price if that
decision relies on a signal generated based on Monday's closing price. Sim-
ilarly, the first day we can close that same position is during Wednesday's
closing session and the return of such a position will be the percentage
price difference between Wednesday's and Tuesday's closing prices.
Another aspect we consider is the impact of contracts that are traded
in a foreign currency, instead of the base currency (USD). We assume that
the collateral or margin is always held in the base currency. Thus, only
the daily profit and loss (P&L) generated from positions in the contracts
traded in a foreign currency is exchanged to USD at the daily closing
exchange rate. The margin itself, which is held in domestic currency, is
not exposed to exchange rate risk (see Appendix A in Koijen et al., 2016).
We use the exchange rates provided by the Bank of England or, when
these are not available, the exchange rates of the respective central bank
to convert the daily P&L of the foreign currency denominated contracts.
We can imagine that incorporating trading frictions and exchange rate
fluctuations can improve the explanatory power of industry benchmarks.
We should emphasize that the proposed ATSMOM strategy does not
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trade every diversified TSMOM portfolio (one for each time frame) sep-
arately, but rather trades the netted position after aggregating the sig-
nals for each constituting TSMOM portfolio. As such ATSMOM is an
equally-weighted portfolio of each TSMOM strategy. This way we follow
the industry standard and non-negligibly, we substantially reduce the level
of transaction costs. The resulting strategy is likely to increase/decrease
existing positions only fractionally each day. Only these net changes and
the rollover of positions generate transaction costs.8
5.5 Results
In this section, we start by estimating the transaction costs for the futures
contracts under consideration. Next, we evaluate the performance of the
ATSMOM strategy and compare the approach to the futures-based fac-
tors suggested by MOP and BK, as well as a number of more traditional
risk factors that are used in the context of hedge fund analysis. We also
analyze the relationship between our newly constructed factor and sys-
tematic trend-following CTAs. Finally, we extend our baseline strategy
by decomposing ATSMOM's drivers, which leads to the introduction of a
`speed factor'. We conclude with an analysis of the relationship between
our newly proposed factors and CTAs.
5.5.1 Estimation of Transaction Costs
Existing benchmarks, with the exception of the SG Trend Indicator index,
do not consider transaction costs incurred executing a systematic trend-
following program. To allow for a meaningful performance measurement,
we account for transaction costs. A prerequisite to the formation of a
CTA benchmark that considers costs is, of course, appropriate estimates
of the trading costs typically incurred by CTAs.
8When a futures contract is rolled over to a further-dated contract, the strategy
closes the nearby contract and opens a position in the new contract. The date of the
contract rollover coincides with the rollover used for the construction of the continuous
futures (see the Appendix). On such days, turnover is usually much higher than on
other days. Daily turnover fairly limited, except in the case of short rate futures. These
contracts exhibit very low levels of volatility (0.01% average daily volatility) compared
to other contracts (1.2% average daily volatility) and thus a large notional position
is needed to obtain the same target level of volatility. Omitting the Eurodollar, the
Euribor, and the 90-day bank accepted bill, the turnover equals 29%. Each short rate
futures generates an average daily turnover of around 22-23%, whereas, the average
turnover for the other contracts is just 0.3%.
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To this end, we first estimate the explicit trading costs from actual
charges incurred in one of RPM Risk & Portfolio Management's flagship
funds over a one-year period from August 2013 through August 2014.
Explicit trading costs include gross commissions, clearing fees, exchange
fees, NFA (National Futures Association) charges, and brokerage and ex-
ecution charges. Second, we also need to account for implicit transaction
costs arising from the bid-ask spread that traders usually pay market
makers for providing liquidity.9 In line with the standard approach in
the literature, in a round trip, the bid-ask spread can be approximated
by the tick size. This simplification dates back to Demsetz (1968), who
argues that when customers trade through market makers, they will pay
the difference between the true price and the bid or ask price on every
trade. We therefore employ the reported tick-size for every contract to
approximate the implicit transaction cost for every contract.10
Ideally, we should re-estimate transaction costs from time to time.
Unfortunately, we only have transaction costs data for a very recent pe-
riod. Following Hurst, Ooi, and Pedersen (2012), we therefore assume
that in the first half of the sample period (1991-2002), transaction costs
were twice as high as in the second half of the sample period (2003-2015).
Table 5.3 reports the estimated transaction costs for each asset class.
[Table 3 about here.]
The results in Table 5.3 clearly illustrate that trading costs vary con-
siderably from asset class to asset class; in basis points of traded notional
amount, short-rate futures are the least expensive to trade, though these
contracts are also the least volatile. Trading in VIX and grains futures is
most expensive. This finding is mainly driven by large tick size indicating
9Effective spread estimators (Roll, 1984; Smith and Whaley, 1994) and approaches
to estimate bid-ask spread directly from the order book (Locke and Venkatesh, 1997)
have also been proposed. Szakmary, Shen, and Sharma (2010) and Locke and
Venkatesh (1997) point out, however, that these estimates are close to the tick size.
Since estimating the bid-ask spread from the order book is beyond the scope of the
current paper, we stick to the simplification that the tick size is a good proxy for the
bid-ask spread.
10We note that transaction costs are likely to be a nonlinear function of trading
volume. In the absence of transaction-level data, however, it is not possible to quantify
the relationship. In addition, taking into consideration transaction costs and other
frictions such as position limits requires assumptions on the portfolio's size. We refer
to the work of Frazzini, Israel, and Moskowitz (2012) for more details on the impact of
transaction costs on exploiting asset pricing anomalies. In this study, we assume that
transaction costs increase linearly with trading volume.
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lower liquidity in these markets. In all markets, except for energy com-
modities and industrial metals, the half tick size accounts for more than
half of the total estimated trading cost. On average, across all markets
traded, we find that the bid-ask spread is responsible for almost three
quarters of the overall transaction costs.
5.5.2 Adaptive TSMOM's Stand-alone Performance
In Table 5.4 we report performance statistics for the adaptive TSMOM
strategy as well as results for the factors suggested by Moskowitz, Ooi,
and Pedersen (2012) and Baltas and Kosowski (2013). The diversified
time series momentum factor (henceforth MOP) is available from Ap-
plied Quantitative Research's (AQR) website. The monthly, weekly, and
daily Futures-based Trend-following Benchmarks (FTB, henceforthBKM ,
BKW , and BKD) are available from Robert Kosowski's website. For the
ATSMOM factor, we report the results both gross and net of transaction
costs in panel A. The existing benchmarks, in panel B, are gross of trans-
action costs. All the factors are scaled to 10% volatility for comparison.
[Table 4 about here.]
We observe that the ATSMOM strategy yields somewhat higher min-
imum and maximum returns than the MOP factor and the BKD and
BKW proposed by Moskowitz, Ooi, and Pedersen (2012) and Baltas and
Kosowski (2013). This suggests that the ATSMOM strategy is success-
ful at limiting downside risk and to allocating more to better performing
assets. The lower downside risk is likely to be the consequence of diversifi-
cation benefits as well as the higher rebalancing frequency. In particular,
more frequent rebalancing implies that the strategy will respond more
quickly to changes in trends. In contrast, MOP's factor is rebalanced
monthly. More frequent rebalancing, however, does not guarantee lower
downside risk, as is evident from BKD`s MDD. Taking into account trans-
action costs, the benefits resulting from the more pro-active nature of the
adaptive TSMOM strategy clearly come at a cost. The Sharpe ratio net-
of-transaction costs drops to 0.96.
The higher upside of the ATSMOM strategy also translates to a higher
skewness and kurtosis. High skewness is consistent with one of the styl-
ized facts of CTAs in that these funds tend to produce positively skewed
returns (refer to, among others, Fung and Hsieh (2001), Lamm Jr (2005),
and Ding and Shawky (2007)). This feature is also present in the BKW
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and BKD. Before transaction costs, we find that the ATSMOM strategy
reports slightly lower average annual returns than the MOP factor, result-
ing in a Sharpe ratio of the ATSMOM that does not differ significantly
from the Sharpe ratio of MOP (using the approach of Ledoit and Wolf
(2008) to test the statistical significance, we obtain a p-value of 0.288).
The focus of this work is, of course, not on stand-alone performance.
The results so far simply indicate that our newly proposed benchmark
is able to compete with existing benchmarks. Next, we turn to the use
of ATSMOM as a benchmark for the Managed Futures industry. Does
the adaptive nature of our newly proposed factor better capture Managed
Futures funds' performance?
5.5.3 A Benchmark for Managed Futures Funds?
In Panel C of Table 5.4, we report the performance of existing industry
indices. These indices are often used by practitioners to benchmark indi-
vidual managers. The two most commonly used CTA benchmarks are the
BarclayHedge CTA Index and the SG (formerly Newedge) CTA Index.
BarclayHedge also publishes a large cap index called BTOP 50 and SG
a Trend-Following sub-index.11 In addition to these manager-based in-
dices, SG also constructs an asset-based benchmark called the SG Trend
Indicator index which reflects the returns of a strategy that relies on a
simple 20/120 moving average crossover model. The index is reported net
of transaction costs and a hypothetical 2% management and 20% perfor-
mance fee.
In addition to the above indices, we also construct an AUM weighted
as well as an equal risk-weighted (ERW) index using the systematic trend-
following CTAs selected in Section 5.3. Similarly to the other CTA indices,
these indices are also far from investable as one cannot rebalance a CTA
portfolio on a monthly basis. Lengthy due diligence and legal processes
to opening new managers and closing existing managers makes such an
approach impractical. Nevertheless, the indices are representative of then-
current CTAs. Further, it is reasonable to expect that the TSMOM-
based benchmarks are particularly relevant for systematic trend-followers,
11The BarclayHedge and SG manager-based indices are equal-weighted. This has the
drawback these indices are overweight CTAs that target higher levels of volatility. The
manager-based indices are rebalanced once a year. The BarclayHedge CTA index is a
broad index of CTAs, some of which are not necessarily trend-followers nor systematic.
The SG CTA index includes only the largest 20 CTAs that are open to investment and
report performance and AUM on a daily basis.
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but may be not for other types of CTAs. While time series momentum
benchmarks may also be relevant for discretionary trend-followers, the
data set at our disposal only includes 19 discretionary trend-following
CTAs that meet the selection criteria. For this reason, we do not include
discretionary managers explicitly.
We observe that most of the CTA indices exhibit positive skewness,
drawdowns of approximately 15% at 10% annual volatility (with the ex-
ception of the BTOP 50), and Sharpe ratios of 0.31 to 0.93. The Trend
Indicator strategy reports the highest drawdown, which may be because
of the fact that the index employs just one long-term moving average
crossover. The industry practice, in contrast, may be rather to apply
several different horizons simultaneously, thereby limiting downside risk.
In Figure 1 we plot the 3-year rolling window Sharpe ratio of the
different benchmarks reported in Panel A and B of Table 5.4.
[Figure 1 about here.]
The performance of the proposed ATSMOM strategy is almost always
somewhere between the slower(-to-react) (MOP TSMOM) and faster (BK
Daily) strategies and is less likely to significantly out or underperform the
other benchmarks. This is what one would expect from a strategy that
allocates both to shorter and longer-term strategies. Longer-term strate-
gies usually outperform shorter-term strategies. This was clearly the case
during 2013 through 2015, when the MOP factor clearly outperformed
ATSMOM. However, in periods when shorter-term strategies outperform,
longer-term strategies tend to suffer. Greyserman and Kaminski (2014)
note that it may be difficult, if not impossible, to determine ex ante the
horizon that will perform best over a given period. In such an environ-
ment, it may be better to trade a wide portfolio of horizons.
To put the performance of the adaptive TSMOM strategy in another
perspective, Figure 2 compares the rolling 3-year Sharpe ratio of the adap-
tive TSMOM strategy, the SG Trend indicator, and the MOP factor, on
the one hand, and peer-based indices, on the other hand. We observe that
the SG Trend indicator performed better in the early period of the sample,
although slightly underperforming the manager-based indices most of the
time. The performance of the adaptive strategy follows the performance
of trend-following managers more closely, especially in recent years. Both
observations are consistent with market participants' sense that the CTA
industry is moving towards increased sophistication and diversification.
[Figure 2 about here.]
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In Table 5.5, we report the correlation of the different futures-based
strategies with the manager indices. With regard to the factors of Baltas
and Kosowski (2013), we include a linear combination of the three separate
factors which we refer to here as `Average BK'.
[Table 5 about here.]
Interestingly, the correlation between the adaptive TSMOM strategy
and the manager-based indices exceeds the correlation of the average of
the BK factors. This suggests that our factor may add value over a com-
bination of the factors of Baltas and Kosowski (2013).
Moving beyond simple summary statistics, we investigate the rela-
tionship between our proposed adaptive TSMOM strategy and exist-
ing (equity-based) risk factors, the primitive trend-following strategies
(PTFS) of Fung and Hsieh (2001) and a number of other recently pro-
posed risk factors in Table 5.6.
[Table 6 about here.]
In column (1) and (2) we report the results for regressions specifi-
cations where we regress the monthly (excess) returns of the adaptive
TSMOM strategy on the excess returns of the Fama and French (1993)
factors and a combination of these and Carhart (1997) cross-sectional mo-
mentum factor. We find that the adaptive TSMOM factor produces eco-
nomically large and significant alphas against existing risk factors, both
gross (Panel A) and after transaction costs (panel B). The alphas vary
from 9.5% p.a. to up to 13.2% p.a. These results mimic the findings of
Moskowitz, Ooi, and Pedersen (2012) that time series momentum is not
well explained by existing (equity-based) risk factors.
In column (3), we include the tradable (equity-based) liquidity fac-
tor of Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) and find that (equity) liquidity is
unrelated to TSMOM. The results in column (4) report the estimates
for a regression where we include the PTFS factors of Fung and Hsieh,
2001. In column (5), we report the results for 8-factor model of Fung
and Hsieh (2004), where we include all five PTFS factors rather than just
the commodities, bonds, and foreign exchange PTFS. While the extended
FH model tends to work well for most hedge fund categories (see Fung
and Hsieh, 2004), only the PTFS factors are significant in explaining our
TSMOM factor. The results corroborate earlier findings that TSMOM is
generally unrelated to equity risk factors and that it is only partly related
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to existing momentum factors such as Carhart's cross-sectional momen-
tum and the lookback straddle based trend-following factors of Fung and
Hsieh (2001). In the appendix, we follow the work of Moskowitz, Ooi,
and Pedersen (2012), Asness, Moskowitz, and Pedersen (2013), and Koi-
jen et al. (2016) and regress the adaptive TSMOM strategy's returns on
a number of macroeconomic, liquidity, volatility, and sentiment variables.
We find that variation in these variables does not explain the observed
excess returns of the adaptive TSMOM strategy.
Finally, we also regress the strategy's returns against the Global Value
and Global (cross-sectional) Momentum factors proposed by Asness, Moskowitz,
and Pedersen (2013), which are arguably more appropriate since these
factors cover multiple asset classes.12 We find that both factors perform
somewhat better in explaining the variation in our strategy's returns,
with both coefficients being significantly positive. The strategy, however,
continues to generate a significant and substantial alpha of 5.64% p.a.
vis-à-vis these factors.
Table 5.7, Panel A, reports the explanatory power of a number of
asset-based style regressions, where we regress the most commonly used
manager-based CTA indices against commonly used asset-style based hedge
fund benchmarks. We consider the period from January 2000 through
January 2012, for which data for all variables is available.
[Table 7 about here.]
Consistent with our earlier findings, Fung and Hsieh' PTFS explain
up to 30% of the variation in the manager indices. The 10-factor model,
which considers other hedge fund asset-based style factors in addition
to the PTFS, performs marginally better, although it still only accounts
for 20% to 35% of the variation in CTAs' returns. Turning to the SG
Trend Indicator, an industry benchmark that has gained some traction
among practitioners in the CTA industry, we find that this indicator per-
forms surprisingly well over the sample period considered. Moskowitz,
Ooi, and Pedersen (2012) their TSMOM factor also performs consistently
across the CTA benchmarks and produces R²s of around 45%, slightly
lower than that of the Trend Indicator. The three-factor model of Baltas
and Kosowski (2013) yields comparable results, with adjusted R²s rang-
ing from 40% to 50%, in line with the authors' findings. The adaptive
TSMOM strategy, however, performs better across the board.
12We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this additional analysis.
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Next, we also perform 60-month rolling regressions to analyze poten-
tial time-variation in the explanatory power of the different asset-based
style factors. The explanatory power for the different models vis-à-vis the
BarclayHedge index (ERW) is reported in Figure 3.
[Figure 3 about here.]
Two points are worth noting. First, the explanatory power of Fung
and Hsieh's 8-factor model that incorporates the all PTFS factors has im-
proved somewhat the last few years, suggesting that CTAs have behaved
more like other hedge fund categories in recent years. Two, the ATSMOM
factor mimics CTAs' returns more closely in the second half of the sample
period.
These results, while tentative, leave unanswered the question of sta-
tistical significance. To determine whether the observed increase of our
proposed factor in capturing CTAs' returns is meaningful, we compare the
adaptive time-series momentum strategy to the model proposed by Bal-
tas and Kosowski (2013).13 To this end, we first estimate the incremental
value added from using the adaptive momentum strategy by calculating
the residuals from a regression that regresses the adaptive time series mo-
mentum strategy against the Futures-based Trend-following Benchmark
(FTB) Strategies. For comparison purposes, we scale all the regressors
including the residuals to 10%. We then rerun the specification of Baltas
and Kosowski, including the obtained residuals. If the coefficient on the
residuals is statistically significant, then this confirms that our proposed
factors adds value over and above the FTB. The results are reported in
panel B of table 5.7.
Not only do we find that the coefficient is significant at conventional
levels, and leads to a meaningful increase in the explanatory power of
the models (i.e. a 15 to 20 percentage points increase compared to the
initially reported adjusted R-squared, see Panel A), we also observe that
the relationship is economically significant. In particular, scaled to the
same volatility, we find that the coefficient on the residuals is comparable
in magnitude to Baltas and Kosowski's monthly and weekly factor.
13We refrain from using an incremental F -test because of potential multicollinearity
issues. Table 5.5 indicates that our proposed factor and the average of the FTB exhibit
a 0.8 pairwise Pearson correlation.
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5.5.4 Decomposing Adaptive Time Series Momentum
Our approach uses TSMOM portfolios with lookback horizons from 10
days to 260 days as the building blocks, with the adaptive TSMOM strat-
egy trading the net position. We can look at these 251 portfolios as
separate variables, jointly describing trend-following performance. In an
attempt to better understand CTAs' returns, we try to decompose the
proposed strategy's returns into its constituent (significant) factors. The
question we wish to evaluate here is whether a single factor, which we
call the adaptive TSMOM strategy and which is a simple average of the
TSMOM strategy portfolios, is enough to fully describe time series mo-
mentum strategies in general. The evidence in Greyserman and Kaminski
(2014) suggests that there may be other factors beyond ATSMOM driving
CTA returns.
One way to address this empirical question is to employ a principal
component analysis (PCA) to the constituting TSMOM portfolios. To
analyze the statistical significance of the different principal components
in time series momentum's returns, we draw 10,000 bootstrapped samples
(see Peres-Neto, Jackson, and Somers, 2003) to calculate p-values for the
estimated eigenvalues. The eigenvalues are compared to both the broken-
stick and Marcenko and Pastur distribution (see e.g., Süss, 2012).
We find that, at the 90% confidence level, both distributions indi-
cate that the first three principal components, corresponding to the three
largest eigenvalues, are significant. At the 95% level of significance, the
Marcenko-Pastur critical values still point towards three significant com-
ponents. The broken-stick model, however, suggests that only the first two
PCs are significant. Regressing the CTA manager-based indices against
the first three PCs, we find that only the first two are significant.
In Figure 4, we plot the loadings of the first two principal components
of the 251 horizon portfolios and the corresponding 95% bootstrapped
confidence bands applying the bootstrap procedure suggested by Peres-
Neto, Jackson, and Somers (2003). The first principal component (PC1)
is similar to an equal-weighted portfolio of horizon portfolios, which is
consistent with the definition of the adaptive TSMOM strategy. Indeed,
the first PC shows a correlation of 0.99 with the strategy's net returns.14
14
ATSMOM, by design, assigns an equal weight to each TSMOM strategy with a
lookback window between 10 and 260 days. This implies that there is a significant
amount of overlap in the lookback windows. For example, the 10-day window is also
part of the 11-day, the 12-day, up to the 260-day window (though it becomes increas-
ingly less important in determining the trend). To generalise, any N-day window is
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[Figure 4 about here.]
The second principal component (PC2), however, does not load uni-
formly on the different constituent portfolios. Instead, Figure 4 indicates
that PC 2 is equivalent to a strategy that buys shorter horizon (strategies
that react fast to changes in trends) and sells longer horizon momentum
strategies (strategies that react slowly to changes in trends). It can there-
fore be interpreted as a speed factor, referring to the trading speed of the
TSMOM strategies. The factor is close to the opposite of the speed factor
in Greyserman and Kaminski (2014), which buys longer (slower) and sells
shorter-horizon (faster) momentum strategies. Nevertheless, without loss
of generality, we take the negative of PC 2 to get a speed factor similar
in Greyserman and Kaminski (2014). Principal components are indiffer-
ent to scaling since they are extracted in a way to show zero pairwise
correlation.
We know that longer-term momentum strategies outperform their shorter-
term counterparts. At the same time, however, longer-term strategies also
generate lower skewness (see Table 5.4). The positive average return of
the speed factor may thus be a compensation for the lower skewness of
longer-term strategies. In that sense, the speed factor can be interpreted
as a risk factor. The reasoning that the lower skewness is compensated
by the speed factor is related to the arguments provided by Greyserman
and Kaminski (2014). They argue that the speed factor is a reward for
higher loss tolerance of longer-term momentum strategies.
In Figure 5 we plot the Sharpe ratio for a portfolio that combines
ATSMOM with the speed factor, net of transaction costs, as a function of
the weight of the speed factor. If the speed factor is scaled to the volatility
of the adaptive TSMOM strategy then, through diversification and lower
trading costs, the factor contributes positively to the overall performance
if its weight is capped at 20% (see Figure 5). Diversification follows from
the fact that, by construction, the speed factor has a correlation of zero
with the adaptive TSMOM strategy (although the sample correlation may
deviate from zero). Thus, calculating the net returns of the speed factor,
we assume that it has a (risk) weight equal to 20% of the overall adaptive
strategy.
part of all longer-term windows. For this reason, the short-term windows are generally
more "over-weight" in the overall strategy. This becomes obvious in Figure 4, where
PC1 and PC2 load collectively more in the shorter-term signals. These dynamics may
explain the large significance of the first two eigenvalues. We thank an anonymous
referee for this valuable insight.
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[Figure 5 about here.]
We note that, although the ATSMOM strategy is a tradable momen-
tum trading program, PC2 is not yet a tradable factor. This is because
PC2 is not net of transaction costs and its composition relies on load-
ings that are estimated in-sample. Without accounting for real trading
conditions, the performance measurement vis-à-vis this factor may be mis-
leading. Therefore, we construct a tradable factor which we henceforth
refer to as the speed factor. The weights of the horizon portfolios in the
speed factor at any point in time are proportional to the loadings esti-
mated over the entire past history up to the penultimate day, to avoid a
look-ahead bias. The initial training period is one year.
It is unlikely that a CTA will trade a strategy similar to the speed
factor on a stand-alone basis or separately from a more general TSMOM
strategy. It may instead be the case that the speed factor is used as an
overlay to complement a more general trend-following strategy, and that
only the net positions are traded. From this perspective, only the addi-
tional trading costs related to the speed factor need to deducted. In what
follows, we discuss the speed factor's performance from this perspective.
To further analyze the newly introduced speed factor, we regress the
factor against existing risk factors in Table 5.8.
[Table 8 about here.]
As expected, we find that the speed factor is unrelated to the adaptive
TSMOM strategy. At the same time, however, it appears to be related to
BK's factors, the PFTS factors, the Carhart cross-sectional momentum
factor, and the Stambaugh-Pastor liquidity factor. The positive associa-
tion with the liquidity factor may be surprising at first sight, especially in
light of the earlier finding that the adaptive TSMOM strategy is unrelated
to liquidity risk. The speed factor, however, invests in longer-term (slower-
to-react) momentum and sells shorter-term (faster-to-react) momentum
strategies and can thus be expected to be more exposed to liquidity risk
as longer-term systems accommodate slower to a situation when liquid-
ity dries up. On account that the speed factor is an auxiliary factor, we
calculate descriptive statistics for the speed factor's and the combined
portfolio's returns net of transaction costs in Table 5.9.
[Table 9 about here.]
The speed factor itself underperforms the adaptive TSMOM strategy.
Because of its complementary nature, however, stand-alone performance
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is not that meaningful. We therefore focus on the statistics with regard
to the portfolio that allocates 80% to the adaptive TSMOM strategy and
20% to the speed factor. Combining the speed factor with the baseline
ATSMOM strategy, we find some improvement for a number of key per-
formance measures compared to the standard adaptive TSMOM strategy.
We can conclude that the speed factor adds some value from a portfolio
management point of view.
5.5.5 The Speed Factor, Asset Class-based Factors
and CTA Performance
With the introduction of the speed factor, we repeat the previous analy-
sis where we regress the various manager-based indices against the newly
introduced factors. We also extend the analysis by considering asset-class
specific factors for commodity, equity index, fixed income, and foreign ex-
change futures. The asset class-based factors are scaled to 10% volatility.
The results can be found in Table 5.10.
[Table 10 about here.]
As we have already discussed in the previous section, the ATSMOM
strategy is able to explain a substantial part of the variation in Managed
Futures funds' returns (Table 5.10, Panel A) indicating no abnormal re-
turns among the CTA indices. This suggests that the ATSMOM strategy
captures CTAs' trading behavior fairly accurately.
Extending the model with the speed factor increases the fit of most of
the regressions, with the exception of the SG indices (Table 5.10, Panel
B). The intercepts of the regressions have also increased, but remain sta-
tistically insignificant in all but one case. The ERW index generates a
significant alpha of 1.69% p.a.
In Panel C of Table 5.10, we report the results for the asset class-
based adaptive TSMOM strategies. Applying asset class-based adap-
tive TSMOM benchmarks has two apparent advantages over a diversified
adaptive TSMOM strategy. First, the asset class-based benchmarks im-
prove the explanatory power five percentage points on average. Second,
asset class benchmarks allow for a style analysis. Since we have scaled
the asset class-based factors to 10% volatility p.a., we can compare the
loadings directly. Looking at Table 5.10, Panel C and Panel D, we find
that CTAs allocate most to fixed income futures and least to FX and
commodity futures. However, the weight of each asset class tends to de-
pend on fund size; large capitalization indices, most of all, the BTOP50
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and the AUM-weighted Barclay systematic TF invest more in more liquid
markets, i.e., fixed income and less in commodities. Small capitalization
managers, gauged by the Barclay CTA and equal risk-weighted Barclay
systematic TF indices, invest more evenly across asset classes.
Employing the asset-class based ATSMOM factors and the speed fac-
tor, we turn to individual CTAs. In particular, we apply the model to all
the individual funds included in the BarclayHedge sample that have at
least a one-year track record after inclusion in the database (see Section
5.3). We note that dropping funds that stop reporting before turning two
years (one-year of track record in the database in addition to the earlier
correction for backfill bias) induces some survivorship bias. Table 5.11 re-
ports the mean and median of the parameter estimates for 335 funds that
have produced jointly significant betas at the 10% level of significance.
[Table 11 about here.]
On average, our model is able to explain 40% of the variation in in-
dividual CTAs' returns. The average (median) alpha is positive at 0.29%
(0.82%) p.a., with 16% of the fund alphas significantly positive and 6%
significantly negative. For the funds for which we obtain a significant al-
pha, we observe considerable variation. Funds with significantly positive
alphas generate mean (median) alphas of 4.77% (3.91%) p.a. Funds with
significantly negative alphas underperform the adaptive TSMOM strate-
gies by an average (median) of 9.55% (6.56%) p.a.
Interestingly, the Fixed Income adaptive TSMOM factor is significant
in 70% of the funds. Thus, CTAs tend to be exposed to fixed income most
frequently and this result corroborates with the fact that manager-based
indices load most heavily on the Fixed Income factor. The commodity
sector is the second most important one, being significant in 64% of the
cases. The equity factor is significant in 53%, whereas the FX factor is
significant for 48% of the funds. The speed factor is also an important
driver of CTA returns being significant in half of the regressions.
Having obtained the alphas versus our proposed factors for the indi-
vidual CTAs, we continue to investigate the role of fund characteristics
in generating alpha. For this particular analysis, we regress the alpha for
each fund for every year on yearly fund characteristics that include lagged
alpha, fund size, fund age, a standard measure of fund flow, R² and the
relative factor exposures of the performance regressions, the level of man-
agement and incentive fees, margin-to-equity (ME) ratio, and round turns
per million dollars per year.
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The alphas are estimated and therefore subject to measurement error.
If we do not correct for this, the measurement error will generate het-
eroscedasticity in the panel regression residuals and it may cause standard
significance tests to be invalid. To correct for potential heteroscedastic-
ity, we weight each observation by the reciprocal of the standard errors
of the performance regressions, as in Dahlquist, Engström, and Söderlind
(2000).
Table 5.12 reports the results controlling for time-fixed effects. In
column (1) we omit the margin-to-equity (ME) ratio and round turns per
million USD per year statistics, as they are only available for a subset of
CTAs. We run a specification that includes the ME ratio and round turns
per million in column (2) and (3) of Table 5.12 , respectively.
[Table 12 about here.]
The results in Table 5.12 suggest strong momentum in Managed Fu-
tures funds' performance. CTAs that outperformed our benchmark port-
folios in the previous year tend to repeat that superior performance the
following year. Fund size appears to negatively affect risk-adjusted perfor-
mance. Somewhat surprising though, aging is positively related to better
alphas. However, for instance, the expected risk-adjusted performance of
a five year old CTA that has 1 billion USD under management is, ceteris
paribus, 1.7% p.a. less than that of a CTA that manages only 10 million
USD but it is only two years old indicating that interpreting one of the
variables alone can be misleading.
Contemporaneous fund flows do not affect risk-adjusted performance.
This suggests that capacity constraints are less an issue for CTAs. Adding
the R²s of the performance regressions, we test and reject the hypothesis
in Sun, Wang, and Zheng (2012) that hedge funds whose returns are less
explainable by risk factors bear more managerial skills. In contrast, funds
that engage in pure trend-following approaches tend to generate higher
risk-adjusted performance. Thus, alpha does not appear to derive from
being less mainstream, but from other sources. This may include superior
risk management, better trade execution, and lower explicit transaction
costs.
The factor weights are simply calculated from absolute loadings in the
individual performance regressions. All else equal, we find that higher
equity momentum exposure is likely to result in higher risk-adjusted per-
formance. In contrast, funds with higher allocations to Fixed Income TF
strategies tend to generate lower alpha. Interestingly, CTAs that have
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higher exposure to the speed factor significantly outperform those who
have less exposure. The speed factor exposure is likely to be a proxy for
the level of sophistication of the manager, since our results suggest that
there is some benefit from allocating to the speed factor in terms of di-
versification and lower transaction costs. All in all, asset exposure, i.e.,
style is partly accountable for superior risk-adjusted performance.
Higher margin usage over capital invested (ME ratio) appears to be
a sign of better performance, most probably through economies of scale.
This result suggests that higher risk-taking does not, per se, imply inferior
risk management and thus poorer performance. Finally, more trading in
terms of rounds per million USD per year does not affect risk-adjusted
performance.
Only a small part of the cross-sectional variation in estimated alphas
is attributable to fund characteristics such as past performance, fund age,
fund size, fees, and style. We conclude that the alphas obtained vis-à-
vis our new risk factors can, to some extent, be interpreted as capturing
managerial skill.
5.6 Conclusion
In this paper we propose a time series momentum strategy that changes
the exposure to futures markets more dynamically by aggregating time se-
ries momentum signals over a wide range of horizons. This way, the model
increases the allocation to the markets where trends are more well-behaved
and decreases exposure to the markets where trends are reversing. We
find that our approach better explains Managed Futures funds' reported
returns. As such, our approach can aid practitioners in benchmarking
and manager selection. We also find that a subset of funds continues to
exhibit positive alpha vis-à-vis our new risk factors. Moreover, the ab-
normal returns of these funds can only be partly explained by observable
fund characteristics and thus appear indicative of skill.
Importantly, we document strong momentum in CTA risk-adjusted
performance, as stellar performance in one year tends to repeat in the
subsequent year, and find evidence that fund size is negatively, whereas
fund age is positively related to risk-adjusted performance. Fund style,
i.e., asset class exposure and the applied trading strategy, also contributes
to CTA alphas. Contemporaneous fund flows, in contrast, do not affect
risk-adjusted performance, suggesting capacity constraints are less an is-
sue for CTAs. Higher management and performance fees do not signal
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prospect for better performance.
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Table 5.1: Example Aggregating Trend-following Signals
Security A Security B rt,A rt,B
t− 3 90 90
t− 2 130 83 44.44% -8.28%
t− 1 140 120 7.69% 45.37%
t 125 125 -10.71% 4.17%
Signal Signal σA σB
Sign(t− 1, t) -1 1 28.08% 28.08%
Sign(t− 2, t) -1 1
Sign(t− 3, t) 1 1
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Table 5.2: Summary Statistics Futures
Start End Cur µ(%) σ(%) Skew. Kurt. MDD (%) SR
Mexican Peso 04-95 09-15 USD 4.82 10.52 -0.97 6.73 -31.20 0.45
Swiss Franc 01-90 09-15 USD 1.11 11.24 0.10 3.92 -49.41 0.10
British Pound 01-90 09-15 USD 1.49 9.19 -0.60 5.41 -29.41 0.16
Canadian Dollar 01-90 09-15 USD 0.40 7.87 -0.34 6.28 -28.21 0.05
Japanese Yen 01-90 09-15 USD -1.01 10.89 0.60 6.03 -61.65 -0.09
Australian Dollar 01-90 09-15 USD 2.57 11.52 -0.33 4.75 -41.30 0.22
US Dollar Index 01-90 09-15 USD -0.71 8.53 0.36 3.78 -44.33 -0.08
Euro FX 05-98 09-15 USD 0.27 10.37 -0.03 3.82 -32.35 0.03
SA Rand 05-97 09-15 USD 1.82 16.42 -0.18 3.73 -46.89 0.11
Brazilian Real 11-95 09-15 USD 4.44 18.42 -1.47 13.38 -53.45 0.24
USD/SEK 05-00 09-15 SEK 0.06 11.85 0.17 3.42 -45.53 0.01
USD/NOK 05-00 09-15 NOK -0.86 11.78 0.49 4.30 -50.80 -0.07
NZ Dollar 05-97 09-15 USD 3.12 13.36 -0.16 4.30 -41.34 0.23
AUD/NZD 05-99 09-15 NZD -0.74 7.74 0.02 2.79 -28.88 -0.10
AUD/Japan Yen 05-02 09-15 JPY 7.35 15.11 -0.88 6.24 -42.61 0.47
Euro FX/ Yen 01-99 09-15 JPY 2.88 12.49 -0.55 5.12 -40.58 0.23
EUR/Nok 09-11 09-15 NOK 3.55 6.80 0.11 2.46 -8.55 0.52
EUR/SEK 06-11 09-15 SEK -0.31 4.68 -0.81 4.05 -11.34 -0.07
EUR/GBP 01-99 09-15 GBP -0.34 8.16 1.63 12.32 -27.73 -0.04
EUR/CHF 01-99 09-15 CHF -0.88 6.58 -2.60 19.03 -34.66 -0.14
CAC-40 Index 01-90 09-15 EUR 4.59 19.29 -0.34 3.20 -62.89 0.23
Nikkei 225 09-90 09-15 USD 0.42 21.60 -0.11 3.37 -77.47 0.02
Russell 2000 02-93 09-15 USD 7.88 19.12 -0.49 4.19 -53.95 0.40
S&P Midcap 400 02-92 09-15 USD 9.40 16.61 -0.66 5.30 -52.79 0.54
Hang Seng 01-90 09-15 HKD 12.24 26.13 0.25 5.34 -58.90 0.44
DAX 11-90 09-15 EUR 7.12 20.74 -0.51 4.88 -71.72 0.33
S&P 500 01-90 09-15 USD 6.67 14.57 -0.62 4.26 -58.65 0.45
Topix Index 04-90 09-15 JPY 0.21 19.93 -0.17 4.07 -73.13 0.01
FTSE 100 Index 01-90 09-15 GBP 3.44 14.52 -0.40 3.45 -52.82 0.23
Swiss Market 11-90 09-15 CHF 9.15 15.80 -0.59 4.44 -52.65 0.56
Ibex 35 Index 04-92 09-15 EUR 7.87 21.77 -0.22 3.62 -59.23 0.35
MIB 30 Stock 11-94 09-15 EUR 4.61 22.50 0.15 3.66 -68.88 0.20
Nasdaq 100 04-96 09-15 USD 11.18 26.73 -0.27 4.09 -83.03 0.40
MSCI Taiwan 01-97 09-15 USD 5.54 26.56 0.13 3.85 -64.71 0.20
DJ Industrial Avg 10-97 09-15 USD 5.01 14.88 -0.63 4.31 -49.75 0.33
KOSPI 200 Index 01-98 09-15 KRW 10.43 28.99 0.43 4.07 -58.55 0.34
DoJStoxx 50 06-98 09-15 EUR 1.45 16.66 -0.52 3.82 -66.68 0.09
DJ Euro Stoxx 06-98 09-15 EUR 2.40 19.68 -0.43 3.80 -64.00 0.12
S&P Canada 60 09-99 09-15 CAD 5.24 14.93 -0.71 4.66 -51.85 0.34
CBOE VIX 03-04 09-15 USD -30.93 62.44 1.95 9.15 -99.89 -0.59
OMX 10-92 09-15 SEK 11.87 21.71 0.04 4.72 -72.40 0.52
US MSCI EAFE 09-10 09-15 USD 4.81 15.64 -0.36 3.16 -24.49 0.30
Amsterdam EOE 10-92 09-15 EUR 7.70 19.62 -0.74 4.81 -68.87 0.38
NYSE Comp 01-90 09-11 USD 5.04 14.70 -0.81 5.11 -57.40 0.34
All Ordinary SPI 01-90 09-01 AUD 2.93 14.26 -0.31 2.83 -28.56 0.20
SPI 200 05-00 09-15 AUD 3.72 13.25 -0.75 3.66 -51.85 0.28
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Table 5.2: Summary Statistics Futures (Cont.)
Start End Cur µ(%) σ(%) Skew. Kurt. MDD (%) SR
Treasury Bonds 01-90 09-15 USD 5.46 9.31 0.10 5.16 -15.83 0.57
Canada 10Y Gov 01-90 09-15 CAD 4.31 6.00 -0.03 3.30 -14.80 0.71
3M-Eurodollar 01-90 09-15 USD 0.19 0.22 0.68 5.77 -0.68 0.87
10-YR Treasury 01-90 09-15 USD 4.47 5.94 0.13 4.73 -11.69 0.74
Japan 10Y Gov 04-90 09-15 JPY 3.76 4.18 -0.58 7.04 -9.59 0.89
Long Gilt 01-90 09-15 GBP 3.64 6.81 0.00 3.44 -15.65 0.53
US 2-YR Treasury 06-90 09-15 USD 1.60 1.64 0.26 3.56 -3.82 0.97
US 10 YR Bonds 01-90 09-15 AUD 4.64 7.87 -0.01 3.26 -23.59 0.58
US 90-Day Bill 01-90 09-15 AUD 0.13 0.25 0.43 6.61 -0.61 0.52
US 3 Year Bonds 01-90 09-15 AUD 2.19 3.41 -0.01 5.05 -8.75 0.64
US 5-YR Treasury 01-90 09-15 USD 3.23 4.02 0.10 3.91 -8.52 0.79
Muni Note Index 01-90 03-06 USD 5.23 6.79 -0.52 3.92 -16.66 0.76
Euro Buxl 10-98 09-15 EUR 6.19 10.73 0.76 5.05 -17.15 0.56
German Bund 10-98 09-15 EUR 4.06 5.27 0.11 2.85 -9.93 0.76
German Bobl 10-98 09-15 EUR 2.60 3.17 -0.02 2.75 -7.42 0.81
German Schatz 10-98 09-15 EUR 0.90 1.31 0.16 4.00 -4.01 0.69
3Y Korean Bond 09-99 09-15 KRW 2.72 3.11 0.39 5.30 -4.86 0.86
PIBOR 01-90 06-99 EUR -0.01 0.35 -1.47 10.81 -1.56 -0.02
3M Euribor 09-98 09-15 EUR 0.08 0.15 2.38 21.61 -0.52 0.53
Gas Oil 01-90 09-15 USD 11.13 32.05 0.48 5.15 -73.39 0.33
Nat Gas 04-90 09-15 USD -11.63 48.05 0.57 4.63 -99.81 -0.26
Brent Crude 01-90 09-15 USD 12.10 33.39 0.60 6.76 -75.63 0.34
Heating Oil 06-06 09-15 USD -4.13 28.23 -0.19 3.94 -70.00 -0.15
Light Crude 01-90 09-15 USD 5.94 33.65 0.44 5.26 -87.15 0.17
Unleaded Gas 01-90 12-06 USD 18.05 36.80 0.84 5.93 -63.18 0.46
Rbob Electronic 10-05 09-15 USD 4.73 33.08 -0.56 5.60 -70.44 0.14
Copper 01-90 09-15 USD 8.19 25.72 -0.03 5.71 -63.90 0.31
Platinum 01-90 09-15 USD 4.40 20.23 -0.55 6.52 -62.28 0.21
Silver 01-90 09-15 USD 4.44 28.45 0.12 3.87 -71.55 0.15
Gold 01-90 09-15 USD 2.05 15.77 0.18 4.25 -61.55 0.13
Palladium 01-90 09-15 USD 10.94 32.68 0.47 6.68 -86.15 0.32
Live Cattle 01-90 09-15 USD 0.43 13.15 -0.69 5.81 -45.11 0.03
Live Hogs 01-90 09-15 USD -5.02 24.49 -0.08 3.63 -94.06 -0.21
Pork Bellies 01-90 07-11 USD 6.58 38.09 0.84 4.61 -80.00 0.17
Feeder Cattle 01-90 09-15 USD 3.16 13.59 -0.47 5.24 -38.61 0.23
Corn 01-90 09-15 USD -2.08 26.16 0.32 3.96 -84.50 -0.08
Oat 01-90 09-15 USD -0.09 29.49 0.65 4.66 -88.85 0.00
Soybeans 01-90 09-15 USD 5.67 23.49 -0.01 3.68 -50.50 0.24
Soybean Meal 01-90 09-15 USD 12.46 25.81 0.46 4.24 -43.72 0.46
Soybean Oil 01-90 09-15 USD -0.48 24.34 0.13 4.64 -72.25 -0.02
Wheat W 01-90 09-15 USD -4.88 27.69 0.46 4.81 -94.44 -0.18
Wheat 01-90 09-15 USD 0.03 27.21 0.51 4.65 -82.15 0.00
Cocoa 01-90 09-15 USD 0.34 29.02 0.49 4.17 -90.23 0.01
Cotton No. 2 01-90 09-15 USD -1.83 26.19 0.26 3.87 -93.14 -0.07
Coffee 01-90 09-15 USD -1.28 37.88 1.21 6.19 -94.21 -0.03
Orange Juice 01-90 09-15 USD -3.98 30.04 0.48 4.35 -91.99 -0.14
Sugar No. 11 01-90 09-15 USD 2.59 30.71 0.26 3.59 -72.49 0.08
Lumber 01-90 09-15 USD -6.22 31.10 0.45 4.16 -97.52 -0.21
Nickel 01-90 09-15 USD 7.79 33.17 0.24 3.52 -79.39 0.23
Aluminum 10-92 09-15 USD 3.55 18.46 -0.34 7.23 -60.47 0.19
Lead 01-90 09-15 USD 7.23 26.52 -0.01 4.34 -72.70 0.26
Zinc 01-90 09-15 USD 4.21 24.56 -0.03 4.84 -74.94 0.17
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Table 5.6: Adaptive TSMOM strategy against existing risk factors
Panel A: Gross of Transaction Costs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
MKT -0.1344* -0.0605 -0.0565 -0.0691
(0.070) (0.069) (0.066) (0.063)
SMB 0.0218 -0.0083 -0.0045 0.0589
(0.054) (0.055) (0.055) (0.048)
HML -0.0228 0.0473 0.0350
(0.070) (0.067) (0.070)
MOM 0.1943*** 0.1964***
(0.042) (0.043)
Liquidity factor -0.0865
(0.056)
PTFSBD 0.0092 0.0010
(0.015) (0.014)
PTFSFX 0.0334** 0.0288**
(0.014) (0.013)
PTFSCOM 0.0455*** 0.0441***
(0.015) (0.015)
PTFSIR 0.0007 0.0008
(0.012) (0.012)
PTFSSTK 0.0427** 0.0408**
(0.018) (0.018)
EM 0.0495
(0.043)
Bond Factor -0.0157
(0.012)
Credit Spread 1.2142
(1.460)
Global VAL 0.3489**
(0.137)
Global MOM 0.8587***
(0.123)
Constant 0.0104*** 0.0089*** 0.0094*** 0.0121*** 0.0118*** 0.0060***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
R-squared 0.033 0.118 0.129 0.195 0.237 0.239
Panel B: Net of Transaction Costs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.0091*** 0.0076*** 0.0081*** 0.0108*** 0.0105*** 0.0047***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
R-squared 0.032 0.114 0.125 0.193 0.236 0.236
Adaptive TSMOM strategy's returns are regressed against existing risk factors. Panel A reports the
results for strategy gross of transaction costs. Panel B reports the alpha for the same regressions
using the net-of-transaction costs strategy returns. The risk factors for the Fama and French (1993)
and Carhart (1997) models have been downloaded from Kenneth French's website. The Pástor
and Stambaugh (2003) traded liquidity factor has been obtained from Lubos Pastor's website. The
Fung and Hsieh (2001) factors have been taken from David A. Hsieh's Hedge Fund Data Library.
The Global value and Global Momentum Factor have been taken from AQR's website. *, **,
and *** denote significance at the 90, 95, and 99% level, respectively. Robust standard errors in
parentheses.
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Table 5.8: Speed Factor Regressions Against Existing Risk Factors.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
MKT 0.0370
(0.068)
EM -0.0328
(0.052)
SMB 0.0654
(0.062)
PTFSBD -0.0581*** -0.0520***
(0.013) (0.012)
PTFSFX -0.0135 -0.0111
(0.013) (0.013)
PTFSCOM -0.0295** -0.0277**
(0.013) (0.013)
PTFSIR -0.0170*** -0.0165***
(0.006) (0.006)
PTFSSTK -0.0557*** -0.0505***
(0.015) (0.015)
BOND -0.0145
(0.009)
CREDIT 0.5737
(1.010)
BKM 0.5603***
(0.048)
BKW -0.5779***
(0.052)
BKD -0.1927***
(0.056)
LIQ 0.1715***
(0.058)
ATSMOM -0.0310
(0.092)
MOP 0.3122***
(0.083)
GVAL 0.2889*
(0.164)
GMOM 0.6829***
(0.168)
Constant 0.0021 -0.0020 0.0018 -0.0020 -0.0012 0.0004 -0.0012
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 215 215 215 215 215 215 215
R-squared 0.001 0.122 0.637 0.296 0.268 0.050 0.173
The tradeable speed factor returns, net of transaction costs, are regressed against existing risk
factors. The adaptive TSMOM returns are net of transaction costs. The risk factors for the
Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) models have been downloaded from Kenneth French's
website. The Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) traded liquidity factor from January 1994 to December
2014 has been obtained from Lubos Pastor's website. The Fung and Hsieh (2001) factors have been
taken from David A. Hsieh's Hedge Fund Data Library. *, **, and *** asterisks denote significance
at 90, 95, and 99% level, respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 5.9: Summary Statistics for the Speed Factor
ATSMOM (Net of
TCs)
Speed Factor (Net
of TCs)
Portfolio 80/20 (net
of TCs)
Min (%) -5.91 -13.92 -6.17
Max (%) 15.22 8.89 13.17
Ann. Mean (%) 9.62 3.32 10.10
Ann. Median (%) 7.73 7.83 11.58
Ann. St. Dev. (%) 10.00 10.00 10.00
Skewness 0.71 -0.97 0.37
Kurtosis 5.61 5.74 4.21
Sharpe 0.96 0.33 1.01
Sortino 1.93 0.39 1.99
Max DD (%) -14.13 -34.27 -13.08
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Table 5.10: Asset pricing regressions on manager-based indices
Barclay BTOP 50 SG CTA SG Trend BH Syst
Trend
(AUM)
BH Syst
Trend
(ERW)
Panel A
ATSMOM 0.4638*** 0.6541*** 0.6878*** 0.6842*** 0.8258*** 0.4398***
(0.041) (0.051) (0.065) (0.072) (0.074) (0.032)
Constant 0.0001 -0.0024** -0.0018 -0.0021* 0.0002 0.0011
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
R-squared 0.483 0.503 0.611 0.605 0.565 0.617
Panel B
ATSMOM 0.4518*** 0.6332*** 0.6881*** 0.6840*** 0.8200*** 0.4361***
(0.047) (0.053) (0.064) (0.071) (0.080) (0.036)
Speed Factor -0.1473*** -0.1219*** 0.0056 -0.0031 -0.1873*** -0.1168***
(0.037) (0.044) (0.052) (0.049) (0.062) (0.027)
Constant 0.0007 -0.0018 -0.0019 -0.0021* 0.0008 0.0014**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
R-squared 0.528 0.530 0.611 0.605 0.594 0.660
Panel C
ATSMOMCOM 0.5718*** 0.5444*** 0.6454*** 0.6478*** 0.6947*** 0.5088***
(0.105) (0.111) (0.142) (0.143) (0.147) (0.069
ATSMOMEQ 0.2316*** 0.3742*** 0.4771*** 0.5908*** 0.6726*** 0.2872***
(0.066) (0.081) (0.093) (0.090) (0.093) (0.045)
ATSMOMFI 0.6985*** 1.1444*** 1.2303*** 1.2746*** 1.5401*** 0.7005***
(0.088) (0.125) (0.152) (0.154) (0.149) (0.070)
ATSMOMFX 0.4982** 0.7636** 0.6464** 0.4397 0.6398* 0.3963**
(0.214) (0.307) (0.297) (0.273) (0.349) (0.173)
Constant -0.0001 -0.0027** -0.0021** -0.0023** -0.0000 0.0009
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
R-squared 0.529 0.571 0.676 0.667 0.632 0.662
Panel D
ATSMOMCOM 0.5617*** 0.5490*** 0.6454*** 0.6479*** 0.6837*** 0.5016***
(0.109) (0.113) (0.142) (0.144) (0.151) (0.072)
ATSMOMEQ 0.2544*** 0.3936*** 0.4770*** 0.5898*** 0.6848*** 0.2952***
(0.068) (0.081) (0.091) (0.089) (0.095) (0.047)
ATSMOMFI 0.6630*** 1.1086*** 1.2303*** 1.2743*** 1.4943*** 0.6705***
(0.090) (0.126) (0.152) (0.154) (0.140) (0.064)
ATSMOMFX 0.4739** 0.7027** 0.6464** 0.4394 0.6500* 0.4030**
(0.215) (0.292) (0.298) (0.274) (0.360) (0.179)
Speed Factor -0.1370*** -0.1154*** -0.0008 -0.0074 -0.1617*** -0.1062***
(0.036) (0.038) (0.046) (0.045) (0.056) (0.025)
Constant 0.0005 -0.0021** -0.0021* -0.0023** 0.0005 0.0012**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
R-squared 0.564 0.591 0.676 0.667 0.653 0.697
This table shows the results of the asset pricing regressions against net returns (net of transaction
costs) of the adaptive TSMOM strategy, the adaptive TSMOM strategy and speed factor, the asset
class based adaptive TSMOM strategies, and the asset class based adaptive TSMOM strategy and
speed factor in Panel A, B, C, and D, respectively. The asset class-based factors are adjusted to 10%
annualized volatility. The dependent variables of the regressions are returns of various manager-
based indices which are net of transaction costs. *, **, and *** asterisks denote significance at 90,
95, and 99% level, respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 5.12: Panel regressions on alphas
(1) (2) (3)
Alpha (t-1) 0.17*** 0.20*** 0.21***
Log (FuM) -0.07** -0.12*** -0.15***
Age 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.09***
Fund Flow 0.00 0.00 0.00
R² Perfor. Regr. 3.53*** 3.50*** 4.26***
Com. Exp. -1.10 -0.31 -0.17
Eq. Exp. 3.21*** 3.11*** 2.68***
FI Exp. -1.47** -1.46** -1.31*
FX Exp. -1.11 -1.07 -0.15
Speed Exp. 3.57*** 3.69*** 3.47***
Mgmt. Fee -0.25 -0.34* -0.29
Incent. Fee -0.09*** -0.12*** -0.16***
ME Ratio 0.11*** 0.13***
Round Turns / MUSD 0.00
No. of Obs. 2254 2007 1615
Adj. R² 0.30 0.33 0.37
This table shows the cross-sectional analysis of the estimated alphas for
335 individual CTAs. The round turns per million USD per year and
the margin-to-equity (ME ratio) statistics are not available for each CTA,
therefore, in column (2) and (3) we repeat the regressions for the subset
of funds for which data are available. The reported coefficients rely on
a weighted least squares (WLS) panel regression that accounts for CTA
period specific fixed effects. The dependent variable which is the alpha
estimates from the performance regressions (see Table 5.11) is subjected
to measurement errors proportional to the standard errors of the perfor-
mance regressions. Therefore, in the estimation the weights are estimated
standard errors of the performance regressions. The standard errors are
clustered on both the specific manager and period. *, **, and *** as-
terisks denote significance at 90, 95, and 99% level, respectively. Robust
standard errors in parentheses.
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Figure 1: 3-Year Rolling Sharpe Ratio Of Rival Objective Benchmarks
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Figure 2: 3-Year Rolling Sharpe Ratios Of Manager Indices And The
Benchmarks
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Figure 3: 60-Month Rolling Window Regression BarclayHedge (ERW)
vs.CTA Benchmarks
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Figure 4: The Loadings Of The First Two Principal Components Of Hori-
zon Portfolios
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Figure 5: Portfolio performance as a function of speed factor's weight
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